AMBASSADOR AND CNS GENERAL WINAI DISCUSS POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002280 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON EINV KDEM KJUS ASEC TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND CNS GENERAL WINAI DISCUSS POLITICAL SITUATION REF: A. BANGKOK 1715 (SURAYUD ON CIVIL LIBERTIES) ¶B. BANGKOK 1538 (AMBASSDOR MEETS WITH CHATURON) ¶C. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (BUILDING CASE VS. THAKSIN) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) A top military officer expressed concern that opposition politicians are fomenting trouble, including by manipulating opposition to the draft Constitution. In an April 20 meeting, Council for National Security (CNS) Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul told the Ambassador that SIPDIS deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's activities remained of concern, but by the end of May the government would have established grounds for his prosecution for financial improprieties. There also were solid grounds for dissolving Thaksin's former party, although Winai acknowledged Thai Rak Thai (TRT) would be able to reconstitute itself after dissolution; Winai hoped the stigma of a ruling that the party cheated in an election would impede a TRT comeback. Winai said Prime Minister Surayud was becoming more decisive and would carry out a major cabinet reshuffle in a month, if the current cabinet continued to languish. CNS Chairman General Sonthi was considering a move into elected politics after retirement from the Army. At Winai's request, the Ambassador explained the USG had no interest in internationalizing the security situation in southern Thailand. The Ambassador also explained that the draft revisions to the Foreign Business Act were harmful to the investment climate. End Summary. WORRIED ABOUT THAKSIN AND HIS CLIQUE -------------- ¶2. (C) General Winai opened his discussion with the Ambassador by expressing concern about the overall situation in Thailand, noting mischievous politicians were roiling the waters and trying to take advantage of the difficulties encountered by the Council for National Security (CNS) and Prime Minister Surayud's administration. When pressed, though, Winai admitted he was uncertain whether former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was trying to direct events, or whether close allies of his (e.g., Newin Chidchob and Prommin Lertsuridej) were trying to further Thaksin's interests. Another possibility was former PM Chavalit, who has rekindled dreams of becoming PM again. Winai expressed concern about rumors that former Natural Resources Minister Yongyuth Tiyapairat has appeared at certain points in the Thai-Lao and Thai-Cambodian border areas. (Yongyuth currently holds a U.S. student visa, issued subsequent to the coup, and we understood he was pursuing studies in the U.S.) ¶3. (C) Thaksin had written to King Bhumibol, pledging to quit politics, Winai recounted. Thaksin had claimed his wife, Potjaman, would divorce him if he sought to return to political life. Thaksin also had contacted the Thai Ambassador in London to try to arrange an audience with Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn during the Crown Prince's April visit to the United Kingdom. Winai said that when the Thai Ambassador denied this request, Thaksin waited in the lobby of the Crown Prince's hotel, inserting himself into the receiving line of hotel staff. On arrival, according to Winai, the Crown Prince had a very brief exchange with Thaksin in this public setting. But when Winai later told unspecified figures from Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party that the deposed PM was acting inappropriately, Winai's TRT interlocutor claimed that the Crown Prince had summoned Thaksin for a lengthy audience. Winai claimed this story illustrated an unacceptable effort by Thaksin to force himself upon the royal family -- and then misrepresent his interactions. ¶4. (C) Winai was optimistic that the government would take effective legal action against Thaksin by the end of May. The Asset Examination Commission (AEC) had clear evidence that Thaksin had inappropriately evaded taxation, and it would impose a substantial penalty on him for doing so. The AEC also would present a strong case that Thaksin had improperly used cutout firms ("nominees") to evade certain provisions of law. Winai admitted, however, that efforts to prosecute Thaksin over his wife's purchase of land from a state agency (ref C) might flounder, especially as former BANGKOK 00002280 002 OF 004 Deputy PM Pridiyathorn Devakula had recently testified before the AEC that the Prime Minister had no formal authority over the state agency in question. (Pridiyathorn subsequently complained that news reports casting his testimony as favorable to Thaksin's side were unfair, as he had simply provided facts without offering his opinion or interpretation.) THAI RAK THAI'S FATE -------------- ¶5. (C) The Constitutional Tribunal had seen strong evidence that TRT had engaged in fraudulent and undemocratic acts during the April 2006 election, Winai said, citing conversations he had with members of the Tribunal. While Winai believed the Tribunal had sufficient cause to rule against TRT and order the party's dissolution (as Winai has predicted in previous meetings with the Ambassador),he mentioned that at least two of the nine Tribunal members had been offered very substantial bribes by Thaksin's associates. When the Ambassador noted that TRT figures planned to reconstitute the party after dissolution (see ref B),Winai admitted this was likely, but he believed that a formal ruling that TRT had cheated in the last election would meaningfully harm the party's reputation and impede it from making a comeback. SURAYUD IN CHARGE -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Winai if he was disappointed with PM Surayud's performance. Winai said he felt more of a sense of pity, rather than disappointment; Surayud's cabinet had failed to perform. The Ambassador noted that, because Surayud did not have a wide circle of civilian acquaintances from the political class, he appeared to have relied on Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda to identify figures for his cabinet. Consequently, Prem -- age 86 -- had recommended people relatively advanced in years (average age 64). Winai agreed this was part of the problem. He derided the cabinet as inept, saying that the cabinet's poor performance had contributed to unfounded rumors of a rift between the CNS and Surayud's administration. Winai said that the PM and CNS leaders had agreed to meet more often and to try to show the public that they were working together. ¶7. (C) Winai was optimistic that Surayud, after his recent extended medical check-up, appeared more energized and determined. (Comment: This tracks with what we have heard from other contacts. End Comment.) He was acting more decisively, and would carry out a complete reshuffle of his cabinet in a month if it continued its poor performance. Addressing Surayud's imminent plan to add a handful of deputy ministers to the cabinet, Winai said that this was Surayud's way of taking a more limited measure, so he would not have to fire anyone, but could still inject new blood into the cabinet. SONTHI RECONSIDERING HIS FUTURE -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked about the plan, floated in the press and subsequently rejected, for a new cabinet position of Deputy PM for Security Affairs. Winai admitted that the creation of this position had been his own idea; he believed it would be useful, to bridge the gap between the CNS and the administration, if CNS Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin were to take this job. Surayud was willing to go along with the plan, Winai claimed, but Sonthi was against it, at least in part because of the negative reaction from foreign quarters. The Ambassador said in clear terms that it would be a mistake to place General Sonthi in a cabinet position; if Sonthi had gone along with this plan, it would have created headaches for the friends of Thailand who supported maximum civilian influence in this government and the earliest possible return to elected civilian leadership. ¶9. (C) Winai added that General Sonthi was reconsidering his earlier determination to avoid a political role for himself in the future. He might run for elected office after his retirement from the Army later this year. Until Thaksin's future disposition was clear, CNS figures could not rule out the deposed PM returning and wreaking havoc on the country -- and possibly acting vengefully against CNS members. The BANGKOK 00002280 003 OF 004 Ambassador expressed surprise that Sonthi might turn to elected politics, noting he lacked the background and instincts to be an effective politician. A move by Sonthi along these lines would complicate efforts of his associates to argue that he was motivated simply by the political crisis of 2005-06, rather than a desire to institutionalize a more powerful role for the armed forces. CONSTITUTION -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador requested Winai's views on the draft constitution. Winai noted the draft was under attack from many quarters, for different reasons. Issues of concern included the nature of the Senate, the creation of multi-member districts, a revamping of the party list system, and especially the decision (consistent with all previous constitution drafts) not to establish Buddhism as Thailand's official religion. This last issue was being exploited by some of the government's foes, Winai lamented -- principally former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who was working behind the scenes to promote public opposition to the draft constitution. Winai observed that Chavalit's ambition to return as Prime Minister remained, and that many of his former New Aspiration Party associates (such as current TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng and Deputy Leader Sudarat Keyuraphan) remained in contact with Chavalit. The former PM's residence buzzed with activity, just as it had when he was in office, Winai observed. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador asked Winai about the recent trip he had taken to Europe over the (mid-April) Songkran holiday. Press reports had surmised that Winai and his traveling companions -- National Legislative Assembly President Meechai Ruchupan and leading constitutional scholars Borwornsak Uwanno and Wissanu Krea-ngam -- had worked on a new constitution draft. Winai told the Ambassador that the trip was purely a sightseeing vacation, devoid of political plotting. (Comment: We remain skeptical. End Comment.) ¶12. (C) Recalling PM Surayud's explanation that the RTG would restore full civil liberties after the passage of a new law on security affairs (ref A),the Ambassador said that, if such a law was indeed a prerequisite for returning to normalcy, it would be good for the government to ensure speedy passage. Winai offered no substantive reply. SOUTH -------------- ¶13. (C) Alluding to recent public comments by a senior U.S. military officer, Winai asked the Ambassador to explain recent foreign interest in the security situation in southern Thailand. He said he was asking this at the request of General Sonthi. The Ambassador explained that the USG had no intention of promoting a foreign presence in southern Thailand; the U.S. military officer's remarks had been sensationalized by an aggressive journalist who had pressed the officer in order to get material for an article. Winai said he was relieved to hear this explanation, which he would relay to General Sonthi. INVESTMENT CLIMATE -------------- ¶14. (C) The Ambassador closed the meeting by expressing concern about the draft revision to the Foreign Business Act (FBA),which would have a negative impact on the investment climate in Thailand. The Ambassador noted that U.S. corporations would in effect be penalized for following long-established practice that benefited the Thai economy. The Ambassador related that a major U.S. agricultural corporation had cancelled a planned 100 million USD expansion because of concern about the uncertain regulation of foreign ventures. The USG understood the RTG's motivation to address irregularities relating to the Shinawatra family's sale of the Shin Corporation to Singapore's Temasek investment firm. But such measures would scare away U.S. corporations, which had other options for investment in the region. Winai conceded that the investment climate was suffering as a consequence of the many problems affecting the country and the administration. COMMENT BANGKOK 00002280 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶15. (C) Winai's claim that CNS opponents are stoking opposition to the draft constitution is not surprising. Winai's allegation that General Sonthi would like to remain in a position of political influence is also plausible; septel will report further concerns we have heard on this issue. Finally, we understand Winai's logic in arguing that a finding by the Constitutional Tribunal against TRT would harm the (reconstituted) party's prospects in the next election. However, Winai may not realize that the Tribunal, as a new institution created post-coup, has a questionable degree of moral authority; regardless of the facts of the case, TRT officials may be able to convince their supporters -- not to mention more neutral voters dismayed by the inept performance of the Surayud administration -- that their party never received a fair hearing. BOYCE