Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK2304
2007-04-24 10:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

DEMOCRAT OFFICIAL WARNS OF SONTHI'S AMBITIONS,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS ASEC TH 
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6438
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 7042
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1733
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002304 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT OFFICIAL WARNS OF SONTHI'S AMBITIONS,
SURAYUD'S WEAKNESS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2280 (MEETING WITH WINAI)


B. BANGKOK 964 (SOMKID APPOINTMENT)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002304

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT OFFICIAL WARNS OF SONTHI'S AMBITIONS,
SURAYUD'S WEAKNESS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2280 (MEETING WITH WINAI)


B. BANGKOK 964 (SOMKID APPOINTMENT)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) There is mounting evidence of serious rifts between PM
Surayud and junta leader General Sonthi. An experienced
politician told us on April 23 that Sonthi has at least
considered replacing Surayud. Democrat Party (DP) Secretary
General Suthep Thaugsuban recounted a discussion in early
April in which Sonthi recruited him for a ministerial slot,
and raised the possibility of heading something like a
national unity government. Although Suthep believed the
tensions might have eased since then, he said that Surayud
faced a hostile alliance that includes military officers and
other high profile activists who organized large protests in
Bangkok in 2005 and 2006. Suthep said the CNS wanted to
establish its own party and therefore had a shared interest
with others who would like to weaken the DP or see a change
in the party's leadership. Suthep declined to predict how
the Palace would react to a change in government leadership,
but he claimed the King only signaled his support for the
2006 coup after the fact, when urged by the Queen. Suthep
said he disagreed with some key provisions of the draft
constitution, but he would be willing to accept the current
draft in order that elections can be held in 2007. End
Summary.

WARNING ABOUT SONTHI
--------------


2. (C) Democrat Party Secretary General Suthep Thaugsuban
warned in an April 23 meeting of serious rifts between CNS
Chairman General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and PM Surayud
Chulanont. While Sonthi previously appeared apolitical,
Suthep said that events subsequent to the coup had affected
Sonthi's ambitions. Being in a position of greater power
also had stoked interest on the part of Sonthi and other CNS
figures, such as CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul, in
using their influence to accumulate wealth. Surayud,

however, remained clean, Suthep claimed.


3. (C) Suthep said he had dined with Sonthi prior to the
April 13-17 Songkran holidays. At that dinner, Sonthi
invited Suthep to join a cabinet which Sonthi might form, in
the event that Sonthi were to replace Surayud and install
himself as Prime Minister. Suthep said he had declined
Sonthi's offer, saying the Democrats would not serve any
government installed by a coup. At one point in the meal,
Sonthi took out a pen and paper to note down whatever names
Suthep might suggest as suitable cabinet members, indicating
his interest in perhaps forming some kind of national unity
government.

KEY FIGURES OPPOSING SURAYUD
--------------


4. (C) Suthep said that Surayud faced a number of prominent
opponents; Sonthi was just the most prominent of these
figures, who are united primarily by opposition to Surayud's
relative restraint and reliance on legal procedures in
efforts to punish Thaksin for abuses of power during his time
in office. Included in this group were CNS Secretary General
Winai, CNS Deputy Secretary General Saprang Kalayanamitr,
media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, retired General Chamlong
Srimuang, and perennial plotter (and Constitution Drafting
Committee Chairman) Prasong Soonsiri. (Note: Sondhi and
Chamlong were the highest profile members of the People's
Alliance for Democracy -- PAD -- which was instrumental in
mobilizing members of the middle and upper class against PM
Thaksin; the PAD has in recent weeks been publicly critical
of Surayud. End Note.) Suthep believed that it would not be
necessary to stage a coup to oust Surayud -- he did not want
to be PM anyway, and he would be ready to resign if asked.


5. (C) Suthep noted that Prasong Soonsiri hoped to become
Prime Minister. In the event of Surayud's resignation,
however, Suthep felt it was certain that Sonthi would take
the top job for himself. Suthep claimed the anti-Surayud
camp's plan for seizing power was dubbed as the "1-4-4"
formula: elections would be delayed for one year, and then a

BANGKOK 00002304 002 OF 003


CNS figure or proxy would serve as PM for two full four-year
terms.


6. (C) Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda -- widely
seen as a key figure behind the September 2006 coup d'etat --
had recently signaled his displeasure with Sonthi, according
to Suthep. Suthep related that Prem had spoken warmly with
Surayud at a Songkran event; by contrast, when in Sonthi's
presence, Prem refused to address the CNS Chairman. Suthep
interpreted Prem's shunning of Sonthi as reflecting
displeasure with Sonthi's growing ambitions.


7. (C) After the Songkran holidays, Suthep told us, he had
greeted Sonthi at a wedding reception. At that event, Sonthi
reportedly told Suthep that he was feeling more comfortable
with the political climate. Nevertheless, Suthep felt the
political situation remained unstable, and he suggested that
we do what we can to bolster Surayud's position, so as to
decrease the likelihood of Sonthi taking full control of the
government.

VIEW OF THE KING'S POSITION
--------------


8. (C) We asked Suthep how he believed the Palace would view
efforts by the CNS to force Surayud -- a former member of the
Privy Council -- out of office. Suthep declined to
speculate, but he said King Bhumibol had not favored the 2006
coup. Suthep claimed that, on the night of the coup, the
King had resisted meeting with the Generals who overthrew
Thaksin. In the end, the King gave in to the entreaties of
Queen Sirikit, but he publicly signaled her role in the coup
by approving the release of a photograph of that audience
which showed the King, casually dressed, in profile, while
the Queen faced the camera.

PRESSURE ON THE DP LEADERSHIP
--------------


9. (C) We asked about the possible dissolution of the
Democrat Party; the Constitutional Tribunal's verdict is due
to be announced at the end of May. Suthep said there were
many outside and even inside the DP who hoped for its
dissolution. Sonthi and Winai were working with former TRT
official Phinij Jarusombat to establish a new political party
that would act as the CNS's political vehicle, Suthep said.
(Note: Ref B reported Phinij's participation in a new
political grouping. End Note.) Intending to use this new
party to compete for power when elections take place, the CNS
had a clear interest in weakening the Democrat Party and
other rivals, Suthep said. In this respect, CNS and Thai Rak
Thai (TRT) interests overlapped.


10. (C) Former PM Chuan Leekpai also had supporters who hoped
for Chuan's return to preeminence in the DP, and they would
welcome a Constitutional Tribunal ruling dissolving the
party. Such a ruling would pave the way for Chuan, now
sidelined as a senior advisor, to head a reconstituted
version of the DP. Suthep -- whose allegedly improper
actions lie at the core of the Constitutional Tribunal
proceedings against the DP -- declined to predict the
Tribunal's ruling. However, he noted that Thaksin had
budgeted 500 million Baht (over 14 million USD) in order to
influence the Tribunal members, and Suthep alleged that the
wife of Tribunal President (and concurrently Supreme Court
President) Panya Thanomrod had accepted a portion of this
money.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
--------------


11. (C) When asked for his views on the draft constitution,
Suthep decried it as an unsatisfactory compromise product.
He joked that the draft was so poor that it was almost as if
the drafters themselves wanted the public to reject it. (In
a more serious tone, he suggested that General Sonthi likely
had an alternate constitution prepared in the event that he
needed one.)


12. (C) Suthep said the drafters should have abolished the
Senate rather than making it an appointed body. He also
expressed dissatisfaction with provisions that establish in
unclear terms a new method for election to the House from one
or more party lists. Suthep advocated abolishing the party

BANGKOK 00002304 003 OF 003


list system entirely, saying that party lists improperly
signal that those elected by virtue of their positions on the
lists are more elite than their colleagues who are elected on
a constituency basis. The party list MPs generally fail to
attend community events and disregard the electorate, Suthep
complained.


13. (C) The DP was currently assembling its formal reaction
to the draft constitution, Suthep said. Nevertheless,
despite his dissatisfaction, he told us if he had to choose
today, he would vote in favor of this constitution, simply to
make it more likely that elections would take place this
year, as planned. After elections, the legislature could
amend the constitution.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Suthep's discussion mirrors others we have been
hearing here. People are worried that the political
situation is precarious, and they do not trust any of their
political leaders. Despite claims to the contrary, there
appear to be serious differences between Surayud and Sonthi,
and it is widely believed Sonthi has at least considered
taking over from Surayud. (Even General Winai recently
confirmed to the Ambassador that Sonthi's interest in
pursuing elected politics had grown -- ref A.) In the longer
term, the CNS has to be worried about how to ensure their
continuing safety from reprisal from Thaksin. More
immediately, it has to figure up how to shore up the public's
dwindling confidence in the interim government and somehow
stumble through the current transition back to elected
government. The Ambassador has scheduled a dinner with
Sonthi on May 2 and will use the occasion to reinforce
strongly our interest in civilian governance during the
interim administration, elections in 2007, and fair treatment
of political parties and their constituents.
BOYCE