SCENESETTER FOR SOCPAC COMMANDER CAMBRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 003885

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOCPAC FOR GEN CAMBRIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SOCPAC COMMANDER CAMBRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. GEN Cambria, your visit to Thailand will
afford you a chance to see the importance of Thailand to our
regional security interests. You will also have an
opportunity to underscore the United States Government's
desire that Thailand maintain timetables for voting on a new
constitution and holding elections this year. End Summary.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION
--------------


2. (C) Thailand appears to be moving towards a return to
democratic rule later this year, but potential bumps in the
road ahead remain. Thais will vote on August 19 in a
referendum on the constitution produced by an assembly
appointed by top military leaders. The charter differs from
the 1997 version by, among other aspects: creating term
limits for the Prime Minister; establishing a
partially-appointed/partially-elected Senate; and creating
multi-member electoral districts and regional party lists for
the House of Representatives. Approval of the constitution
in the referendum should result in national elections taking
place around the end of December. Rejection would represent
a severe setback to the authorities plan for returning the
country democratic civilian rule and would likely provoke a
major political crisis. At this juncture, we do not see this
as likely, and expect the draft constitution to pass the
referendum.


3. (C) Recent events have decreased the likelihood of a
return to power of leading officials from the administration
of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin. Thaksin's personal assets
have been frozen by the Asset Examination Committee
(established by the coup leaders),following accusations of
corruption. Demonstrations in Bangkok by Thaksin loyalists
have failed to energize the population against the coup
leaders. Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved by the
Constitutional Tribunal in May, following credible
allegations of undemocratic acts committed during 2006
national elections; the Tribunal banned top executives of
this party from holding political office for five years.
Nevertheless, there is a widespread expectation that a
reincarnated version of Thai Rak Thai will participate in
elections, once the legislature approves a bill that will
allow the registration of new political parties. Thai Rak
Thai appears to retain significant public support, especially
in the North and Northeast.


4. (C) There has been much public speculation about Army
Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin's possible candidacy in
upcoming elections. Sonthi faces mandatory retirement from
the Army this fall, and he appears concerned that the coup
leaders' measures to block Thaksin from exerting influence in
Thailand might be undone or weakened once Thailand reverts to
democratic governance. Sonthi's preferred political vehicle
remains unclear.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


5. (C) Prior to the coup, bilateral relations with Thailand
were very good and we are optimistic that this will be the
case after a new elected government is in place. We continue
to focus on ways to ensure that our strategic interests in
maintaining access to Thai military facilities, assisting
Thailand to counter regional terrorism, fight transnational
crime and stop the spread of new disease are protected until
an elected government is in place. Thailand is a treaty ally
and has been firmly supportive of our fight against terrorism
and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It is a key partner in our
efforts to assist refugees and counter narcotics. American
businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in
Thailand. The United States is Thailand's largest export
market and its second-largest foreign investor.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
--------------


6. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior
to coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest
participant in the U.S. International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the
United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for
our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making
Operation Unified Assistance a success. Utapao is a unique
facility and our most important Cooperative Security Location
(CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. In your meetings with Thai
military officials, you will want to note our determination
to return to a more healthy military relationship once a
democratically elected government is in place.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND
--------------


7. (C) Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat,
has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated
into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, since January
2004 over 2,000 persons have been killed either by militants
or by security forces; the level of violence has worsened in
recent months. While the violence has remained limited to
the South--and we see no indications that it will spread to
Bangkok or tourist-rich areas like Phuket in the near
term--sectarian tensions between the ethnic-Malay Muslims and
ethnic-Thai Buddhists are rising. Several particularly
heinous incidents -- including the brutal execution murders
of eight Buddhist van passengers -- have triggered reprisal
acts of violence such as a grenade attack against a mosque
that injured 14. Despite these recent events, PM Surayud has
maintained his commitment to finding a peaceful settlement to
the situation. He has made several gestures of goodwill
towards militants: in November he apologized for past human
rights abuses by security officials; he has pledged to
increase cooperation with Malaysian authorities; consider
opportunities to negotiate with separatists; he reinstated
the interagency security coordination centers that were
dissolved by Thaksin that served to defuse tensions and
investigate incidents; and, he has pledged to make amnesty a
part of any eventual peace settlement. The recent arrest of
several hundred separatist suspects appears to reflect a
newly energized approach to security operations and better
intelligence from local citizens. Other plans put forward by
the RTA, including arming Buddhist paramilitary "ranger
units," seem less well thought out and run the risk of
exacerbating the unrest.


8. (C) Rumors that the U.S. is somehow behind the violence
or desires bases in the South continue to circulate, making
the subject of our assistance to Thai efforts in that part of
the country a politically sensitive issue. In order to avoid
redirecting the anger of insurgents towards the United States
and linking this ethnic-based insurgency to the international
jihadist movement--a link that is currently absent--we ensure
that any offers of assistance or training pass the "location
and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military personnel
away from the far South and we make sure that we do not label
any assistance or training as directly linked to the southern
situation. Instead, we focus on improving the nationwide
capabilities of Thai security forces with emphasis on skills
that will be of use to units rotating to the South. Examples
of the types of training we offer the Thai to improve their
ability to counter insurgents include:

--Conducting a Non-Lethal Weapons Seminar and deploying a Non
Lethal Weapons mobile training team (MTT) designed to assist
Thai soldiers conduct quasi-police functions like crowd
control and less than lethal use of force.

--Setting up a U.S. Information Operations Team to assist the
Royal Thai Army (RTA) to develop psyops capabilities such as
target audience analysis, effect, message development,
product development and distribution.

--Assigning a U.S. Civil Affairs Planner to assist the RTA
develop better Civil Affairs programs in the south.

--Dispatching mobile education teams to conduct courses on
Human Rights/Law of Armed Conflict and the Legal Aspects of
Counter Terrorism and Domestic Military Operations.

--Each year, U.S. Special Operation Forces conduct about five
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises throughout
Thailand. The primary purpose of these exercises is to
maintain military skills, improve interoperabilitiy, and gain
access to facilities and influence key military leaders.
Each mission lasts approximately six weeks and focuses on
training Royal Thai special operations and conventional
forces -- including the Thai Delta Force, Thai Army Special
Forces and Thai Navy SEALS. Each JCET targets 150-200
soldiers for training. Skill sets include: direct action
hostage rescue, raids, ambushes, special reconnaissance
(urban and rural),advanced urban combat, jungle operations,
combat medical training, battalion level counter insurgency
(COIN),parachute, psychological and riverine operations.
Air Force JCETS focus on Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and
rotary wing night flying to support Royal Thai Navy, Army and
Air Force CT units.
--Conducting courses run by the Defense Institute for
International Legal Studies' (DIILS) Legal Aspects of
Combating Terrorism Mobile Training Team (MTT). DIILS has
conducted 13 MTTs in Thailand since 1996. Topics included
Peace Operations, Military Operations other than War, Human
Rights Violations, Law of the Sea, and Legal Aspects of
Combating Terrorism. Each seminar targeted 50-60 participants
from the Thai MOD, Royal Thai Supreme Command, Ministry of
Justice, NSC, Special Police Branch, MFA and Counter
Terrorism Operations Center. Following the death of scores
of Muslim protestors at Tak Bai in 2005, DIILS conducted a
special Human Rights Violation/Law of Armed Conflict MTT at
Royal Thai Supreme Command. DIILS has assisted in developing
a comprehensive strategic plan for educating and training the
military and police to conduct themselves in accord with
international rules of behavior.


9. (C) We are exploring other ways to assist the Thai while
paying heed to both 508 sanctions and political
sensitivities. For example:

--We are discussing whether to expand the multi-national
participation in Cobra Gold and evolving the exercise to
include more counter insurgency and counter terrorism
training.

--We have a number of efforts underway to improve the Thai
military's command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I) capabilities that will improve their
ability to coordinate counter insurgency operations among
units and with the police.

--A number of senior Thai RTA officers have asked for
assistance in developing better training materials for Thai
soldiers at the RTA Infantry Center and to improve
instruction in identifying and defeating IEDs, conduct better
Civil Military Operations and Information Operations.

MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
--------------


10. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States
good base infrastructure, large areas in which our aircraft
and ground forces can conduct unrestricted operations, and
access to bombing ranges--all in short supply in Asia.
Located near strategic maritime choke points and having good
liberty ports, Thailand also has the potential to play a
greater role in U.S. Naval planning. Perhaps due to their
lack of a colonial heritage, Thai leaders are far more
willing to host multilateral exercises than are other
countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual
bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective
security, or Australia, which avoids multilateral exercises
so as not to "dumb down" its own training opportunities, the
Royal Thai Government supports multilateral exercises as a
way to show regional leadership. This has allowed us to use
our exercises in Thailand to further key U.S. objectives such
as supporting Japan's growing military role in Asia and
engaging the TNI. The Thai are aware that we only approved
this year's Cope Tiger air exercise and Cobra Gold exercise
after high-level discussions.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION
--------------


11. (C) Thailand continues to feel the rising influence of
China and has improved military links with India. While
emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. in the region--and
Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement--Thai leaders
also focus on developing stronger relations with the two
regional powers. Bangkok views both countries as sources of
unlimited consumer demand and hopes to conclude Free Trade
Agreements with both nations. The Thai military has a number
of Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal and mil-mil
contacts are improving. For example, RTA CINC GEN Sonthi
visited PRC Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and Vice President
Zeng Qinghong during a four-day visit to Beijing in January.
While Thai military links with the United States are deeper
and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing
influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is evident in
business, the arts, the media and the military. The PLA Navy
has close links with the RTN and recently conducted a major
ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding a limited naval
exercise in the Andaman Sea in 2005, Thailand and China are
exploring conducting joint SAR exercises. The RTN has
acquired several ships from China over the past decade. China
is refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment provided to
Thailand in the late 1980's. Mil-to-mil exchanges between
China and Thailand have expanded in recent years as has the
number of bilateral military VIP visits.

COBRA GOLD
--------------


12. (C) We recently completed the 26th iteration of Cobra
Gold. The exercise has evolved from a bilateral event
designed to repel an armored invasion from Vietnam to a
multilateral Command Post Exercise (CPX) coupled with a
U.S.-Thai joint/combined Field Training Exercise (FTX) and
multilateral engineering and medical civil affairs projects
(ENCAPS/MEDCAPS). This year, Thailand, the United States,
Singapore, Japan and Indonesia participated in the CPX which
focused on a PKO scenario. The U.S., Thailand, Singapore and
Japan took part in MEDCAPS/ENCAPS and several countries,
including the PRC, Australia, France, Germany, the
Philippines and Korea observed the exercise. MARFORPAC lead
the U.S. contingent for Cobra Gold this year and will next
year as well. Marines and soldiers will conduct ground
exercises in various parts of the country. F-18s and KC-130s
from the USMC, P-3's and F-18s from the USN and B-52s and
C-130s from the USAF participated.


13. (U) I look forward to meeting you during your visit.
BOYCE