Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK2424
2007-04-30 10:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

PAD LEADER OPPOSES DECEMBER ELECTIONS, INTERIM

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002424 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PAD LEADER OPPOSES DECEMBER ELECTIONS, INTERIM
GOVERNMENT

REF: 05 BANGKOK 7197 (THE KING AND HIM)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Alexander A. Arvizu, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002424

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PAD LEADER OPPOSES DECEMBER ELECTIONS, INTERIM
GOVERNMENT

REF: 05 BANGKOK 7197 (THE KING AND HIM)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Alexander A. Arvizu, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: One of the most prominent leaders of the
anti-Thaksin "People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)," whose
massive rallies paved the way for the ouster of PM Thaksin,
said he opposed holding elections in December. Media mogul
Sondhi Limthongkul complained that here has been no political
reform since the September coup, and elections this year
would just return Thailand to the same problems it was facing
before the coup. He told polcouns on April 26 that he would
consider supporting junta chief GEN Sonthi to replace interim
PM Surayud, but the general would have to commit to holding
elections in 2008, to a timetable for political and media
reform, and to a genuinely inclusive process. Sondhi pointed
out the need to reform the institution of the monarchy as
well. Sondhi has not made a final decision on whether to
support the ouster of PM Surayud, and he does not yet appear
to have the support of all the elements of the loosely-knit
PAD coalition. Polcouns emphasized the importance of holding
elections this year to avoid both international condemnation
and a backlash within Thailand. Sondhi appears motivated
largely by his deep-seated hatred of Thaksin. He
overestimates his influence, but he could cause some problems
for the interim government and the election timetable if he
rallied his supporters to oppose the constitution and
December elections. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Sondhi Limthongkul, rabble-rousing leader of the
anti-Thaksin demonstrations last year, told Polcouns on April
26 that he opposed holding elections in December because
"there has been no political or media reform." He complained
that the government has done nothing to educate the
grassroots (i.e., Thaksin supporters) and therefore the
elections would not lead to democracy, but would just return
Thailand to the same problems it faced under Thaksin.

SONDHI AND SONTHI
--------------



3. (C) Polcouns asked Sondhi about the rumors that he had
swung his support to junta chief GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin,
and that the powerful anti-Thaksin coalition People's
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) wanted to oust PM Surayud.
Sondhi said that he would consider supporting the general to
be prime minister under very specific circumstances. First,
GEN Sonthi would have to "make a contract" setting an
election date in 2008. He would have to lay out a
"quarter-by-quarter" timetable for political and media
reform. He would have to make it a genuinely inclusive
process, with a new legislative assembly and a new cabinet.
Genuinely inclusive meant that it should include politicians,
who have been, after all, the elected representatives of the
people. This appointed legislative assembly could therefore
be "almost like an elected one." The cabinet should include
politicians from the political parties as well.


4. (C) Sondhi said that he would have to wait to see the
result of important events in May and June before deciding
whether to commit his support to the general. The court would
decide whether to dissolve Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party and the Democrat Party at the end of May. The Assets
Examination Commission was expected to take some significant
steps against Thaksin in the coming weeks as well. These
events would have a major effect on the political landscape.


5. (C) Finally, by June the probable fate of the draft
constitution would become clearer. "This draft constitution
does not give the military what it needs," Sondhi said. It
was possible that the 100-member Constitution Drafting
Assembly, which must approve the draft constitution before it
goes to public referendum, would vote to reject the draft.
"GEN Sonthi wants Surayud out, but he cannot ask him," Sondhi
said (because Surayud had been GEN Sonthi's boss and because
the PM still has support from influential Privy Council
President Prem.) The rejection of the draft constitution by

BANGKOK 00002424 002 OF 003


the Assembly could provoke a political crisis; that crisis
could provide the excuse for GEN Sonthi to sideline Surayud
and step in, Sondhi speculated. "Let's talk again in June,"
he suggested.

WHAT A TERRIBLE IDEA
--------------


6. (C) Polcouns said that any move of this kind would be
condemned by the international community and would not be
accepted by the Thai people. We firmly believed that
elections this year were necessary. Trust in and support for
the interim government and the coup-makers' Council for
National Security is already low and falling. Why would
anyone believe GEN Sonthi's "contract" for reform and
elections in 2008 if he broke the promises he has already
made -- to return to elected government and not to take over
as PM? Furthermore, GEN Sonthi's performance has given no
evidence that he is even capable of leading the country
through such a long and difficult period. "But he wants to,"
Sondhi replied. He went on to say, essentially, that the
public would accept the general's leadership if he received
Sondhi Limthongkul's imprimatur, and kept to the timetable
promised.

"THIS MADMAN SONDHI"
--------------


7. (C) Sondhi took the occasion to review his role in the
overthrow of PM Thaksin. Thaksin had disturbed the order of
Thai society, he said. Previously, there had been an
established relationship between the 'feudal' elements of
Thai society (meaning the Palace and the circle of old elite
families) and the business community. Patronage flowed
across the bridge in one direction, money and fidelity in the
other. Thaksin had destroyed that bridge, and tried to
isolate the King as a purely symbolic figure. He interfered
in the military, which was the King's domain. No one had
dared to challenge Thaksin, however, until "this madman
Sondhi" began to rally opposition, said Sondhi, referring to
himself in the third person. Sondhi used his cable TV access
to reach the neglected middle class ("12 million viewers")
all around Thailand. This middle-class ("largely
Chinese-Thai," he added) had always paid their taxes in full,
but got nothing for it.

REFORM OF THE MONARCHY
--------------


8. (C) Looking ahead, Sondhi said that one important issue
that had to be addressed was whether the King would permit
the reform of the monarchy and the institutions around it.
The King, at 80 years old, had "at best`{Va']Ntfor the Privy Council: an
end to lucrative positions as board members of big companies.
Sondhi said he had publicly criticized Privy Council
President Prem for taking money from so many companies; in
response, he claimed, Prem was resigning from the board of CP
(a controversial conglomerate that had supported PM Thaksin),
but would retain his seat on the board of less controversial
companies, like Bangkok Bank.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Since the beginning of his anti-Thaksin
demonstrations, Sondhi Limthongkul has been driven foremost
by a deep and personal hatred of former PM Thaksin. PM
Surayud has frustrated the hard-core anti-Thaksin faction
with his emphasis on reconciliation and on a slow and
legally-defensible investigation of corruption allegations.
It is worth noting that Sondhi was speaking personally, and
did not claim to be speaking for all of the PAD, at least not
yet. In our view, Sondhi overestimates his own influence,
but, even so, he could cause trouble for the interim
government and the election timetable if he decides to rally

BANGKOK 00002424 003 OF 003


opposition to the constitution and December elections.
ARVIZU