CHASING SURAYUD IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002780

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: CHASING SURAYUD IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

REF: A. BANGKOK 02642 (DEMOCRACY ALIVE AND WELL IN

NORTHEAST)

B. BANGKOK 02565 (PREPARING FOR THE REFERENDUM IN
NORTHEASTERN THAILAND)

C. (06) BANGKOK 07549 (POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN
NORTHEAST THAILAND)

D. (06) BANGKOK 07286 (CHASING "UNDERCURRENTS" IN
NORTHEASTERN THAILAND)

Classified By: Political Officer Trent N. Wilson. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Surayud's late April visit to
the northeastern province of Ubon Ratchatani received mixed
marks from voters who met with him. Most of our contacts
characterized local interest in national politics as low, and
denied the presence of "undercurrents" or mass movements
supporting former PM Thaksin. Members of a prominent Ubon
NGO were equally biting in their criticism of both Thaksin's
and Surayud's administrations' inattention to local economic
issues. This group may organize a march on Bangkok in late
May to highlight their concerns. Finally, a local academic
bemoaned the nature of patronage politics in Thailand,
calling his country a "failed state." End Summary.


2. (C) Poloffs traveled to the northeastern province of Ubon
Ratchatani May 2-3 to gauge local political sentiment,
attitudes towards the draft constitution and reactions to a
recent visit by PM Surayud. Reftels (A,B) detail Ubon
perspectives on the draft charter and local elections.

WELCOME TO THAKSIN COUNTRY
--------------


3. (SBU) The nineteen provinces of the rural northeast
(Isaan) are the heartland of Thailand. Approximately one
third of the Thai population resides in this
agriculture-dependent region. Isaan is also Thaksin country.
Since 2001, Isaan voters have overwhelmingly supported the
ousted-PM's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) political party--over 70
percent of voters in the region voted for TRT candidates in
the 2005 election. In that election, Isaan voters selected
136 of the 400 constituency MPs that made up the lower house
(another 100 MPs were selected by party list)--a sizable
block.


4. (C) Following the September 2006 coup, Council on National
Security (CNS) leaders made repeated claims that pro-Thaksin
"undercurrents" were politically active in Isaan and
responsible for a handful of arson attacks on schools in that
region. Indeed, CNS and other interim government leaders
cited these threats when attempting to justify the continued
imposition of martial law in several Isaan provinces. As
reported (refs C, D),in December 2006 our local contacts in
a number of historically pro-Thaksin provinces denied claims
of any "undercurrent," and explained that the overwhelmingly
rural and poor people of Isaan were--as always--more focused
on basic survival than national politics.


5. (C) Nonetheless, while chatter among government officials
in Bangkok about the "undercurrents" in Isaan has died down,
several senior officials have publicly explained the need to
"educate" rural voters on the iniquities of the Thaksin
government in order to undercut support for former TRT
politicians ahead of the expected December 2007 election.
Concurrently, several grassroots organizations in Isaan have
threatened to march on Bangkok to call attention to local
problems.

SURAYUD'S VISIT TO THE STICKS
--------------


6. (C) Given these concerns, Prime Minister Surayud traveled
to Ubon Ratchatani on April 22-24 to meet with local voters,
hear their concerns, build support for his government and
dissuade the farmers from marching on the capital. In a
meeting on May 2, Ubon Governor Sutee Markboon characterized
the visit as a success, saying that the PM was interested in
detailed accounts of the problems facing Ubon, particularly
the annual challenges of drought and floods. In contrast to
previous short visits to sister provinces like Buriram in
late 2006--where Surayud was criticized for spending little
time with local voters--the PM held several discussions with

BANGKOK 00002780 002 OF 003


low-income farmers and representatives from Ubon-based NGOs.


7. (C) The leader of one of these NGOs had a less charitable
view of Surayud's visit. According to Somparn Kuendee,
coordinator for the Assembly of the Poor (AOP)--a grassroots
NGO in Ubon that famously mobilized tens of thousands of
farmers in a 1997 march on Bangkok--her group was invited to
meet with the PM, but only for about 20 minutes. Surayud
reportedly spoke for approximately two minutes about "big"
topics, not local concerns, but never mentioned the draft
constitution or its likely impact on the people of Ubon.
Somparn said that the PM invited AOP leaders to meet with him
in Bangkok to discuss their concerns but tried to dissuade
them from mobilizing their supporters to rally in the
capital. According to Somparn, AOP leaders are still
planning a march to Bangkok in late May.

"THE LAO GOVERNMENT IS BETTER THAN OURS"
--------------


8. (C) In a meeting at the AOP's local headquarters--a modest
collection of concrete slab structures far outside of
town--Somparn and a group of elderly villagers reiterated
some familiar themes voiced by contacts in other Isaan
provinces last December. According to Somparn, most local
voters are not focused on national level politics. People at
the bottom of the socio-economic scale--most members of the
AOP fit this profile--are overwhelmingly interested in local
concerns, such as the status of the Pak Mun Dam--a
controversial project nearby that inspired the formation of
the AOP--and government flood relief. Somparn dismissed talk
about "undercurrents" in Ubon, saying that, while Thaksin
promised a lot to poor people, his government rarely
delivered. Thaksin-era programs benefited people "who
already had some authority;" i.e. local politicians, police
and village leaders. Somparn and her colleagues offered
scathing criticism of several Thaksin initiatives, including
the million cow program and village loan fund. In their
opinion, both were representative of poor planning and even
worse execution. "Thaksin didn't understand the lives of
poor people."


9. (C) When asked about local attitudes towards the Surayud
government, Somparn was equally pessimistic, saying that she
is "not confident that the government will address our
concerns." This statement inspired a cacophony of hoots from
the assembled elders. One of the most senior AOP activists
present said, "this government hasn't done anything for
us...the Lao government is better!" He added that every
government in his lifetime had failed the poor people of
Isaan, which prompted one of his colleagues to comment that
"every government lies to us."


10. (C) In a separate meeting with representatives from
another NGO, the Ubon Community Network, Pongsak Saiwan
repeated these sentiments, saying that national-level
politicians are not interested in their problems. Moreover,
the impact of political decisions and jockeying in Bangkok is
not evident to most local voters. While the central
government provides funds for flood relief and infrastructure
projects, provincial and district officials are the ones who
allocate such money, often according to their own patronage
networks. While Saiwan's NGO is very interested in the draft
constitution and expanded rights for local people, the key
issues for Ubon farmers remain fundamental issues like land
rights, access to legal representation and effective local
governance.

NO UNDERCURRENTS
--------------


11. (C) All of our interlocutors denied the presence of
"undercurrents" in Ubon, but for different reasons. Governor
Sutee said that "politics in Ubon are very quiet." Sutee
suggested that those Thaksin supporters capable of fomenting
unrest are focused on preparing for the next election. In a
separate meeting, several village headmen likewise denied the
existence of mass movements in support of Thaksin due to a
lack of money to support such operations. They added that if
such funding was available, it may be possible to organize
such a movement.


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12. (C) Sawing Boonjerm, a leader of Ubon's Caravan of the
Poor--a group ostensibly representing the farmers of Ubon
that marched on Bangkok in support of Thaksin in the summer
of 2006--also denied any organized support for Thaksin, again
attributing this to a lack of funding. Sawing, who unlike
the village chiefs was outspoken in his support for the
ousted PM and criticism of the CNS, also suggested that any
pro-Thaksin movement would be quickly squashed by the CNS and
Army. (Note: Sawing and the other leaders of the Caravan of
the Poor are anything but impoverished; solidly middle class,
they reportedly funneled TRT funds to recruit supporters for
their 2006 rallies. End Note.)

"THAILAND IS A FAILED STATE"
--------------


13. (C) The most comprehensive political assessment we
received was from Phruk Thaowatin, a Professor at Ubon
Ratchatani University. Born and raised in Ubon, Phruk
provided a very pessimistic assessment of the Thai political
situation and local politics in Ubon, calling his country a
"failed state." Phruk agreed that most local people aren't
focused on national-level politics. He emphasized that the
Surayud government's real problem is not a lack of support
nor direct opposition by rural voters. Using a popular term
for pro-Thaksin/anti-CNS movements, Phruk said, "the
government thinks that the undercurrent is the people, but it
is the local officials." These village and district-level
elected officials, and their backers, benefited greatly under
Thaksin and remain his strongest supporters. According to
Phruk, Thai Rak Thai revolutionized Isaan politics by tying
together these local officials to national level politics
through money and patronage. The current government, in his
opinion, is unable to secure the allegiance of village and
district officials, who remain under the influence of former
TRT leaders. This is the central weakness of the CNS and
Surayud government. These crucial power-brokers at the local
level are merely waiting for the current government to leave.
Thus, Surayud and his team are forced to use the military to
secure their control, but this is not enough. According to
Phruk, "this government has no clear policy."


14. (C) Phruk was bluntly critical of the King's much-lauded
"self-sufficiency" economic theory, which is an oft-stated
guide for government action and very rarely the subject of
outright criticism. "Who knows what this means? If people
don't have land or economic opportunities, how can they be
self-sufficient?" Phruk joked that people who did well under
Thaksin were self-sufficient already.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) The disconnect between political attitudes in the
northeast and the characterization of those sentiments by
people in the capital is not surprising, given the long
history of Bangkok's policy neglect and outright dismissal of
political voices from the countryside. The lack of
"undercurrents" agitating for Thaksin's return was likewise
expected, but local frustration with the Surayud government's
perceived ineptitude could inspire some authentic protests
and add to the PM's woes. While the people of Isaan have
never played such a direct role in the downfall of a
government--as the saying goes, the people of Isaan select
the PM, but the elite in Bangkok depose him-- Surayud's
enemies are looking for all the excuses they can find to
attack the embattled premier.
BOYCE