Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK3092
2007-06-05 09:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST
VZCZCXRO5480 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #3092/01 1560942 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 050942Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7383 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4307 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7210 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3183 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9333 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003092
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST
REF: BANGKOK 02994 (TRIBUNAL DISSOLVES THAI RAK THAI)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003092
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST
REF: BANGKOK 02994 (TRIBUNAL DISSOLVES THAI RAK THAI)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. In one of the largest protests since the
surge in separatist violence in 2004, several thousand
Malay-Muslims peacefully gathered in Pattani province's
central mosque from May 31 to June 4. The
protestors--including students from Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng
and Pattani's Prince of Songkhla Universities--demanded the
removal of some security forces, an end to local curfews and
investigations into reported abuses by paramilitary forces.
A counter-protest by a mixed Muslim-Buddhist crowd raised
concerns over potential clashes, but the groups were kept
separated by government officials. Protesters ended their
action on June 4 after the local Army Commander agreed to
establish an independent commission to investigate alleged
abuses. End Summary.
2. (C) While the rest of the country remain fixated on the
fate of Thailand's two leading political parties (ref),
several thousand Malay-Muslims entered Pattani's central
Mosque on May 31 to protest RTG policy in the southern
provinces. Accounts of crowd size vary, with the Deputy
Pattani governor telling us that at most 1,500 people were
involved. A local journalist contact at the scene, however,
estimated that nearly 8,000 people had joined the protest at
its peak. Our contacts agreed that the scene was peaceful,
despite some tensions when the protesters moved to seal off
the mosque to prevent the infiltration of security forces.
Following this episode on May 31, concerns eased and local
citizens were free to enter and exit the building for
prayers. Security forces established a loose cordon around
the mosque, blocking several surrounding roads and using cell
phone jamming equipment to prevent the use of remotely
detonated explosive devices. A brief counter protest by a
mixed group of Malay-Muslims and Buddhists on June 3 raised
the prospect of violent clashes, but security officials were
able to keep the groups separated.
3. (C) The exact make-up of the protesting group is not
clear. The Deputy Governor of Pattani--who led the
government negotiating team--listed a range of local social
networks and student groups as represented. Thai media
identified Tuvaedaniya Tuvaemaengae--a student from Bangkok's
Ramkhamhaeng University, home to a sizable Malay-Muslim
student body--as a leader of the protest. Spokesmen from
Ramkhamhaeng's leading student groups publicly denied formal
participation in the protest, however.
4. (C) The protest appears to have been sparked by
allegations that security officials were responsible for the
murder of four people in two separate mid-May incidents in
the Yaha district of Yala. Among the most incendiary rumors
surrounding these incidents, according to a local journalist
contact, was the account of a survivor of one of these
attacks, who alleged that a female victim was raped before
being killed by government paramilitaries. Despite local
government officials' statements denying this claim, based on
an autopsy of the victim, the story sparked wide outrage.
5. (C) In discussions with government officials and press
statements, the protesters listed ten demands, including
removal of military and paramilitary forces from the Southern
provinces, the lifting of local curfews and the Emergency
Decree, investigation and prosecution for state officials'
abuse of power, and the release of "innocent" people
arrested. Of note, the group did not espouse a separatist or
Islamic agenda; there were no calls for independence,
autonomy, or the imposition of Islamic law in the three
southern provinces. Following grueling negotiations between
protest leaders and local government officials on June 1-2,
it appeared that the protest would end, after RTG officials
agreed to establish an independent commission to investigate
allegations of abuses by security forces. At the last
minute, the protesters reportedly added a new demand: that
Prime Minister Surayud formally agree to this new commission.
Finally, on June 4, the top military official in the South,
4th Army Commander Wirote Buajaroon, publicly signed an order
establishing this independent investigatory body, after which
BANGKOK 00003092 002 OF 002
the protesters dispersed.
6. (C) According to the Deputy Pattani Governor, the 30-40
member independent commission will be chaired by the head of
the Pattani Islamic Committee. A local journalist says that
this new body will have responsibility for all three southern
provinces and will serve as a focal point for citizen
complaints against the government. (Note: several southern
contacts have pointed that the Southern Border Administration
Center--disbanded by Thaksin in 2002--filled this role to
great effect. The newly constituted Southern Border
Provinces Administration Center does not appear to be
effectively providing this service for the local population.
End Note.)
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) The use of protests to pressure local officials into
releasing suspected separatists has become a regular and
disconcerting dynamic in the troubled South. Thai officials,
leery of overreacting as they did in the October 2005 tragedy
of Tak Bai, have repeatedly given in to this tactic. The
Pattani central mosque protest, however, appears to have
produced a positive result. The lack of credible,
independent investigations into allegations of abuses by
security officials has been a major weakness of RTG policy in
the South, and as more security forces are based in that
region, has contributed to the perception that the central
government does not care about the concerns of Malay-Muslim
citizens in the South. If this new commission is able to
address some of these grievances, it would be a small, but
important step forward in RTG policy. Failing to follow
through on this commitment, however, would add to the list of
broken promises by the RTG in the South. The involvement of
Muslim-Malay student activists from Bangkok's universities is
a new wrinkle. This could inspire more paranoid musing by
security officials of a link between students in the capital
and separatist violence, although those students involved
appear to be playing a positive role in enhancing public
dialogue, not conducting attacks. Finally, the peaceful
nature of the protest and the lack of any separatist or
Islamic demands sheds some positive--if dim--light on the
difficult question of broader political sentiment in the
South.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST
REF: BANGKOK 02994 (TRIBUNAL DISSOLVES THAI RAK THAI)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. In one of the largest protests since the
surge in separatist violence in 2004, several thousand
Malay-Muslims peacefully gathered in Pattani province's
central mosque from May 31 to June 4. The
protestors--including students from Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng
and Pattani's Prince of Songkhla Universities--demanded the
removal of some security forces, an end to local curfews and
investigations into reported abuses by paramilitary forces.
A counter-protest by a mixed Muslim-Buddhist crowd raised
concerns over potential clashes, but the groups were kept
separated by government officials. Protesters ended their
action on June 4 after the local Army Commander agreed to
establish an independent commission to investigate alleged
abuses. End Summary.
2. (C) While the rest of the country remain fixated on the
fate of Thailand's two leading political parties (ref),
several thousand Malay-Muslims entered Pattani's central
Mosque on May 31 to protest RTG policy in the southern
provinces. Accounts of crowd size vary, with the Deputy
Pattani governor telling us that at most 1,500 people were
involved. A local journalist contact at the scene, however,
estimated that nearly 8,000 people had joined the protest at
its peak. Our contacts agreed that the scene was peaceful,
despite some tensions when the protesters moved to seal off
the mosque to prevent the infiltration of security forces.
Following this episode on May 31, concerns eased and local
citizens were free to enter and exit the building for
prayers. Security forces established a loose cordon around
the mosque, blocking several surrounding roads and using cell
phone jamming equipment to prevent the use of remotely
detonated explosive devices. A brief counter protest by a
mixed group of Malay-Muslims and Buddhists on June 3 raised
the prospect of violent clashes, but security officials were
able to keep the groups separated.
3. (C) The exact make-up of the protesting group is not
clear. The Deputy Governor of Pattani--who led the
government negotiating team--listed a range of local social
networks and student groups as represented. Thai media
identified Tuvaedaniya Tuvaemaengae--a student from Bangkok's
Ramkhamhaeng University, home to a sizable Malay-Muslim
student body--as a leader of the protest. Spokesmen from
Ramkhamhaeng's leading student groups publicly denied formal
participation in the protest, however.
4. (C) The protest appears to have been sparked by
allegations that security officials were responsible for the
murder of four people in two separate mid-May incidents in
the Yaha district of Yala. Among the most incendiary rumors
surrounding these incidents, according to a local journalist
contact, was the account of a survivor of one of these
attacks, who alleged that a female victim was raped before
being killed by government paramilitaries. Despite local
government officials' statements denying this claim, based on
an autopsy of the victim, the story sparked wide outrage.
5. (C) In discussions with government officials and press
statements, the protesters listed ten demands, including
removal of military and paramilitary forces from the Southern
provinces, the lifting of local curfews and the Emergency
Decree, investigation and prosecution for state officials'
abuse of power, and the release of "innocent" people
arrested. Of note, the group did not espouse a separatist or
Islamic agenda; there were no calls for independence,
autonomy, or the imposition of Islamic law in the three
southern provinces. Following grueling negotiations between
protest leaders and local government officials on June 1-2,
it appeared that the protest would end, after RTG officials
agreed to establish an independent commission to investigate
allegations of abuses by security forces. At the last
minute, the protesters reportedly added a new demand: that
Prime Minister Surayud formally agree to this new commission.
Finally, on June 4, the top military official in the South,
4th Army Commander Wirote Buajaroon, publicly signed an order
establishing this independent investigatory body, after which
BANGKOK 00003092 002 OF 002
the protesters dispersed.
6. (C) According to the Deputy Pattani Governor, the 30-40
member independent commission will be chaired by the head of
the Pattani Islamic Committee. A local journalist says that
this new body will have responsibility for all three southern
provinces and will serve as a focal point for citizen
complaints against the government. (Note: several southern
contacts have pointed that the Southern Border Administration
Center--disbanded by Thaksin in 2002--filled this role to
great effect. The newly constituted Southern Border
Provinces Administration Center does not appear to be
effectively providing this service for the local population.
End Note.)
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) The use of protests to pressure local officials into
releasing suspected separatists has become a regular and
disconcerting dynamic in the troubled South. Thai officials,
leery of overreacting as they did in the October 2005 tragedy
of Tak Bai, have repeatedly given in to this tactic. The
Pattani central mosque protest, however, appears to have
produced a positive result. The lack of credible,
independent investigations into allegations of abuses by
security officials has been a major weakness of RTG policy in
the South, and as more security forces are based in that
region, has contributed to the perception that the central
government does not care about the concerns of Malay-Muslim
citizens in the South. If this new commission is able to
address some of these grievances, it would be a small, but
important step forward in RTG policy. Failing to follow
through on this commitment, however, would add to the list of
broken promises by the RTG in the South. The involvement of
Muslim-Malay student activists from Bangkok's universities is
a new wrinkle. This could inspire more paranoid musing by
security officials of a link between students in the capital
and separatist violence, although those students involved
appear to be playing a positive role in enhancing public
dialogue, not conducting attacks. Finally, the peaceful
nature of the protest and the lack of any separatist or
Islamic demands sheds some positive--if dim--light on the
difficult question of broader political sentiment in the
South.
BOYCE