SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF OSD PRINCIPAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000358

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OSD PLEASE FORWARD TO BRIGADIER GENERAL TOOLAN
MANILA PLEASE PASS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL TOOLAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL OVIP MARR MASS TH
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF OSD PRINCIPAL
DIRECTOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN A. TOOLAN, JR.

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary. General Toolan, your visit to Bangkok will
be the first by a senior Pentagon official since the
September 19 coup in Thailand and will provide an excellent
opportunity to press Thai officials to rescind martial law
and maintain timetables for drafting a new constitution and
holding elections. After a three month honeymoon with the
domestic media and intelligentsia, the Council for National
Security (CNS) is under increasing criticism for imposing
limits on press freedom and displaying economic ineptitude.
Public confidence in the effectiveness of the junta to manage
the country, let alone reform politics, is dropping. Despite
our concerns over the return to democracy, Thailand remains
important to U.S. strategic interests in the region.
Thailand affords the United States a unique platform in
Asia. Our largest exercise, Cobra Gold, is America's only
annual joint/combined multilateral training exercise in the
Asia Pacific Region and includes the active participation of
Japan, Singapore and Indonesia. You can explain to the Thai
that the policy decision whether the United States will
participate in Cobra Gold in 2007 will be made at senior
levels in Washington and will be determined in large part by
how effectively the Thai fulfill their commitment to lift
martial law and return to democracy. Thai troops deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq and we are working closely with the Thai
to make them better able to address separatist elements in
the Muslim majority South. Before the coup, working with
PACOM and other U.S. embassies in the region, we had won Thai
endorsement of joining a regional maritime security network
to create a layered approach providing coverage of the
northern shipping lanes feeding into the Strait of Malacca.
END SUMMARY.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION


2. (C) Most in the Thai media and chattering class welcomed
the September 19 coup d'etat that removed former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and ushered in the military-led
Council for National Security (CNS). CNS chair General
Sonthi Boonyaratklin and the military were able to capitalize
on popular opposition to Thaksin, particularly within Bangkok
and the monarchy, to topple Thaksin's government. The swift
selection of respected privy councilor General Surayud
Chulanont as Prime Minister, the appointment of a qualified
civilian cabinet, and the promulgation of a timetable to
draft a new constitution and to hold a national election were
seen as hopeful signs that the CNS was dedicated to
democratic principles. Recently, however, the CNS has been
pummeled in the press for a number of missteps including not
moving quickly enough to investigate corruption by Thaksin
officials, a ham-fisted attempt to control the rising baht
that resulted in the stock market plunging 14 percent in a
single day, failure to respond effectively to a rash of bombs
that went off in Bangkok on New Year's Eve, and a general
perception of incompetence. Critics have also raised concern
that the interim legislature appointed by the CNS is not
representative of Thai society and that the initial framework
under which the new Constitution was to be drafted favors
elite interests. CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul has
been criticized for telling the press not to run stories
about Thaksin -- although Winai denies reports he threatened
the media if they would not cooperate, the electronic media
is engaging in obvious self-censorship.


3. (C) The CNS has not yet demonstrated an ability to
govern effectively or to steer Thailand through the difficult
months ahead. Further complicating issues are recent rumors,
so far unsubstantiated, that some hard-line members of the
CNS might sponsor a new coup to push out CNS moderates or
Cabinet members who are not responding adequately to
political challenges. Regarding martial law, Embassy
officials have raised repeatedly our desire that the CNS move
with dispatch to return the country to the situation that

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existed prior to the coup -- when martial law was in effect
in a limited number of border areas. It would be useful for
you to echo this sentiment. We have also emphasized the need
for the CNS not to let milestones slip in drafting a new
constitution and holding elections. We have requested
meetings for you with a number of key officials and hope you
will underscore all these points, emphasizing the Washington
perspective.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


4. (C) Prior to the coup, bilateral relations with Thailand
were very good and we are optimistic that this will be the
case after a new government is in place. The goodwill
generated by America's quick and massive response to the
December 26, 2004 tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a Treaty
Ally and has been firmly supportive of the International War
on Terror and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). American businesses
have over $20 billion in direct investment in Thailand. The
United States is Thailand's largest export market and its
second-largest foreign investor.


5. (C) Senior officials have not been as energetic in
supporting our policy efforts on Burma as we had hoped. The
new Thai approach of not actively defending Burma, however,
is an improvement over Thaksin's policy of "constructive
engagement" with the military junta in Burma.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP


6. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior
to coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest
participant in the U.S. International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the
United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for
our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making
Operation Unified Assistance a success. In fact, PACOM
recently designated Utapao as the most important Cooperative
Security Location (CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. While we
avoid using the term "CSL" with the Thai due to their
sensitivities about bases, Utapao remains vital to our
interests in the region. In your meetings with Thai military
officials, you will want to note our desire to return to a
more healthy military-military relationship once a
democratically elected government is in place.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND


7. (C) Until recently, Thailand's biggest domestic challenge
was the unsettled security situation in the far southern part
of the country. Southern Thailand, in particular the
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However,
since January 2004, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in
the level of violence. Press reports indicate that over
1,900 persons have been killed either by militants or by
security forces during this period. Local Muslim separatist
militants have attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist
authority, civilians, and local citizens suspected of
collaborating with the Government. Thaksin was sharply
criticized for not having an effective policy to curb
violence in the South. Despite initial optimism that the CNS
under General Sonthi might be able to make progress, the new
government has not demonstrated an improved ability to
counter the unrest in the near term.


8. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a
U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South

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could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently
absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air
Station.


9. (C) Although some of our tools to work with the Thai
military on Southern issues have been affected by coup
sanctions, the Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to
improve our military cooperation in order to address the
violence in the South:

--1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
--2) Help the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
--3) Do everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.

MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM


10. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States
military good base infrastructure, large areas in which our
aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted
operations and access to bombing ranges -- all in short
supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime choke points
and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has the
potential to play a greater role in U.S. Naval planning.
Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to
further key U.S. objectives such as supporting Japan's
growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI. The Thai
are aware that we only approved this year's COPE TIGER air
exercise after high-level discussions in Washington and will
be eager to hear from you whether we will likely proceed with
COBRA GOLD this year. This conversation again will afford
you an opportunity to underscore steps the CNS and interim
government can take that would allow Washington to approve
COBRA GOLD.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION


11. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. Bangkok views both
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hopes
to conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. The
Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its
arsenal. While Thai military links with the United States
are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links,
China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is
evident in business, the arts, the media and the military.
The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently
conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly
holding a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea in 2005,

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Thailand and China are exploring conducting joint SAR
exercises. The RTN has acquired several ships from China
over the past decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air
defense equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's.
Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded
in recent years as has the number of bilateral military VIP
visits.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY


12. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
maritime security. As part of an effort funded by Section
1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, we
worked closely with PACOM and sister Embassies in Manila,
Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Colombo to develop a regional
maritime security architecture to improve communications,
domain awareness and intercept capabilities in the waters
surrounding Southeast Asia. The Thai portion of the
initiative, approved by Congress but suspended as part of
coup sanctions, was a layered approach to assist the Thai
military secure territorial waters while also providing
coverage of the northern shipping lanes feeding into the
Strait of Malacca. We hope to revisit this initiative and
work closely with neighboring countries when Thailand returns
to a democratic government.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY


13. (C) The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is a legacy force faced
with serious modernization issues. The RTA is still primarily
designed to defeat the large conventional threat that Vietnam
represented in the mid-1980's. On paper, the RTA would seem
to possess the capability to defeat a large conventional
attack -- however, it is plagued by an almost universally low
Operational Readiness (OR) rate. This problem is a systemic
weakness based on insufficient sustainment of equipment as
well as budget shortages since the 1997 financial crisis.


14. (C) Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the
budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the
Asian Financial Crisis. Since that time, budgets have
increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels. Correcting
this military budget shortfall is a key focus of CNS leaders
and there is a strong likelihood that the interim government
will expand the defense budget, allowing all the services to
improve their capabilities.


15. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the
U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC
and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and
the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are perfect training
partners for the RTA and field exercises in Thailand afford
our Marines many opportunities they don't have elsewhere in
Asia. We have explored hosting the USS Essex Amphibious
Assault Ship and will look for other training opportunities
in the future.

THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP


16. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military
is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as
strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force. The
RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less
willing to be open with U.S. counterparts. In the past we
have had a better relationship with the RTN and we were
working to reverse the current trend through potential
projects like the 1206 Andaman Sea Maritime Security
Initiative. Prior to the coup, we worked with PACFLT and
Seventh Fleet to increase the tempo of U.S. Navy ship visits.
Recent U.S. aircraft carrier visits were well received by
the RTN, received front page and prime time media coverage,
and were successful opportunities to demonstrate the benefits
of the U.S.-Thai security relationship. Recently, the
Chinese have improved their ties to the RTN as mentioned

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above. Likewise, the RTN has been developing a closer
relationship with the Indian Navy and has conducted some
exercises with the Indians.


17. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand,
JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units
to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide
their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities.
For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at
protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand.
This NSW relationship was graphically demonstrated during the
tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to

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Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts. The Prime Minister
was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the SEALS.
Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai SEALS are
not well-supported by senior RTN officials.

THE AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP


18. (C) The annual COPE TIGER flight training exercise among
the United States, Thailand and Singapore is scheduled to run
from January 29 until February 9 in Thailand. COPE TIGER is
the largest joint/combined air combat exercise in Thailand.
Since its beginning in 1994, COPE TIGER has evolved into a
multinational exercise conducted in two phases. Phase one
was a tactical seminar/command post exercise coupled with a
final planning conference that took place in Singapore from
December 11-16. The flying training exercise is scheduled to
take place at Korat Air Force Base in Thailand from January
29 until February 9. U.S. Marine Corps aircraft scheduled to
participate in COPE TIGER are based in Japan and hope to
conduct warm weather operations in Thailand. U.S. Air Force
aircraft include A-10 ground support aircraft based in Korea.
The A-10s hope to conduct ground support training that they
only have a limited ability to conduct in Korea.


19. (C) In 2005, Thailand announced its plans to replace
aging F-5s in the RTAF fleet. Former Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Rice and the President all urged Thailand to either

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use its defense budget to perform mid-life upgrades (MLU) on
its existing F-16s and/or to buy F-16 Block 52s. A vast
majority of senior RTAF officers favor the F-16 over SU-30.
However, Russian officials and Israeli contractors have
reportedly offered inducements to senior RTAF officers to buy
Russian planes and former PM Thaksin reportedly promised
President Putin that he would look favorably on Sukhoi's bid.
We are urging the Thai to proceed with the MLU purchase or
procure new F-16s but not to procure any Russian planes for
interoperability reasons, the impact such a move could have
on technology releases in the future, and the effect such a
procurement might have on Thailand's ability to eventually
purchase the Joint Strike Fighter.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT


20. (U) I look forward to hosting you for dinner when you
come to Bangkok and to sharing views on how best to promote
our strategic interests in Thailand.
BOYCE