GENERAL WINAI: TRT THREAT DIMINISHED, ELECTIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS ECON EINV ASEC TH
SUBJECT: GENERAL WINAI: TRT THREAT DIMINISHED, ELECTIONS ON
TRACK

REF: A. BANGKOK 3058 (AMNESTY PROPOSAL)

B. BANGKOK 2994 (TRT DISSOLVED)

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Council for National Security (CNS) Secretary General
Winai Phattiyakul told the Ambassador the CNS had
accomplished its main objectives; with Thaksin deposed and
his party weakened, the CNS would readily leave power and
restore democratic governance. In a June 8 meeting with the
Ambassador, Winai discussed the recent Constitutional
Tribunal ruling, progress in the constitution drafting
process, and his vision of the post-election political map.
The Ambassador discussed concerns about the safety of Hmong
refugees, the appointment of a security advisor with a
negative reputation, and the investment climate. End Summary.

EARLY ELECTION?
--------------


2. (C) In a four-eyes meeting on June 8, the Ambassador
reminded Council for National Security (CNS) Secretary
General Winai Phattiyakul that the USG had welcomed Prime
Minister Surayud's public commitment to hold elections in
mid- to late-December. It now appeared the RTG was
considering holding elections even sooner, possibly in
November. This would be a highly positive development, the
Ambassador said.


3. (C) Winai replied that he saw no need for the interim
administration and CNS to remain in power; they had already
ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, and had overseen a weakening of
his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, most recently through the May
30 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal (ref B). So Winai
believed it was possible for elections to be held earlier
than December. (Note: We have not heard of a new target date
for elections, but there is widespread discussion of holding
the constitutional referendum on August 19, rather than
September 2. End Note.)


4. (C) The Ambassador asked whether any figures from the CNS
intended to move into elected politics. Winai quickly
replied that CNS Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin intended to do
so. Although Winai was unaware of Sonthi's precise plan, if
one existed, he said Sonthi's basic objectives were to ensure
his own protection after his retirement as Army Commander,
and to block Thaksin's return to power. These could best be
accomplished through a move into party politics. The
Ambassador cautioned that any such plunge by Sonthi or other
CNS members into participatory politics would have to come
through a transparent democratic procedure, i.e., election.

POLITICAL PARTIES
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked about rumors that Kachit
Habanananda, a Thai businessman with a military background,
would head a new party serving the CNS's interests. Winai
said he had never heard of Kachit before and did not know his
intentions. He confirmed that the CNS did hope to work with
the leaders of breakaway factions of Thai Rak Thai -- he
named Somsak Thepsuthin, Pinij Jarusombat, and Suwat
Liptapanlop. Winai said he had spoken recently with former
Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who staunchly asserted
he would not lead a reconstituted version of Thai Rak Thai or
otherwise front for Thaksin's interests. Nevertheless, Winai
told the Ambassador that there was widespread speculation
that Chavalit might think he could successfully return to the
political fray.


6. (C) Winai believed the Democrat Party had a good chance to
become Thailand's leading party and form a coalition that
would lead a government of national reconciliation, including
all parties except those consisting of hard-core Thaksin
supporters, who could participate as an opposition block in
the legislature. Winai believe TRT could win at most 100
seats in the next election. He admitted, though, that the

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authorities had done a poor job of explaining to the public
Thaksin's abuses of power, and he concurred when the
Ambassador said reliance on soldiers to sell this message at
the grassroots level seemed unlikely to succeed.


7. (C) Winai claimed that he and others in the CNS had been
surprised by the Tribunal's decision to bar TRT's entire
executive board from politics for five years. Although
initially concerned this sanction could unite TRT, Winai felt
the situation had calmed somewhat in recent days. General
Sonthi had intended his announcement that he could support
amnesty for TRT figures (ref A) as a reconciliation measure;
this proposal had been suggested to Sonthi by the dean of
Thammasat University, but it drew widespread condemnation.
Responding to many phone calls critical of Sonthi's
statement, Winai had told Sonthi he should clarify his view,
as the amnesty proposal was not well thought out and would
not work. Winai told the Ambassador that the time for an
amnesty might come in a couple of years, well after the next
election, when the matter would be in the hands of an elected
parliament.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Winai's view of the ongoing
constitutional process. Winai said the second draft seemed
likely to be much improved; he credited the drafters with
including provisions in the first draft that could be
excluded later, showing their responsiveness and co-opting
their critics. The next draft, Winai predicted, would not
establish Buddhism as a state religion; would not contain
provisions for a "crisis committee" with unspecified powers;
and would feature a partially-elected Senate and
single-member districts in the House. Such a draft would
have good prospects in the upcoming referendum. Winai said
he had not seen signs that Thaksin's supporters would
mobilize to defeat the constitution when it would be put
before the voters.

"ASSASSIN" BROUGHT IN AS ADVISOR
--------------


9. (C) Citing recent reports in the international press about
the appointment of retired General Pallop Pinmanee as an
advisor on security affairs, the Ambassador told Winai he had
received calls from a concerned staff member of the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Pallop's penchant for
tough talk, and his association with the brutal 2004 raid on
insurgents at the Krue Sae mosque, had the potential to raise
international concerns. Winai jotted a note to himself on
this point. He reassured the Ambassador there was no reason
to worry about Pallop. General Sonthi had decided to give
Pallop this position, but it was simply advisory, and he had
far less authority than when he previously worked at the
Internal Security Operations Command.

HMONG REFUGEES
--------------


10. (C) Although Winai no longer handles refugee affairs on a
daily basis, the Ambassador raised certain issues in this
area, because of Winai's longstanding interest and his
willingness to promote humanitarian solutions. The
Ambassador first noted that Immigration Commissioner
Boonruang Polpanich seemed to have misinterpreted both RTG
and ROK Korean policy, in attempting to channel all North
Korean refugees toward the ROK, effectively precluding them
from seeking resettlement in the U.S. Winai took note of
this matter and said he would look into it. (Note: The
Ambassador has also raised this with MFA Permanent Secretary
Virasakdi Futrakul and NSC Secretary General Prakit
Prachonpachanuk, who appear sympathetic to our concern and
have more formal responsibility in this matter than Winai.
End Note.)


11. (C) The Ambassador also raised the case of 18 Hmong
female minors, now apparently in the Petchabun area. Reading
to Winai from the heart-wrenching testimony to Medecins Sans
Frontieres of one of the minors, Mai Moua Vang, the

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Ambassador urged that these girls not be sent back to Laos.
Winai displayed visible sympathy and disgust on hearing
Vang's account of mistreatment by the Lao authorities.


12. (C) When the Ambassador then noted reports of 48 Hmong
being deported to Laos from Amphoer Lom Sak in northern
Thailand, Winai paused the conversation and used his cell
phone to call a Thai official and request a report on this.
Following the meeting, Winai phoned the Ambassador to explain
that, more than one week ago, 37 new arrivals had crossed
into Thailand from Laos and were sent back over the border.
(Note: There was confusion on the Thai side about this matter
because the group of 37 is separate from the Lom Sak group.
End Note.) The military and the NSC were well aware of the
USG's concern, Winai said; no Persons of Concern have been
forced back to Laos. The Ambassador, noting the positive
efforts of General Nipat Thonglek to set up a screening
mechanism for the Hmong currently at Petchabun, requested
that no Hmong be returned to Laos pending the establishment
of that mechanism.

INVESTMENT CLIMATE
--------------


13. (C) Winai criticized the interim administration for its
lack of coordination and poor performance. He believed Prime
Minister Surayud Chulanont had been kept out of the loop on
the Health Ministry's decision to issue compulsory licenses
for pharmaceutical drugs; Health Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla
was "out of control," Winai observed. Neverthelesss, Winai
indicated further compulsory licenses were unlikely to be
issued.


14. (C) Speaking generally about the investment climate,
Winai said he understood how some might believe the Thais
were becoming less welcoming of foreign investment, but he
did not believe this was in fact the case. Recent moves that
could appear xenophobic in fact resulted from a lack of
coordination, and some misguided policies. The Thais would
retain their traditional openness to foreigners, Winai said.

COMMENT
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15. (C) We are encouraged by Winai's generally positive view
of the situation. He appears to see a relatively smooth path
forward, toward elections and a return to democratic
governance free of Thaksin's influence. We agree this is a
plausible outcome, but it is also the "best case" scenario,
and we do not discount the possibility of complications that
could send Thailand down a different path.
BOYCE