SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: GOOD POLICY POORLY IMPLEMENTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 004217

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR ASEC PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: GOOD POLICY POORLY IMPLEMENTED

REF: A. BANGKOK 04168 (LEADING ACADEMIC EXPERT SEES SOME

IMPROVEMENT)

B. BANGKOK 04201 (SIGNS OF SOUTHERN HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPROVEMENTS)

C. BANGKOK 03813 (SECURITY FORCES MOVING FORWARD AS
SECTARIAN TENSIONS SIMMER)

D. BANGKOK 01675 (THE RISING USE OF PARAMILITARY
AND NON-TRADITIONAL FORCES)

E. BANGKOK 01572 (SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING)

Classified By: Charge' d'Affairs A.I James F. Entwistle. Reason 1.4 (b,
d)


1. (C) Summary. A range of government and NGO contacts in
Pattani and Yala expressed guarded optimism during late July
poloff travel to the South that the recent arrest of
suspected insurgents in that region had led to decreased
violence. Several interlocutors criticized the sweeping
nature of these raids. Two ethnic-Malay Muslims emphasized
the lack of public trust in the government and the climate of
fear inspired by the separatists. While a senior Army
official emphasized the government's efforts to marry a
reconciliatory "hearts and minds" approach with improved
security, two teachers, one an ethnic-Malay Muslim and the
other an ethnic-Thai Buddhist separately castigated the RTG
for failing to effectively implement this policy. End Summary.

RETURN TO THE DEEP SOUTH
--------------


2. (C) Poloffs traveled to the southern provinces of Pattani
and Yala on July 25-26 to discuss the insurgency and related
issues with local contacts. This was our first journey to
these provinces in 2007; compared to the year before, there
was a notable increase in manned checkpoints on major roads.
Both Royal Thai Army (RTA) and police patrols appeared more
visible and frequent in both provinces. Commercial traffic
on major roads appeared unchanged and may have actually
increased. Local markets and cafes seemed to be engaged in
similar levels of business as last year. Downtown Pattani
city appeared relatively unchanged, while the inner portions
of Yala municipality seemed quieter than in previous visits.
(Note: refs (A,B) detail our meeting with noted southern
scholar Dr. Srisomphop Chiphiromsi and update on the human
rights climate in South. End Note).

ARMY SAYS "MORE STABLE"
--------------


3. (C) In a meeting at the RTA's Fourth Army Forward Command
in Pattani, MAJ GEN Chamlong Bunsong said that the situation
in the South is not better or worse, but more "stable."
Chamlong, who serves as the Chief of Staff in the Region Four
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC),emphasized that
the Army remains firmly focused on PM Surayud's
reconciliation policy and the need for a long-term approach
to win the hearts and minds of the people. He admitted that
local officials from all agencies must do a better job at
providing support to the local community, but highlighted
improving basic security as the key challenge facing the
government. According to Chamlong, the recent surge of raids
and arrests (ref A) were the result of better intelligence
information from local sources. These operations were not a
one-time push, but will continue for the foreseeable future.


4. (C) Chamlong said that the Army has a clearer
understanding of who the insurgents are now. He said that
while the insurgency does not fit under the command of a
single separatist group, like the Patani United Liberation
Organization (PULO),he believes that members of the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C) have played a key role
in conducting attacks. Chamlong explained that the label
Runda Kumpalan Kecil (RKK)--often cited in local press
reporting of insurgent arrests--was not a separate insurgent
organization, but rather a label given to separatists
involved in anti-government attacks, who had presumably
received some training in Thailand (as opposed to training in
other countries). Chamlong said that he believes that
approximately 200 villages in the South have 5-6 insurgent
fighters residing there, conducting and coordinating

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separatist operations.


5. (C) According to Chamlong, the goal of the insurgents
remains the reduction of state control in the South, building
popular support for separatism and the eventual intervention
of international Muslim groups on the separatists' side.
Chamlong noted that the RTG has been successful in denying
this international support to the insurgents through regular,
careful outreach to these organizations. He added that the
insurgents remain unable to take and hold any piece of
territory in the South. Chamlong denied any evidence of
direct foreign involvement in the conflict, but noted that
the trends of globalization and expanded access to
information through the internet likely had an impact on the
thinking of ethnic-Malay Muslims.


6. (C) Turning to recent raids that resulted in the arrest of
over 300 suspects (Note: since this meeting several more
raids have netted an additional surge of detainees. End
Note.) Chamlong estimated that approximately 20 percent of
those captured had been involved in direct attacks against
security forces and civilians. The remaining 80 percent were
associated with the separatist movement or had provided some
type of support to the rebels. Chamlong tried to soften the
picture of these arrests, suggesting that all 300 had merely
been "invited" into custody, and admitted that only perhaps
10 percent of those captured would be turned over to the
police and courts for prosecution. The remainder would be
held for interrogation for up to 30 days under the Emergency
Decree. An unspecified percentage of these detainees would
then be "invited" to attend the Army-administered reeducation
program, which includes vocational training. When asked what
happens to detainees after their release, Chamlong said that
local district and village officials "look after them."


7. (C) Chamlong strongly underlined the commitment of the
Army to improve its image in the South and win hearts and
minds. He denied allegations of abuse at any of the Army
detention centers, and emphasized that Thai human rights NGOs
had been allowed access to detainees there. Chamlong said
that international groups such as the Red Cross would not be
granted access, however, because the insurgency remained a
Thai internal manner. (Note: see ref B for more details on
allegations of abuse. End Note).


8. (C) When asked about the role of the irregular Army
Rangers (Tahaan Prahaan, ref D),Chamlong explained that the
military tried to recruit locals to serve in this capacity,
given their knowledge of the area, culture and people.
Ranger units focused on building government support in
specific villages and denying this territory to the
insurgents.

BUT ARRESTS TOO BROAD
--------------


9. (C) Dr. Tayudin Osman, (protect) the Vice Director of the
Center for Muslim and Democratic Development, splits his time
between his home village of Cho Airong and his wife's home in
Si Sakhon, both in Narathiwat province (and both hotbeds of
insurgent support). According to Tayudin, the situation is
"better," with a decline in the number of deaths in recent
weeks. Tayudin said that ambushes on security patrols had
increased this year, as the separatists have switched the
focus of their attacks from economic and civilian targets to
the security forces. He believes that recent raids and
arrests definitely had an impact on insurgent operations, and
said that several operational leaders had been arrested. As
a result of these arrests, the South, in his view, is
"quieter."


10. (C) Tayudin echoed other contacts' concern that recent
security force operations resulting in the arrests of
suspected insurgents were too broad, however. Army and
police units would move into a specific area and block off
all roads and trails into a village for up to three days,
before slowly moving this security cordon into the village
itself. While security forces had specific names of suspects
that they sought to arrest, they also detained any people who
were present but not registered residents of that village.

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Tayudin explained that he often stays at his wife's family's
home in Si Sakhon, where he is not a registered resident,
meaning that he should also be subject to arrest should the
security forces conduct a similar operation in that village.


11. (C) In Tayudin's opinion, a major problem is that "people
don't trust the government." He believes that this can be
reversed, but it will take time. He said that the RTG needs
to build support through economic, social projects and better
communication. Punishing "bad" officials would be a major
step in winning broader public support. When asked about
attitudes towards the judicial system, Tayudin said that
people used to trust the courts, but now, that level of trust
has decreased. The local population has not seen the
prosecution of either insurgents or much more importantly,
corrupt officials. In Tayudin's view, most people don't
support the militants, they fear them. The local population
is scared to talk to strangers or share information with
government. When asked about sectarian tensions, Tayudin
said that before the violence began in 2004, the ethnic-Malay
Muslim and ethnic-Thai Buddhist communities were very close.
As an example, Tayudin explained that, in the past,
ethnic-Malay Muslims and ethnic-Thai Buddhists would invite
each other to family weddings and celebrations. Ethnic-Thai
Buddhists would even make special efforts to provide food
prepared in accordance with Muslim dietary rules. Now,
however, relations are very tense, and Tayudin said that he
could not imagine ethnic-Malay Muslims and ethnic-Thai
Buddhists coming together in such a harmonious manner.

GOOD POLICY, POOR IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


12. (C) Nidir Waba, Head of the Saiburi Islam Wittaya private
Islamic school, adviser to the PM and Chairman of the Pondok
School Association lauded the Surayud government's
reconciliation policy, albeit with one caveat. "The problem
is not government policy, but the administration of that
policy." Nevertheless, Nidir believes that the Surayud
government's approach is a marked improvement from the policy
under ousted-PM Thaksin. "Thaksin was a major problem."
Nidir judged that Buddhist-Muslim relations are "ok," but in
some areas, tensions between the two communities may be
rising. Nidir estimated that 70 percent of ethnic
Malay-Muslims in the three provinces provide some type of
support to the separatists--often out of fear--or are
sympathetic to the idea of separatism. Nidir emphasized that
fear is a key motivation, however. Most ethnic-Malay Muslims
are afraid that if they are seen as supporting the
government, they will be killed. Nidir said that the
government must counter this climate of fear by providing
effective security in a manner that shows appropriate respect
for local identity.

BUDDHIST FRUSTRATION
--------------


13. (C) Prasit Meksuwan, (protect) member of the Yala
Teachers' Association and a former member of the National
Reconciliation Commission--an independent body which in 2006
issued policy recomendations for reducing violence in the
South--was very critical of RTG efforts in the South. In a
surprising echo of Nidir's words, the ethnic-Thai Buddhist
Prasit said that the government "has a good policy, but poor
implementation." According to Prasit, some elements of the
government are improving their tactics, but the disunity on
broader policy implementation remains a serious problem.
"Individual agencies and ministries have their own missions."
More specifically, Prasit alleged that police, military and
civilian officials still fail to "speak with one voice" on
southern policy. Even worse, police and civilian-led
community development and economic efforts remain unfunded,
while the relatively healthy military budget is sometimes
"skimmed off" by senior defense officials. When asked if the
re-establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Peace
Building Command (SBPPBC)--a center designed to unify these
efforts--has led to better coordination and information
sharing, Prasit, who has several friends working in the
Command, said it had not. "It is beyond the SBPPBC
now...they cannot fix the South." Prasit said that the RTG's

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inability to significantly retard the violence in the South
is not driven by the success of the militants, but by the
failure of the state. He added that most people in the South
do not agree with the separatist cause, particularly the use
of violence in attaining it. The difference is, separatists
have easy access to the local people in their villages, and,
while the insurgent policy is "not good" it is effectively
implemented.


14. (C) Prasit lamented the lack of reliable information on
the conflict in the South. He said that the Thai media often
censors bad news from the South. Prasit believes that the
government bureaucracy is even worse in failing to transmit
negative reports to senior leaders in Bangkok. He pointed to
this lack of internal awareness as a major failing in the
Thaksin government. Prasit believes that the Surayud
administration has fallen prey to this dynamic as well.


15. (C) Echoing comments from other contacts (ref A,C),
Prasit said that relations between ethnic-Malay Muslims and
ethnic-Thai Buddhists are not good. Both groups fear each
other, and that fear is turning into anger. Prasit said that
the way of life in the South has changed dramatically.
Frequent school closures due to security problems means that
many children remain home all day. Prasit added that he had
heard truly shocking statistics of the number of Buddhists
who have fled the South (Note: an oft-rumored dynamic that
has eluded our attempts to gather reliable statistics on.
Septel will detail newly available government numbers on this
trend. End Note). According to Prasit, in 2004, the three
southern provinces were home to approximately 320,000
ethnic-Thai Buddhists. As of 2007, Prasit said that number
had fallen to only 90,000. Ethnic-Malay Muslims had fled as
well, especially those with children. (Note: these numbers
are far more dramatic than any others we have come across and
need to be confirmed. End Note).


16. (C) Prasit does see some positive dynamics at work in the
South. In his view, local cooperation with security
officials is improving, leading to better intelligence and
arrests. Many people in the ethnic-Malay Muslim community
who once voiced skepticism over the existence of the
insurgency now believe that it exists. People also are
starting to believe that the worst violence is not conducted
by government security forces, but by the separatists. This
growing realization, in Prasit's view, is leading more and
more people to "ignore" the militants and their demands for
support.


17. (C) When asked about his experience on the NRC, Prasit
was openly critical of the group's final report. Prasit
agrees with the need to use peaceful needs in winning support
from the broader population, but cited the lack of effective
security operations as a major policy weakness. He said that
NRC head and former PM Annand Panyarachun focused the NRC
report on the poor performance and abuses by state officials
as a major cause of the violence. In Prasit's opinion,
however, the real problem in the South is the separatist
movement and its campaign of violence.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) The broad outlines of the Surayud government's
southern policy appear to be well-regarded among almost all
of our interlocutors. The lack of effective implementation
of this policy and concurrent sustained improvements in
security, however, remain the key hurdles to significant
improvements in the situation on the ground. Army and police
officials are moving to address the security element of this
equation, but it is not yet clear whether their emphasis on
sweeping raids and arrests will result in more than a
temporary lull in the violence. It is not yet clear whether
the government has succeeded in disrupting the separatists'
networks, or merely inspired the militants to lay low for a
short time. Moreover, it is an open question whether the
quieter atmosphere stemming from recent sweeps and arrests
will outweigh the resulting negative impact on ethnic-Malay
Muslim attitudes towards the state.
ENTWISTLE