CHASING SURAYUD IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002780 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: CHASING SURAYUD IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND REF: A. BANGKOK 02642 (DEMOCRACY ALIVE AND WELL IN NORTHEAST) ¶B. BANGKOK 02565 (PREPARING FOR THE REFERENDUM IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND) ¶C. (06) BANGKOK 07549 (POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN NORTHEAST THAILAND) ¶D. (06) BANGKOK 07286 (CHASING "UNDERCURRENTS" IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND) Classified By: Political Officer Trent N. Wilson. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Surayud's late April visit to the northeastern province of Ubon Ratchatani received mixed marks from voters who met with him. Most of our contacts characterized local interest in national politics as low, and denied the presence of "undercurrents" or mass movements supporting former PM Thaksin. Members of a prominent Ubon NGO were equally biting in their criticism of both Thaksin's and Surayud's administrations' inattention to local economic issues. This group may organize a march on Bangkok in late May to highlight their concerns. Finally, a local academic bemoaned the nature of patronage politics in Thailand, calling his country a "failed state." End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloffs traveled to the northeastern province of Ubon Ratchatani May 2-3 to gauge local political sentiment, attitudes towards the draft constitution and reactions to a recent visit by PM Surayud. Reftels (A,B) detail Ubon perspectives on the draft charter and local elections. WELCOME TO THAKSIN COUNTRY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The nineteen provinces of the rural northeast (Isaan) are the heartland of Thailand. Approximately one third of the Thai population resides in this agriculture-dependent region. Isaan is also Thaksin country. Since 2001, Isaan voters have overwhelmingly supported the ousted-PM's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) political party--over 70 percent of voters in the region voted for TRT candidates in the 2005 election. In that election, Isaan voters selected 136 of the 400 constituency MPs that made up the lower house (another 100 MPs were selected by party list)--a sizable block. ¶4. (C) Following the September 2006 coup, Council on National Security (CNS) leaders made repeated claims that pro-Thaksin "undercurrents" were politically active in Isaan and responsible for a handful of arson attacks on schools in that region. Indeed, CNS and other interim government leaders cited these threats when attempting to justify the continued imposition of martial law in several Isaan provinces. As reported (refs C, D),in December 2006 our local contacts in a number of historically pro-Thaksin provinces denied claims of any "undercurrent," and explained that the overwhelmingly rural and poor people of Isaan were--as always--more focused on basic survival than national politics. ¶5. (C) Nonetheless, while chatter among government officials in Bangkok about the "undercurrents" in Isaan has died down, several senior officials have publicly explained the need to "educate" rural voters on the iniquities of the Thaksin government in order to undercut support for former TRT politicians ahead of the expected December 2007 election. Concurrently, several grassroots organizations in Isaan have threatened to march on Bangkok to call attention to local problems. SURAYUD'S VISIT TO THE STICKS -------------- ¶6. (C) Given these concerns, Prime Minister Surayud traveled to Ubon Ratchatani on April 22-24 to meet with local voters, hear their concerns, build support for his government and dissuade the farmers from marching on the capital. In a meeting on May 2, Ubon Governor Sutee Markboon characterized the visit as a success, saying that the PM was interested in detailed accounts of the problems facing Ubon, particularly the annual challenges of drought and floods. In contrast to previous short visits to sister provinces like Buriram in late 2006--where Surayud was criticized for spending little time with local voters--the PM held several discussions with BANGKOK 00002780 002 OF 003 low-income farmers and representatives from Ubon-based NGOs. ¶7. (C) The leader of one of these NGOs had a less charitable view of Surayud's visit. According to Somparn Kuendee, coordinator for the Assembly of the Poor (AOP)--a grassroots NGO in Ubon that famously mobilized tens of thousands of farmers in a 1997 march on Bangkok--her group was invited to meet with the PM, but only for about 20 minutes. Surayud reportedly spoke for approximately two minutes about "big" topics, not local concerns, but never mentioned the draft constitution or its likely impact on the people of Ubon. Somparn said that the PM invited AOP leaders to meet with him in Bangkok to discuss their concerns but tried to dissuade them from mobilizing their supporters to rally in the capital. According to Somparn, AOP leaders are still planning a march to Bangkok in late May. "THE LAO GOVERNMENT IS BETTER THAN OURS" -------------- ¶8. (C) In a meeting at the AOP's local headquarters--a modest collection of concrete slab structures far outside of town--Somparn and a group of elderly villagers reiterated some familiar themes voiced by contacts in other Isaan provinces last December. According to Somparn, most local voters are not focused on national level politics. People at the bottom of the socio-economic scale--most members of the AOP fit this profile--are overwhelmingly interested in local concerns, such as the status of the Pak Mun Dam--a controversial project nearby that inspired the formation of the AOP--and government flood relief. Somparn dismissed talk about "undercurrents" in Ubon, saying that, while Thaksin promised a lot to poor people, his government rarely delivered. Thaksin-era programs benefited people "who already had some authority;" i.e. local politicians, police and village leaders. Somparn and her colleagues offered scathing criticism of several Thaksin initiatives, including the million cow program and village loan fund. In their opinion, both were representative of poor planning and even worse execution. "Thaksin didn't understand the lives of poor people." ¶9. (C) When asked about local attitudes towards the Surayud government, Somparn was equally pessimistic, saying that she is "not confident that the government will address our concerns." This statement inspired a cacophony of hoots from the assembled elders. One of the most senior AOP activists present said, "this government hasn't done anything for us...the Lao government is better!" He added that every government in his lifetime had failed the poor people of Isaan, which prompted one of his colleagues to comment that "every government lies to us." ¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with representatives from another NGO, the Ubon Community Network, Pongsak Saiwan repeated these sentiments, saying that national-level politicians are not interested in their problems. Moreover, the impact of political decisions and jockeying in Bangkok is not evident to most local voters. While the central government provides funds for flood relief and infrastructure projects, provincial and district officials are the ones who allocate such money, often according to their own patronage networks. While Saiwan's NGO is very interested in the draft constitution and expanded rights for local people, the key issues for Ubon farmers remain fundamental issues like land rights, access to legal representation and effective local governance. NO UNDERCURRENTS -------------- ¶11. (C) All of our interlocutors denied the presence of "undercurrents" in Ubon, but for different reasons. Governor Sutee said that "politics in Ubon are very quiet." Sutee suggested that those Thaksin supporters capable of fomenting unrest are focused on preparing for the next election. In a separate meeting, several village headmen likewise denied the existence of mass movements in support of Thaksin due to a lack of money to support such operations. They added that if such funding was available, it may be possible to organize such a movement. BANGKOK 00002780 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Sawing Boonjerm, a leader of Ubon's Caravan of the Poor--a group ostensibly representing the farmers of Ubon that marched on Bangkok in support of Thaksin in the summer of 2006--also denied any organized support for Thaksin, again attributing this to a lack of funding. Sawing, who unlike the village chiefs was outspoken in his support for the ousted PM and criticism of the CNS, also suggested that any pro-Thaksin movement would be quickly squashed by the CNS and Army. (Note: Sawing and the other leaders of the Caravan of the Poor are anything but impoverished; solidly middle class, they reportedly funneled TRT funds to recruit supporters for their 2006 rallies. End Note.) "THAILAND IS A FAILED STATE" -------------- ¶13. (C) The most comprehensive political assessment we received was from Phruk Thaowatin, a Professor at Ubon Ratchatani University. Born and raised in Ubon, Phruk provided a very pessimistic assessment of the Thai political situation and local politics in Ubon, calling his country a "failed state." Phruk agreed that most local people aren't focused on national-level politics. He emphasized that the Surayud government's real problem is not a lack of support nor direct opposition by rural voters. Using a popular term for pro-Thaksin/anti-CNS movements, Phruk said, "the government thinks that the undercurrent is the people, but it is the local officials." These village and district-level elected officials, and their backers, benefited greatly under Thaksin and remain his strongest supporters. According to Phruk, Thai Rak Thai revolutionized Isaan politics by tying together these local officials to national level politics through money and patronage. The current government, in his opinion, is unable to secure the allegiance of village and district officials, who remain under the influence of former TRT leaders. This is the central weakness of the CNS and Surayud government. These crucial power-brokers at the local level are merely waiting for the current government to leave. Thus, Surayud and his team are forced to use the military to secure their control, but this is not enough. According to Phruk, "this government has no clear policy." ¶14. (C) Phruk was bluntly critical of the King's much-lauded "self-sufficiency" economic theory, which is an oft-stated guide for government action and very rarely the subject of outright criticism. "Who knows what this means? If people don't have land or economic opportunities, how can they be self-sufficient?" Phruk joked that people who did well under Thaksin were self-sufficient already. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) The disconnect between political attitudes in the northeast and the characterization of those sentiments by people in the capital is not surprising, given the long history of Bangkok's policy neglect and outright dismissal of political voices from the countryside. The lack of "undercurrents" agitating for Thaksin's return was likewise expected, but local frustration with the Surayud government's perceived ineptitude could inspire some authentic protests and add to the PM's woes. While the people of Isaan have never played such a direct role in the downfall of a government--as the saying goes, the people of Isaan select the PM, but the elite in Bangkok depose him-- Surayud's enemies are looking for all the excuses they can find to attack the embattled premier. BOYCE