Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK3502
2007-06-25 10:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
SUMMARY OF DRAFT THAI SECURITY LAW
VZCZCXRO4786 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #3502/01 1761030 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251030Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7844 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4432 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7330 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3283 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9437 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003502
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DRAFT THAI SECURITY LAW
REF: A. BANGKOK 03402 (DOUBLE SECRET LEGISLATION: THAI
SECURITY ACT
B. PENDING?)
C. BANGKOK 01754 (THAILAND'S NEW SECURITY
STRUCTURE: BETTER LIVING THROUGH ISOC)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003502
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DRAFT THAI SECURITY LAW
REF: A. BANGKOK 03402 (DOUBLE SECRET LEGISLATION: THAI
SECURITY ACT
B. PENDING?)
C. BANGKOK 01754 (THAILAND'S NEW SECURITY
STRUCTURE: BETTER LIVING THROUGH ISOC)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The draft Internal Security Act approved by
the cabinet on June 19 would significantly expand the powers
of the military through its proxy, the Internal Security
Operations Command (ISOC). Under this new law, the Army
commander would serve as Director, ISOC, and have the
authority to order curfews, searches and seizures with little
oversight. Arrests made under the new law would still
require judicial approval. We expect that wide opposition
from segments of the public and the legislature will lead to
significant changes in the draft when it is debated next
month. Septel reports the Ambassador's conversation with
Prime Minister Surayud on this topic. End Summary.
2. (C) As expected (ref A),the Thai cabinet on June 19
approved the draft Internal Security Act. Since the 2006
coup, senior government officials have highlighted the need
for enhanced legal frameworks to cope with both separatists
in the South and potential political upheaval throughout the
rest of the country. Recent rallies by anti-government
demonstrators and threats of further actions by supporters of
ousted PM Thaksin appear to have driven the latest push for
this security law. After consideration by the Council of
State (a high-level legal review that is almost pro-forma)
the draft law will be given to the National Legislative
Assembly (which will not be in session until early July) for
consideration.
3. (C) While this bill has been coming for some time, press
coverage (and details about the law's specifics) had been
spotty. Following the cabinet's approval this week, local
media have begun reporting on the draft law, in particular
emphasizing the expansion of the Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC, a security element founded in the 1960s that
waned in the 1990s and was resurrected after the 2006 coup;
see ref B for more details). Human rights activists have
highlighted concerns over the possible impact on personal,
political and press freedoms, while critics of the coup point
to ISOC as both a haven and power-center for the coupmakers
after elections and the formation of a new government.
4. (C) Although media criticism over the draft provision is
rising, the specific language in the new security act has not
been widely publicized. Several senior security officials
have denied knowledge of the specifics in recent days, both
publicly and privately. Both an NGO and an official
government contact have quietly provided us copies of the
bill, however. The draft Internal Security Act is almost
completely focused on the structure, role and powers of ISOC.
While we have not yet done an exhaustive analysis of the
draft law, a short summary of key elements follows.
STRUCTURE
--------------
5. (C) Under this draft, the Army Commander-in-Chief is the
Director of ISOC and reports directly to the Prime Minister's
office (Note: previous accounts suggested that the ISOC chief
would be separate from the Army commander and would report
directly to the military or Ministry of Defense). A separate
Internal Security Commission chaired by the PM and composed
of Ministers, senior military officials and the police
Commissioner-General would also be established, but its
relation to ISOC is unclear. (PM Surayud told the Ambassador
that the commission would set security policy for
implementation by ISOC)
6. (C) ISOC's regional, provincial and local structure would
remain unchanged from the model implemented this year under a
Prime Minister's order. Commanders of the Army's four
regions would serve as regional ISOC Chairmen; Ministry of
Interior-appointed Governors would chair ISOC committees in
each province. At each level, representatives from the
BANGKOK 00003502 002 OF 002
police, military and civilian agencies would serve on the
ISOC committee.
7. (C) Of note, while the ISOC Director has the power to
appoint advisers and direct personnel from other agencies,
the draft law does not establish an ISOC-specific career
service, nor direct the merger of other government agencies
or ministers (despite frequent public statement by RTG
officials that ISOC will be similar to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security).
ISOC'S AUTHORITIES
--------------
8. (C) The expanded authorities provided to the ISOC Director
are likely to generate much more controversy. While the
Director of ISOC may authorize the arrest or detention of a
person who "conspires to commit danger to the internal
security," this action must be approved by a court of law.
Those detained under ISOC authority can be held for a
reoccurring period of seven days, up to a total of 30 days.
Other authorities granted the ISOC Director include the
ability to:
--order searches (in some cases requiring judicial approval)
--establish curfews
--block public assembly
--seize assets, documents or evidence relating to an act
harming national security
--place suspects into "reeducation" sessions not more than
six months in length
--order employers to collect and maintain biographic
information on their employees
--regulate the purchase, sale, or possession of "any
material...used to create a threat to internal security"
COMMENT
--------------
9. (C) Human rights activists and other public figures are
already taking aim at the draft bill, prompting defensive
statements by RTG leaders such as Army Chief (and current
ISOC Director) GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who was quoted in
local papers as saying 'when it comes to national security,
all other concerns are secondary.' While we expect that the
draft will face significant revision in the legislature
during its consideration next month, we will be sure to
underscore to senior RTG contacts that the law should remain
consistent with international norms of civilian oversight and
control over law enforcement.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DRAFT THAI SECURITY LAW
REF: A. BANGKOK 03402 (DOUBLE SECRET LEGISLATION: THAI
SECURITY ACT
B. PENDING?)
C. BANGKOK 01754 (THAILAND'S NEW SECURITY
STRUCTURE: BETTER LIVING THROUGH ISOC)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The draft Internal Security Act approved by
the cabinet on June 19 would significantly expand the powers
of the military through its proxy, the Internal Security
Operations Command (ISOC). Under this new law, the Army
commander would serve as Director, ISOC, and have the
authority to order curfews, searches and seizures with little
oversight. Arrests made under the new law would still
require judicial approval. We expect that wide opposition
from segments of the public and the legislature will lead to
significant changes in the draft when it is debated next
month. Septel reports the Ambassador's conversation with
Prime Minister Surayud on this topic. End Summary.
2. (C) As expected (ref A),the Thai cabinet on June 19
approved the draft Internal Security Act. Since the 2006
coup, senior government officials have highlighted the need
for enhanced legal frameworks to cope with both separatists
in the South and potential political upheaval throughout the
rest of the country. Recent rallies by anti-government
demonstrators and threats of further actions by supporters of
ousted PM Thaksin appear to have driven the latest push for
this security law. After consideration by the Council of
State (a high-level legal review that is almost pro-forma)
the draft law will be given to the National Legislative
Assembly (which will not be in session until early July) for
consideration.
3. (C) While this bill has been coming for some time, press
coverage (and details about the law's specifics) had been
spotty. Following the cabinet's approval this week, local
media have begun reporting on the draft law, in particular
emphasizing the expansion of the Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC, a security element founded in the 1960s that
waned in the 1990s and was resurrected after the 2006 coup;
see ref B for more details). Human rights activists have
highlighted concerns over the possible impact on personal,
political and press freedoms, while critics of the coup point
to ISOC as both a haven and power-center for the coupmakers
after elections and the formation of a new government.
4. (C) Although media criticism over the draft provision is
rising, the specific language in the new security act has not
been widely publicized. Several senior security officials
have denied knowledge of the specifics in recent days, both
publicly and privately. Both an NGO and an official
government contact have quietly provided us copies of the
bill, however. The draft Internal Security Act is almost
completely focused on the structure, role and powers of ISOC.
While we have not yet done an exhaustive analysis of the
draft law, a short summary of key elements follows.
STRUCTURE
--------------
5. (C) Under this draft, the Army Commander-in-Chief is the
Director of ISOC and reports directly to the Prime Minister's
office (Note: previous accounts suggested that the ISOC chief
would be separate from the Army commander and would report
directly to the military or Ministry of Defense). A separate
Internal Security Commission chaired by the PM and composed
of Ministers, senior military officials and the police
Commissioner-General would also be established, but its
relation to ISOC is unclear. (PM Surayud told the Ambassador
that the commission would set security policy for
implementation by ISOC)
6. (C) ISOC's regional, provincial and local structure would
remain unchanged from the model implemented this year under a
Prime Minister's order. Commanders of the Army's four
regions would serve as regional ISOC Chairmen; Ministry of
Interior-appointed Governors would chair ISOC committees in
each province. At each level, representatives from the
BANGKOK 00003502 002 OF 002
police, military and civilian agencies would serve on the
ISOC committee.
7. (C) Of note, while the ISOC Director has the power to
appoint advisers and direct personnel from other agencies,
the draft law does not establish an ISOC-specific career
service, nor direct the merger of other government agencies
or ministers (despite frequent public statement by RTG
officials that ISOC will be similar to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security).
ISOC'S AUTHORITIES
--------------
8. (C) The expanded authorities provided to the ISOC Director
are likely to generate much more controversy. While the
Director of ISOC may authorize the arrest or detention of a
person who "conspires to commit danger to the internal
security," this action must be approved by a court of law.
Those detained under ISOC authority can be held for a
reoccurring period of seven days, up to a total of 30 days.
Other authorities granted the ISOC Director include the
ability to:
--order searches (in some cases requiring judicial approval)
--establish curfews
--block public assembly
--seize assets, documents or evidence relating to an act
harming national security
--place suspects into "reeducation" sessions not more than
six months in length
--order employers to collect and maintain biographic
information on their employees
--regulate the purchase, sale, or possession of "any
material...used to create a threat to internal security"
COMMENT
--------------
9. (C) Human rights activists and other public figures are
already taking aim at the draft bill, prompting defensive
statements by RTG leaders such as Army Chief (and current
ISOC Director) GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who was quoted in
local papers as saying 'when it comes to national security,
all other concerns are secondary.' While we expect that the
draft will face significant revision in the legislature
during its consideration next month, we will be sure to
underscore to senior RTG contacts that the law should remain
consistent with international norms of civilian oversight and
control over law enforcement.
BOYCE