PRIVY COUNCILOR PREM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000400

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PRIVY COUNCILOR PREM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

REF: A. BANGKOK 329

B. BANGKOK 179

C. BANGKOK 152 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary. Privy Councilor General Prem Tinsulanonda
believes that the Council for National Security (CNS) is
being "too gentlemanly" by not working harder to make a
corruption and malfeasance case against ousted Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra. Prem shares our concern that recent
missteps by the CNS have undermined confidence in the interim
government but discounts rumors that discontented factions in
the military might attempt another intervention into
politics. Prem has urged coup leaders to stop their public
bickering and focus on getting Thailand through the months
ahead. I shared our concerns about martial law and the
timetable to return to elected government. End Summary.

THE CNS MUST REMAIN COHESIVE


2. (C) In the latest of our periodic lunches to discuss
Thai politics, on January 19, Privy Councilor General Prem
Tinsulanonda shared my concern about apparent drift within
the Council for National Security (CNS) and the Surayud
Government. I noted that, while the interim rulers seem to
be adhering to the rough timetable it laid out to put a draft
constitution before voters and elect a new government, they
have not clearly spelled out for the Thai people what
citizens can expect at the end of this process.


3. (C) Prem believes it is important that the men who
conducted the coup remain united and not allow policy
differences to split them apart. He also thinks that CNS and
RTG leaders are being "too gentlemanly" by not going after
Thaksin head on for abuses under his administration and
letting Thaksin manipulate the media to keep the focus on his
personal predicament rather than on the political process in
Thailand. Prem said that he recently reminded CNS head
General Sonthi Boonyarataglin of the tremendous risk involved
in Sonthi's present undertaking by pointing out that the men
who had tried to overthrow the Prem government in a coup in
the 1980's had been either imprisoned or executed for their
failed coup.

DRIFT AND INEPT ECONOMIC AND SECURITY MOVES


4. (C) I told Prem that we thought it a mistake that in the
weeks following September 19 the coup leaders had focused on
trivial issues like the drinking age and the lottery. I also
pointed to the two disastrous economic decisions -- the
short-lived capital control regulations and the proposed
amendments to the Foreign Business Act -- which had created a
perception that the interim government was capricious and
inept in its policy making. I noted that, in the case of the
capital controls, the RTG had quickly acknowledged its error
and tried to mitigate the damage but emphasized that the
proposed changes in the Foreign Business Act, while they aim
to close loopholes abused by Thaksin's Shin Corporation in
the sale of Shin to Singapore's Temasek Corporation, were
having the undesired effect of creating confusion in the
business community, especially the telecommunications sector;
they were reinforcing a perception of government incompetence
and arrogance since the proposed amendments were put forward
without consulting the foreign business community. The
potential impact of these economic missteps in terms of
foreign investment foregone was "incalculable" I said. All
of this policy confusion, I reminded Prem, came to a head
right as the government had immediately fingered Thaksin as
the culprit behind the New Years bombs without providing one
scintilla of evidence.


5. (C) Prem agreed, further noting how Thaksin had taken
advantage of the CNS's accusations to go on international
television to defend himself, thereby slamming the CNS from
his recent perch in Singapore. Prem mused that it might be
easier to control Thaksin if he were to return to Thailand

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and be placed under house arrest, but conceded that absent a
concerted prosecution effort there are no legal grounds to
arrest Thaksin and keep him from continuing his Flying
Dutchman act.

THE CHAVALIT-SAPRANG SPAT


6. (C) Recounting the public feud which recently played out
in the press between former Prime Minister General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh and CNS Assistant Secretary General Saprang
Kallayanamit, Prem told me how he had summoned Chavalit to
ask him to stop the public bickering. During that meeting,
Chavalit told Prem that he was only trying to do what is best
for Thailand. He said that he could not understand why some
members of the CNS seemed opposed to him, claiming they were
all his brother officers and that some were even juniors he
had mentored.


7. (C) I asked Prem whether he really believed Chavalit,
noting Chavalit's penchant for double talk, spreading
conspiracy theories and, his obvious political ambitions, and
asked if Prem had really understood what Chavalit had said.
Prem laughed, saying that his encounter was one of the "rare
occasions where Chavalit was clear and concise."

RECOUP RUMORS AND KOWIT


8. (C) I asked Prem for his take on recent rumors of a
"recoup" under which some members of the CNS purged other
members of the junta and government who were not moving
quickly enough to rid Thailand of Thaksin's influence. Prem
said that he had contacted CNS chair GEN Sonthi about the
rumors and is convinced that the military remains cohesive
and there is little risk of a follow up coup. He did concede
that the police remain a "major problem," noting Sonthi's
public complaint that the police did not respond effectively
to the New Year's bombings. That said, Prem does not agree
that CNS member and Police General Kowit Wattana should be
ousted. Prem believes that firing Kowit could result in his
slot on the CNS being filled by "someone worse." Prem
suggested that Kowit's problem is not that he does things
incorrectly, rather that he does nothing at all.

CONSTITUTION DRAFTING


9. (C) Prem knew that I had recently met Constitution
Drafting Assembly Chairman Noranit Setabutr and asked what we
thought about the Constitution process. I explained that the
press headlines following my meeting with Noranit which
suggested we had "demanded" a quicker drafting process had
been blown out of proportion and told Prem that my meeting
with Noranit had actually been quite civil. That said, I
told Prem that we were beginning to focus on the real
possibility that, no matter how good the draft constitution
is, the constitutional referendum could fail due to lack of
support in the North and Northeast, Thaksin's populous
strongholds. I suggested that the interim government was not
doing nearly enough to explain to the electorate how it
planned to transition to a normal government. The vast
majority of rural Thai get their news from the electronic
media which had been masterfully used by Thaksin for five
years to justify his policies. I noted that for the previous
four months I had not seen one program in which the coup
leaders laid out Thaksin's shortcomings either from the Shin
Corporation sale, widespread corruption and cronyism,
extra-judicial killings, media control, or his inept policies
towards the separatist violence in the South.

MARTIAL LAW


10. (C) I explained to Prem how the continuation of martial
law in areas beyond the border areas under military control
before the coup was a major concern in Washington. I
reminded Prem that Surayud had promised President Bush in
Hanoi that he would lift martial law and that bureaucratic
dithering over implementation measures was difficult to
explain. When Prem suggested that Thai authorities were not

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really enforcing martial law, I countered by asking why then
is it needed in the first place. I also told Prem that it
was difficult to effectively plan our Cobra Gold military
exercise without greater clarity on the martial law
situation.

COMMENT


11. (C) Prem obviously shares some of our concerns about
policy drift and a lack of cohesion within the interim
government and he appears to have taken steps to try to stop
the public bickering among Thai leaders that is undermining
public confidence. His comments about the coup leaders being
"too gentlemanly" hopefully pertains not to the need to be
more ruthless, but rather to the need for the CNS to make a
more concerted effort to explain to the electorate why the
coup leaders believe a coup was necessary, and take the steps
needed to pave the way for a successful constitutional
referendum and national election.
BOYCE