THE POST-THAI RAK THAI POLITICAL MAP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003442

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THE POST-THAI RAK THAI POLITICAL MAP

REF: A. BANGKOK 3402 (ISOC LEGISLATION)


B. BANGKOK 3191 (DISCUSSION WITH WINAI)

C. BANGKOK 3166 (DISCUSSION WITH CHATURON)

D. BANGKOK 2994 (TRT DISSOLUTION)

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) It remains unclear which party or figure will fill the
void left by the dissolution of deposed Prime Minister
Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. The Democrat Party (DP)
currently appears unlikely to draw power brokers from TRT
strongholds, but the DP seems to have laid the foundation for
a coalition with the Chart Thai (CT) party, which may be in a
better position to assimilate former TRT figures. Some
former TRT figures would like to reestablish their party, but
the legislature has yet to allow the registration of new
parties. If a new party is formed to represent Thaksin's
interests, Thaksin would likely provide the symbolic appeal,
even though he is legally precluded from holding a formal
position. Various contacts tell us that Thaksin remains
highly popular, although we believe recent steps by the
government may erode his standing. It is unclear whether the
Generals who launched the coup intend to rely on a political
party to protect their interests after the next election.
End Summary.

DEMOCRATS NOT READY TO FILL THE VOID
--------------


2. (C) The Constitutional Tribunal's dissolution of Thai Rak
Thai (ref D) seemed initially to boost the prospects of the
Democrat Party, the second-largest in 2005's elections.
However, contacts from TRT as well as the DP itself have
expressed skepticism that the DP will fill the void in TRT
strongholds, especially the vote-rich Northeast. This
skepticism appears based on several factors:

- A recent history of Democrat Party weakness in the
Northeast, ever since an influential political rival
successfully branded the DP as a party of the South; this
weakness may be exacerbated by a perception of embittered TRT
loyalists that the DP received preferential treatment from
the Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled favorably on charges
against the DP while dissolving TRT.

- Democrat Party turf battles; one member of the DP's
executive board told us that his fellow officials with
responsibilities for the Northeast are wary of losing
stature, as would inevitably happen if the party were to
recruit other prominent figures from the region. This same
executive board member cautioned that the DP -- Thailand's
oldest party -- has become hobbled by its own bureaucratic
and legalistic traditions.

- Money politics; the DP, which has led the opposition in
parliament since 2001, is not generally thought of as a
wealthy party, and it may be disadvantaged in competing to
recruit prominent figures from the Northeast, where the
political machinery runs on cash. One DP executive board
member told us his party can generally offer 2-3 million Baht
(approximately 58-87,000 USD) to lure former legislators from
the Northeast, and he believed this offer would not be
competitive with those of rivals, especially if Thaksin
proves willing to finance a new party.


3. (C) The DP may also find itself needing to devote
significant energies just to maintain its standing in the
South, which has been the party's most supportive region.
The DP's current Party Leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, is the
scion of an elite Bangkok-based family; by contrast, from
1991 until March of 2005, the DP had Party Leaders who hailed
from the South and presumably were more popular there.

DEMOCRAT-CHART THAI COALITION
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4. (C) Our contacts from both the DP and Chart Thai --
Thailand's third-largest party -- tell us their parties will

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most likely join together in a coalition after the next
election. Chart Thai is largely an old style Thai party
built around its leader, former Prime Minister Banharn
Silapa-Archa, with a strong regional support base in central
Thailand. While the DP significantly outperformed CT in
2005, CT appears to have a better chance of attracting former
TRT figures. Some of these politicians migrated to CT soon
after the 2006 coup d'etat, including three who were
executive board members and now are affected by the
Tribunal's sanction. Chart Thai contacts have told us they
are satisfied to remain a medium-sized party and avoid the
factionalism that accompanies rapid growth; they said they
would not actively recruit former TRT legislators, but they
admitted CT would welcome them if they were to request to
join the party. (Comment: The question of who courts whom is
not simply a matter of pride; it also has implications for
the financing of campaigns. End Comment.)


5. (C) If either the Democrats or Chart Thai were to win a
plurality in upcoming elections, they probably would have the
seats to form a coalition government with the help of the
other, likely bringing in smaller parties as well. Despite
some nostalgia within the DP for former Prime Minister Chuan
Leekpai, current Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva is on track
to become Prime Minister in the event of a Democrat victory,
while Chart Thai Party Leader Banharn would be CT's
PM-designate in the event that CT pulls off a first-place
finish.

CAN TRT BE RESURRECTED?
--------------


6. (C) Since TRT's dissolution, contacts from the party
(including former Acting Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng --
ref C) have assured us that both TRT and former Party Leader
Thaksin remain popular. They expect that a new party
representing TRT's populist policies, and possibly even
bearing the old name, will compete in the next elections.
Should that happen, they predict that this new version of TRT
has a chance to win a plurality in the next legislature.


7. (C) Predictions of a strong showing for a reincorporated
TRT seem based on both a perception of grassroots sentiment
and on Thaksin's capability to finance the campaigns of
influential figures in the North and Northeast. Both these
factors could change in the coming months; recent efforts by
the authorities to freeze Thaksin's assets, while highly
unlikely to render him destitute, could constrain any efforts
of his to deploy funds in the coming election. Also, the
cumulative effect of corruption revelations and legal charges
against Thaksin could reduce sympathy for him in rural areas.


8. (C) When we have asked our contacts who might be best
suited as the formal leader of a revived TRT, they have
admitted their difficulty envisioning any credible figure in
that role. They have generally dismissed the potential of
former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (too obtuse and
unpopular, including with the Palace); former Bangkok
Governor Samak Sundaravej (no political network outside of
Bangkok, currently embroiled in a procurement scandal); and
former cabinet member Korn Dabbaransi (too inexperienced in
organizational matters). One former TRT official emphasized
to us that, no matter who might formally lead a new TRT, the
party would draw its strength from Thaksin's endorsement; the
deposed PM himself would be the symbolic (even if unofficial)
leader.


9. (C) While TRT figures have stated they want to resurrect
their party as soon as possible, they will have to wait until
the legislature passes a law that lifts the current
prohibition on the registration of new parties. It remains
unclear whether the legislature will prohibit the
registration of new parties that bear the name or other
unique characteristics of predecessors that have been ordered
dissolved. Should this be the case, TRT figures will likely
reconcile themselves to using a new name or, if necessary,
taking over a minor existing party; there are 39 political
parties currently registered in Thailand.

WHAT ABOUT THE CNS?
--------------

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10. (C) Well-connected sources have told us that several of
the most influential faction leaders from TRT (Somkid,
Somsak, Suwat, and Pinij) had agreed prior to the
Constitutional Tribunal's ruling that they would throw their
support behind Council for National Security (CNS) Chairman
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. These accounts are consistent
with the CNS Secretary General's admission to the Ambassador
that Sonthi aims to move into party politics (ref B). The
Tribunal's verdict, barring these TRT figures from holding
elected office, may have thrown this plan into disarray.


11. (C) Sonthi faces mandatory retirement from the Army this
fall; he could conceivably become a candidate in the next
election. Sonthi, who surely sits atop the "enemies list" of
notoriously vindictive Thaksin, surely intends somehow to
retain influence after his retirement. However, rather than
seeking elected office -- which does not play to his
strengths -- he may instead hope to build a new power base as
the head of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC),
rather than as an elected figure. Draft legislation that
would redefine ISOC's role and authority (ref A) may redefine
the balance of power between the security forces and elected
officials. If this bill provides Sonthi with confidence that
he can continue to shape events regardless of which party
might be in power, then the CNS may be more likely to allow
elections to proceed.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Most Thai politicians currently expect the next
elections will feature a Democrat-Chart Thai coalition vying
against some type of pro-Thaksin party rising from the ashes
of Thai Rak Thai. Today's snapshot of the political map may
well evolve in important ways before the elections (whose
legal framework has yet to be created). It is worth
highlighting, however, that most of our contacts share a
premise that elections will take place in the coming months,
as promised, and will feature competition between parties
playing by traditional rules.
BOYCE