GENERAL WINAI PROMISES AMBASSADOR HELP ON MARTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000231 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER PHUM MOPS ASEC KDEM TH SUBJECT: GENERAL WINAI PROMISES AMBASSADOR HELP ON MARTIAL LAW REF: A. BANGKOK 179 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD) ¶B. BANGKOK 151 (PRASONG ON BOMBINGS) ¶C. BANGKOK 111 (PRESSING WINAI) ¶D. BANGKOK 110 (CDA FORESEES PROGRESS) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a four-eyes lunch I hosted for Council for National Security Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul, I pushed for a quick recision of martial law. Using maps to graphically illustrate our concerns, I emphasized it was important to go beyond the planned partial lifting and return Thailand to pre-coup conditions. Winai promised to do what he could to expedite this. I welcomed indications the constitution might be completed ahead of schedule. Winai said his attempts to discourage the media from focusing on deposed Prime Minister Thaksin (septel) had been misrepresented as more heavy-handed than they in fact were. He indicated Thaksin cannot negotiate conditions for his return to Thailand, saying legal processes had to continue. While Thaksin should not be allowed to resume political activities, Winai said the authorities did not intend for him to face imprisonment, although the courts would impose significant fines for his financial misdeeds. Thai Rak Thai should be dissolved, Winai said, and he denied he aimed to become active in party politics. We also discussed former Prime Minister Chavalit, the New Year's Eve bombings, and the organization of security forces. Septel will report our discussion of Hmong refugees. End Summary. EXPLAINING HIS PLEA TO THE PRESS -------------- ¶2. (C) Winai came to the Residence for lunch on January 11, arriving in a good mood and seemingly relaxed, despite all the problems facing the current government. Knowing that I would bring up the press reports that he had ordered a clampdown on the media (septel),he quickly addressed the issue, saying he wished Thaksin would "give up and go away." That was why Winai had summoned the media executives, he said -- not to order them what to do, but simply to request that the journalists ease up on covering Thaksin for a few months. He did not want the CNS to have to play politics and continue sparring with Thaksin through the press. Winai stressed that he had no objection to journalists criticizing the government for whatever it might do wrongly. MARTIAL LAW -------------- ¶3. (C) I explained to Winai the USG's profound disappointment with the RTG's failure to lift martial law. Well over a month since Prime Minister Surayud promised President Bush that he would rescind martial law, we still did not have even the partial recision that had been announced November 28. Winai offered the same explanation that Prime Minister Surayud had given me the day before (ref A),citing nomenclature irregularities. He promised to help fix the problem and secure the partial lifting as soon as possible. ¶4. (C) Progress on this issue would be essential in order for us to begin envisioning a restoration of the RTG's credibility, I said. Citing an RTG request to explore a possible visit to Washington of Foreign Minister Nitya, I said that I would have great difficulty recommending that the USG welcome such a visit. Thailand should not simply carry out its partial lifting of martial law, but return to the pre-coup circumstances (when martial law was in effect in a limited number of border areas) in order for Nitya to be taken seriously by USG interlocutors. ¶5. (C) To explain the situation more fully, I pulled out two maps we had created at the Embassy, showing graphically where martial law had been in place prior to the coup, and how much more widespread it would be even after the RTG's planned partial lifting. (We have e-mailed copies of the maps to EAP/MLS.) Winai appeared taken aback by the amount of territory that would remain under martial law. He said he understood USG discomfort on this issue, and he would do his best to expedite the partial recision, with a return to the BANGKOK 00000231 002 OF 003 status quo ante as soon as possible after that. TIMETABLE -------------- ¶6. (C) The CNS and the administration had devised various timetables since the coup, I said, and they had managed to stay basically on track, although there were grounds to criticize the way they had met their deadlines. I noted the recent prediction by the Constitution Drafting Assembly President that the constitution could be finished ahead of schedule (ref D),and I said those comments were tremendously welcome. Promulgating the constitution ahead of schedule would be extremely well-received, I stressed, and Winai took the message on board. THAKSIN CANNOT SET CONDITIONS FOR RETURN -------------- ¶7. (C) I asked Winai about Thaksin's claim that he had approached the administration several times and offered to quit politics if the government would simply drop the charges against him and let him return to Thailand. Winai appeared unaware of any such offer, but he stressed that if Thaksin were to come back, he would have to do so without conditions -- and this would not happen for some time. The court procedures relating to Thaksin's misdeeds would have to go forward. Winai anticipated that Thaksin would face at least a 10 billion Baht (almost 280 million USD) tax bill for his profit on the sale of Shin Corp. Once Thaksin were to pay the fine and promise to quit politics, he then would be able to return. Winai noted that the courts might sentence Thaksin to serve time in prison, but he said if that were the case, the authorities would be inclined to let him off, using "good behavior" or some other rationale. They did not feel it was necessary for Thaksin to go to jail. ¶8. (C) I noted that the investigation of Thaksin's children (the principle Shin Corp shareholders at the time of the sale to Temasek) might generate sympathy for the family, since the two are relatively young adults who do not come across in the media as malicious. Winai acknowledged that was the case, but he noted -- without histrionics -- that it was Thaksin who had brought this upon his children, by involving them in his financial schemes. ¶9. (C) In an aside, Winai remarked that the real reason for the coup had been to ensure Thaksin would remain out of power forever. He was simply not acceptable to "those upstairs," Winai said, alluding to the monarchy. THAI RAK THAI MUST BE DISSOLVED -------------- ¶10. (C) I asked Winai how he felt about Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. He insisted that it would have to be dissolved. (The Constitutional Tribunal, empowered to dissolve political parties, is considering serious allegations of anti-democratic activities against TRT that could lead to its dissolution; these allegations pre-date the coup.) I asked how he felt about the prospect of Thailand returning to an era in which government power constantly shifted between weak parties. Winai acknowledged the possibility existed, and he said it would be up to the constitution drafters to devise a good system for governance. ¶11. (C) I asked if Winai, as rumored, was contemplating a future for himself in party politics. He stated unconditionally and absolutely that he had no such interest. He acknowledged that he met with politicians but framed that as necessary in order to encourage Thaksin's loyalists to distance themselves from their former patron. ¶12. (C) Turning to perpetual bete noir Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, I asked Winai his assessment of the former Prime Minister's agenda. Upon hearing Chavalit's name uttered, Winai flinched visibly. Winai said one of his contacts -- a former politician with ties to the media world -- had admitted counseling Chavalit that the current field of politicians might be sufficiently weak that Chavalit could emerge from retirement, win election as Prime Minister, and redeem himself for his last disastrous term in office. This was what had provoked Chavalit's latest return to the political BANGKOK 00000231 003 OF 003 stage. ¶13. (C) I asked whether Winai believed Chavalit was involved in the December 31 bombings. Winai said this was plausible, but he did not know. I floated Prasong Soonsiri's scenario (ref B),in which Thaksin finances mischief, Chavalit devises the strategy, and discontented police officers plant the bombs. Winai said this was a reasonable possibility, consistent with the CNS's assessment -- but he lamented that they lacked the evidence to establish the truth. However, he estimated up to 40 people might have been involved in the attacks, and he hoped that one of the culprits would turn up and crack. ORGANIZING THE SECURITY FORCES -------------- ¶14. (C) Noting Surayud's comments the day before about responding to security threats using the 2005 Emergency Decree, I asked if Winai considered that practical. Winai said he did; when I noted that the Emergency Decree would empower the police, Winai said that was true, but the military could deploy as well, in a supporting role. ¶15. (C) I asked Winai for his view of the draft internal security act, which Surayud had also mentioned. Winai confirmed this was in the works. He explained that Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin intended to remain head of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) until the fall, but after that he was recommending that someone other than the Army Commander head an interagency organization like ISOC. ISOC should fall under the Supreme Commander, Winai said -- or perhaps even a civilian. ¶16. (C) I asked also about the creation of the CNS's Special Operations Center. Winai said it was Sonthi's initiative. The concept was that the Center would enable the CNS to penetrate hard-core pro-Thaksin areas and carry out a type of reeducation of Thaksin supporters, persuading them that Thaksin would not be returning to power, but that his more popular programs in the rural areas would be maintained, and the nation would be moving on. (This seems quite similar to the strategy used successfully against the communists.) COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) Winai is the brains behind the CNS and also an experienced, IMET-trained officer with a good understanding of the United States. He has leverage and influence with the leadership. His long experience dealing with both the USG and the U.S. Congress makes him receptive to our strong messages. That said, we'll believe it when we see it, given the overall sense the interim government and CNS are increasingly bogged down in a quagmire of their own making. BOYCE