Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK3092
2007-06-05 09:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH 
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003092 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST

REF: BANGKOK 02994 (TRIBUNAL DISSOLVES THAI RAK THAI)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003092 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE PROTEST REF: BANGKOK 02994 (TRIBUNAL DISSOLVES THAI RAK THAI) Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In one of the largest protests since the surge in separatist violence in 2004, several thousand Malay-Muslims peacefully gathered in Pattani province's central mosque from May 31 to June 4. The protestors--including students from Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng and Pattani's Prince of Songkhla Universities--demanded the removal of some security forces, an end to local curfews and investigations into reported abuses by paramilitary forces. A counter-protest by a mixed Muslim-Buddhist crowd raised concerns over potential clashes, but the groups were kept separated by government officials. Protesters ended their action on June 4 after the local Army Commander agreed to establish an independent commission to investigate alleged abuses. End Summary. ¶2. (C) While the rest of the country remain fixated on the fate of Thailand's two leading political parties (ref), several thousand Malay-Muslims entered Pattani's central Mosque on May 31 to protest RTG policy in the southern provinces. Accounts of crowd size vary, with the Deputy Pattani governor telling us that at most 1,500 people were involved. A local journalist contact at the scene, however, estimated that nearly 8,000 people had joined the protest at its peak. Our contacts agreed that the scene was peaceful, despite some tensions when the protesters moved to seal off the mosque to prevent the infiltration of security forces. Following this episode on May 31, concerns eased and local citizens were free to enter and exit the building for prayers. Security forces established a loose cordon around the mosque, blocking several surrounding roads and using cell phone jamming equipment to prevent the use of remotely detonated explosive devices. A brief counter protest by a mixed group of Malay-Muslims and Buddhists on June 3 raised the prospect of violent clashes, but security officials were able to keep the groups separated. ¶3. (C) The exact make-up of the protesting group is not clear. The Deputy Governor of Pattani--who led the government negotiating team--listed a range of local social networks and student groups as represented. Thai media identified Tuvaedaniya Tuvaemaengae--a student from Bangkok's &#x
000A;Ramkhamhaeng University, home to a sizable Malay-Muslim student body--as a leader of the protest. Spokesmen from Ramkhamhaeng's leading student groups publicly denied formal participation in the protest, however. ¶4. (C) The protest appears to have been sparked by allegations that security officials were responsible for the murder of four people in two separate mid-May incidents in the Yaha district of Yala. Among the most incendiary rumors surrounding these incidents, according to a local journalist contact, was the account of a survivor of one of these attacks, who alleged that a female victim was raped before being killed by government paramilitaries. Despite local government officials' statements denying this claim, based on an autopsy of the victim, the story sparked wide outrage. ¶5. (C) In discussions with government officials and press statements, the protesters listed ten demands, including removal of military and paramilitary forces from the Southern provinces, the lifting of local curfews and the Emergency Decree, investigation and prosecution for state officials' abuse of power, and the release of "innocent" people arrested. Of note, the group did not espouse a separatist or Islamic agenda; there were no calls for independence, autonomy, or the imposition of Islamic law in the three southern provinces. Following grueling negotiations between protest leaders and local government officials on June 1-2, it appeared that the protest would end, after RTG officials agreed to establish an independent commission to investigate allegations of abuses by security forces. At the last minute, the protesters reportedly added a new demand: that Prime Minister Surayud formally agree to this new commission. Finally, on June 4, the top military official in the South, 4th Army Commander Wirote Buajaroon, publicly signed an order establishing this independent investigatory body, after which BANGKOK 00003092 002 OF 002 the protesters dispersed. ¶6. (C) According to the Deputy Pattani Governor, the 30-40 member independent commission will be chaired by the head of the Pattani Islamic Committee. A local journalist says that this new body will have responsibility for all three southern provinces and will serve as a focal point for citizen complaints against the government. (Note: several southern contacts have pointed that the Southern Border Administration Center--disbanded by Thaksin in 2002--filled this role to great effect. The newly constituted Southern Border Provinces Administration Center does not appear to be effectively providing this service for the local population. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The use of protests to pressure local officials into releasing suspected separatists has become a regular and disconcerting dynamic in the troubled South. Thai officials, leery of overreacting as they did in the October 2005 tragedy of Tak Bai, have repeatedly given in to this tactic. The Pattani central mosque protest, however, appears to have produced a positive result. The lack of credible, independent investigations into allegations of abuses by security officials has been a major weakness of RTG policy in the South, and as more security forces are based in that region, has contributed to the perception that the central government does not care about the concerns of Malay-Muslim citizens in the South. If this new commission is able to address some of these grievances, it would be a small, but important step forward in RTG policy. Failing to follow through on this commitment, however, would add to the list of broken promises by the RTG in the South. The involvement of Muslim-Malay student activists from Bangkok's universities is a new wrinkle. This could inspire more paranoid musing by security officials of a link between students in the capital and separatist violence, although those students involved appear to be playing a positive role in enhancing public dialogue, not conducting attacks. Finally, the peaceful nature of the protest and the lack of any separatist or Islamic demands sheds some positive--if dim--light on the difficult question of broader political sentiment in the South. BOYCE

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