SCENESETTER FOR SOCPAC COMMANDER CAMBRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 003885 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOCPAC FOR GEN CAMBRIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC TH SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SOCPAC COMMANDER CAMBRIA Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. GEN Cambria, your visit to Thailand will afford you a chance to see the importance of Thailand to our regional security interests. You will also have an opportunity to underscore the United States Government's desire that Thailand maintain timetables for voting on a new constitution and holding elections this year. End Summary. THE POLITICAL SITUATION -------------- ¶2. (C) Thailand appears to be moving towards a return to democratic rule later this year, but potential bumps in the road ahead remain. Thais will vote on August 19 in a referendum on the constitution produced by an assembly appointed by top military leaders. The charter differs from the 1997 version by, among other aspects: creating term limits for the Prime Minister; establishing a partially-appointed/partially-elected Senate; and creating multi-member electoral districts and regional party lists for the House of Representatives. Approval of the constitution in the referendum should result in national elections taking place around the end of December. Rejection would represent a severe setback to the authorities plan for returning the country democratic civilian rule and would likely provoke a major political crisis. At this juncture, we do not see this as likely, and expect the draft constitution to pass the referendum. ¶3. (C) Recent events have decreased the likelihood of a return to power of leading officials from the administration of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin. Thaksin's personal assets have been frozen by the Asset Examination Committee (established by the coup leaders),following accusations of corruption. Demonstrations in Bangkok by Thaksin loyalists have failed to energize the population against the coup leaders. Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved by the Constitutional Tribunal in May, following credible allegations of undemocratic acts committed during 2006 national elections; the Tribunal banned top executives of this party from holding political office for five years. Nevertheless, there is a widespread expectation that a reincarnated version of Thai Rak Thai will participate in elections, once the legislature approves a bill that will allow the registration of new political parties. Thai Rak Thai appears to retain significant public support, especially in the North and Northeast. ¶4. (C) There has been much public speculation about Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin's possible candidacy in upcoming elections. Sonthi faces mandatory retirement from the Army this fall, and he appears concerned that the coup leaders' measures to block Thaksin from exerting influence in Thailand might be undone or weakened once Thailand reverts to democratic governance. Sonthi's preferred political vehicle remains unclear. THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶5. (C) Prior to the coup, bilateral relations with Thailand were very good and we are optimistic that this will be the case after a new elected government is in place. We continue to focus on ways to ensure that our strategic interests in maintaining access to Thai military facilities, assisting Thailand to counter regional terrorism, fight transnational crime and stop the spread of new disease are protected until an elected government is in place. Thailand is a treaty ally and has been firmly supportive of our fight against terrorism and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It is a key partner in our efforts to assist refugees and counter narcotics. American businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in Thailand. The United States is Thailand's largest export market and its second-largest foreign investor. THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶6. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over 50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest participant in the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making Operation Unified Assistance a success. Utapao is a unique facility and our most important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. In your meetings with Thai military officials, you will want to note our determination to return to a more healthy military relationship once a democratically elected government is in place. COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND -------------- ¶7. (C) Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, since January 2004 over 2,000 persons have been killed either by militants or by security forces; the level of violence has worsened in recent months. While the violence has remained limited to the South--and we see no indications that it will spread to Bangkok or tourist-rich areas like Phuket in the near term--sectarian tensions between the ethnic-Malay Muslims and ethnic-Thai Buddhists are rising. Several particularly heinous incidents -- including the brutal execution murders of eight Buddhist van passengers -- have triggered reprisal acts of violence such as a grenade attack against a mosque that injured 14. Despite these recent events, PM Surayud has maintained his commitment to finding a peaceful settlement to the situation. He has made several gestures of goodwill towards militants: in November he apologized for past human rights abuses by security officials; he has pledged to increase cooperation with Malaysian authorities; consider opportunities to negotiate with separatists; he reinstated the interagency security coordination centers that were dissolved by Thaksin that served to defuse tensions and investigate incidents; and, he has pledged to make amnesty a part of any eventual peace settlement. The recent arrest of several hundred separatist suspects appears to reflect a newly energized approach to security operations and better intelligence from local citizens. Other plans put forward by the RTA, including arming Buddhist paramilitary "ranger units," seem less well thought out and run the risk of exacerbating the unrest. ¶8. (C) Rumors that the U.S. is somehow behind the violence or desires bases in the South continue to circulate, making the subject of our assistance to Thai efforts in that part of the country a politically sensitive issue. In order to avoid redirecting the anger of insurgents towards the United States and linking this ethnic-based insurgency to the international jihadist movement--a link that is currently absent--we ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do not label any assistance or training as directly linked to the southern situation. Instead, we focus on improving the nationwide capabilities of Thai security forces with emphasis on skills that will be of use to units rotating to the South. Examples of the types of training we offer the Thai to improve their ability to counter insurgents include: --Conducting a Non-Lethal Weapons Seminar and deploying a Non Lethal Weapons mobile training team (MTT) designed to assist Thai soldiers conduct quasi-police functions like crowd control and less than lethal use of force. --Setting up a U.S. Information Operations Team to assist the Royal Thai Army (RTA) to develop psyops capabilities such as target audience analysis, effect, message development, product development and distribution. --Assigning a U.S. Civil Affairs Planner to assist the RTA develop better Civil Affairs programs in the south. --Dispatching mobile education teams to conduct courses on Human Rights/Law of Armed Conflict and the Legal Aspects of Counter Terrorism and Domestic Military Operations. --Each year, U.S. Special Operation Forces conduct about five Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises throughout Thailand. The primary purpose of these exercises is to maintain military skills, improve interoperabilitiy, and gain access to facilities and influence key military leaders. Each mission lasts approximately six weeks and focuses on training Royal Thai special operations and conventional forces -- including the Thai Delta Force, Thai Army Special Forces and Thai Navy SEALS. Each JCET targets 150-200 soldiers for training. Skill sets include: direct action hostage rescue, raids, ambushes, special reconnaissance (urban and rural),advanced urban combat, jungle operations, combat medical training, battalion level counter insurgency (COIN),parachute, psychological and riverine operations. Air Force JCETS focus on Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and rotary wing night flying to support Royal Thai Navy, Army and Air Force CT units. --Conducting courses run by the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies' (DIILS) Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism Mobile Training Team (MTT). DIILS has conducted 13 MTTs in Thailand since 1996. Topics included Peace Operations, Military Operations other than War, Human Rights Violations, Law of the Sea, and Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism. Each seminar targeted 50-60 participants from the Thai MOD, Royal Thai Supreme Command, Ministry of Justice, NSC, Special Police Branch, MFA and Counter Terrorism Operations Center. Following the death of scores of Muslim protestors at Tak Bai in 2005, DIILS conducted a special Human Rights Violation/Law of Armed Conflict MTT at Royal Thai Supreme Command. DIILS has assisted in developing a comprehensive strategic plan for educating and training the military and police to conduct themselves in accord with international rules of behavior. ¶9. (C) We are exploring other ways to assist the Thai while paying heed to both 508 sanctions and political sensitivities. For example: --We are discussing whether to expand the multi-national participation in Cobra Gold and evolving the exercise to include more counter insurgency and counter terrorism training. --We have a number of efforts underway to improve the Thai military's command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) capabilities that will improve their ability to coordinate counter insurgency operations among units and with the police. --A number of senior Thai RTA officers have asked for assistance in developing better training materials for Thai soldiers at the RTA Infantry Center and to improve instruction in identifying and defeating IEDs, conduct better Civil Military Operations and Information Operations. MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM -------------- ¶10. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States good base infrastructure, large areas in which our aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted operations, and access to bombing ranges--all in short supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime choke points and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has the potential to play a greater role in U.S. Naval planning. Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security, or Australia, which avoids multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership. This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to further key U.S. objectives such as supporting Japan's growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI. The Thai are aware that we only approved this year's Cope Tiger air exercise and Cobra Gold exercise after high-level discussions. THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION -------------- ¶11. (C) Thailand continues to feel the rising influence of China and has improved military links with India. While emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. in the region--and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement--Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger relations with the two regional powers. Bangkok views both countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hopes to conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. The Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal and mil-mil contacts are improving. For example, RTA CINC GEN Sonthi visited PRC Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and Vice President Zeng Qinghong during a four-day visit to Beijing in January. While Thai military links with the United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the military. The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea in 2005, Thailand and China are exploring conducting joint SAR exercises. The RTN has acquired several ships from China over the past decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's. Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded in recent years as has the number of bilateral military VIP visits. COBRA GOLD -------------- ¶12. (C) We recently completed the 26th iteration of Cobra Gold. The exercise has evolved from a bilateral event designed to repel an armored invasion from Vietnam to a multilateral Command Post Exercise (CPX) coupled with a U.S.-Thai joint/combined Field Training Exercise (FTX) and multilateral engineering and medical civil affairs projects (ENCAPS/MEDCAPS). This year, Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan and Indonesia participated in the CPX which focused on a PKO scenario. The U.S., Thailand, Singapore and Japan took part in MEDCAPS/ENCAPS and several countries, including the PRC, Australia, France, Germany, the Philippines and Korea observed the exercise. MARFORPAC lead the U.S. contingent for Cobra Gold this year and will next year as well. Marines and soldiers will conduct ground exercises in various parts of the country. F-18s and KC-130s from the USMC, P-3's and F-18s from the USN and B-52s and C-130s from the USAF participated. ¶13. (U) I look forward to meeting you during your visit. BOYCE