THAI COUP LEADER CONSIDERING MOVE TO POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003978 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAI COUP LEADER CONSIDERING MOVE TO POLITICAL PARTY REF: A. BANGKOK 3442 (POLITICAL MAP) ¶B. BANGKOK 3191 (DISCUSSION WITH WINAI) ¶C. BANGKOK 3166 (DISCUSSION WITH CHATURON) ¶D. BANGKOK 2994 (TRT DISSOLVED) ¶E. BANGKOK 2503 (SONTHI ON TRANSITION) ¶F. OFFICE OF RESEARCH ANALYSIS M-36-07 ¶G. BANGKOK 151 (PRASONG ON COUP) BANGKOK 00003978 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The leader of the September 19 coup d'etat is considering whether to run for elected office after his retirement from the Army this fall. Many Thais believe that General Sonthi Boonyaratglin hopes to become Prime Minister, although he currently appears to be a long shot candidate for this position. Sonthi, who is relatively low-ranked in opinion polls, has not yet demonstrated an ability to operate as a civilian politician. His political vehicle remains unclear. Ironically, he might team up with one or more splinter groups from Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party. The prospect of Sonthi holding a position in the next government may assuage realistic concerns he has about his physical safety and, in so doing, may make it more likely that he will support a return to democratic governance. If he runs for office, he will fuel concerns that the Army is trying to retain power. We believe, however, his personal fears and ambition are the main factors in his plans. End Summary. RIDING THE TIGER -------------- ¶2. (C) As the leader of the September 19 coup d'etat, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin was able to minimize criticism of his unconstitutional seizure of power by pledging to quickly restore democratic rule. At the same time, the Council for National Security (CNS) established mechanisms -- such as the Asset Examination Commission -- to diminish deposed Prime Minister Thaksin's influence. The dissolution of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT),the freezing of Thaksin's known assets in Thailand, and ongoing court cases against Thaksin and his family mark progress toward this objective. However, as the date for elections draws near, Thaksin seems to still have significant influence and allies, as shown by: - Efforts by a core group of TRT figures to create a new party aligned with Thaksin's interests; - Pro-Thaksin demonstrations in Bangkok and elsewhere that have drawn thousands of people, although it is commonly assumed that attendees were paid to appear; - Thaksin's retention of significant wealth, as evidenced by his purchase of the British Manchester City soccer team; and - Thaksin's continuing popularity in the North and Northeast, according to many political figures. ¶3. (C) With Thaksin intending to remain ensconced abroad until after elections, it appears increasingly doubtful that Sonthi and the interim administration will preside over an eradication of Thaksin's influence. Sonthi has more to fear than just a harsh judgment by historians; Thaksin is notoriously vindictive and, as a former Police officer who directed a brutal anti-narcotics campaign while Prime Minister, he is widely perceived as willing to order extreme measures against his foes. Numerous contacts believe Sonthi and other coup leaders face a credible threat of physical harm from Thaksin and his allies. ¶4. (C) Facing mandatory retirement from the Army this fall, Sonthi may feel uneasy with the loss of his prominent position. (He may also have other motives for clinging to power; contacts have for months passed along vague but not implausible assertions that, since the coup, leading generals such as Sonthi have found new sources of illicit income.) BANGKOK 00003978 002.2 OF 003 Thus, in recent weeks, there has been much public speculation that Sonthi plans to move into elected politics -- just as his fellow coup plotter, General Winai Phattiyakul, has privately told the Ambassador (ref B). Questioned by journalists, Sonthi has refused to commit one way or another; he remarked that the likelihood of his becoming a candidate was "50-50." ¶5. (C) The constitution does not require that cabinet members hold seats in the legislature; only the Prime Minister must come from the ranks of elected politicians. If Sonthi's ambition was limited to a ministerial position, he could likely arrange such an appointment without needing to run for office. (The Democrat Party Secretary General recently told us he would happily offer Sonthi the position of Defense Minister in a Democrat-led administration.) It is easy to infer, therefore, that Sonthi's prospective candidacy would be intended to enable him to become Prime Minister. Some politicians who believe Sonthi seeks the Prime Ministership may be aware of substantiated rumors that, several months ago, Sonthi considered displacing Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and installing his own government (ref E). ¶6. (C) Given the power that Sonthi currently wields as CNS Chairman, his move into any position beneath that of Prime Minister would appear to mark a significant diminishment of his status. It is possible, however, that Sonthi might be satisfied with a lesser role -- either in the cabinet, or as a regular Member of Parliament -- simply in order to ensure he retains political clout and enjoys some of the associated benefits (such as a degree of immunity from prosecution). POTENTIAL VEHICLES -------------- ¶7. (C) General Winai has told the Ambassador that Sonthi could rely on a soon-to-be-established "Love the Nation" (Rak Chart) Party, under the leadership of a businessman named Kachit Habanananda. It is unclear how Kachit, who has not been a significant player in party politics, might turn Rak Chart from a concept into a major force in just a few months. None of the politicians with whom we speak appear concerned about Rak Chart's emergence as a rival. ¶8. (C) Ironically, Sonthi might also draw support from splinter groups of Thaksin's former party, TRT. Numerous credible sources, and media accounts, allege ties between the CNS and major faction leaders from TRT (ref A). The effectiveness of those former TRT figures is in question, though; in particular, it is unclear how much support their factions can draw without the backing of Thaksin's funds. Sonthi reportedly has not yet lined up financing for his campaign, according to a senior politician with direct access to the CNS Chairman. NOT THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE -------------- ¶9. (C) Sonthi himself is not very popular. USG opinion polling (ref F - protect) conducted in February showed only four percent of Thais saw Sonthi as the best person to lead Thailand. (Thai polling experts have told us privately that they do not feel free to publicize data that reflects poorly on the CNS, so we are skeptical about many published poll results.) Sonthi has shown little aptitude for public relations, exhibiting a tendency to assert rather than persuade. Prime Minister Surayud has publicly hinted that Sonthi's candidacy would not be a good idea, and one of Sonthi's fellow coup plotters, Prasong Soonsiri (see ref G), has publicly criticized the prospect of Sonthi running for office. ¶10. (C) Sonthi's religion also may impede his candidacy; he is of the Islamic faith, putting him in a distinct minority. (Only 5-10 percent of Thais are Muslim.) Violence of an increasingly sectarian nature in Thailand's southern border provinces has increased Buddhist antipathy toward Muslims in some areas. Furthermore, some pro-Thaksin outlets (e.g., the hi-thaksin.net website) have at times warned in hysterical BANGKOK 00003978 003.2 OF 003 tones of an Islamic conspiracy against Thailand's Buddhist majority; we would not be surprised if some of the mud thrown Sonthi's way sticks. ¶11. (C) Contemporary events also make many Thais uneasy about Sonthi's designs. In 1992, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, leader of the 1991 coup d'etat, engineered his own nomination as Prime Minister by recently-elected legislators, sparking large demonstrations that culminated in the security forces carrying out a bloody attack on protestors. While the political environment has changed in significant ways, there are enough similarities that Sonthi's angling for the Prime Ministership would convey a sense that an unpleasant chapter in Thai history is repeating itself. In discussions with Sonthi associates, the Ambassador has warned that it would be better if Sonthi did not enter politics; if he does, it would be better for him to run for a seat in parliament like anyone else, rather than seek an appointment to the cabinet without any mandate from the voters. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The Thai are nothing if not practical. Sonthi has recently publicly reaffirmed his commitment to elections at the year's end; the idea that he can enter party politics likely makes it easier for him to support a return to democratic governance. Many politicians who would not favor Sonthi becoming Prime Minister nevertheless recognize his quandary and seem to acknowledge he should be able to pursue a political position, in order to assuage his concerns. Even if Sonthi makes a determined push for the top job, his ability to win it is in serious doubt. His public flirtation with a political career has further disenchanted the Thai public and contributes to fears that the Army will try to retain a political role after the election. If he runs, however, it will be less to defend the interests of the Army, and more for his own ends -- a mixture of personal ambition and self-preservation. BOYCE