Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK1973
2007-04-04 10:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
VIEWS ON ASEAN CHARTER, US-ASEAN RELATIONS, TAC
VZCZCXRO4087 RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #1973 0941010 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 041010Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6051 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4039 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6996 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001973
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MORROW
STATE FOR EAP/RSP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016
TAGS: PREL TH
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON ASEAN CHARTER, US-ASEAN RELATIONS, TAC
REF: A. MANILA 748
B. MANILA 499
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001973
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MORROW
STATE FOR EAP/RSP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016
TAGS: PREL TH
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON ASEAN CHARTER, US-ASEAN RELATIONS, TAC
REF: A. MANILA 748
B. MANILA 499
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of other discussions, a
couple of post interlocutors have briefly raised issues
connected to the ASEAN charter drafting and US-ASEAN
relations. On the charter, civil society is trying to play a
role, and Burma is not (yet) blocking some controversial
provisions, but it is hard to imagine that the charter will
contain effective mechanisms for addressing human rights
problems in member states. On US-ASEAN relations, our
interlocutors say, signing the TAC would have a very high
symbolic value, and lack of ratification by the Senate, if
handled carefully, might not be an insurmountable obstacle.
End Summary
ASEAN CHARTER
--------------
2. (C) An MFA official in the East Asian Affairs division
noted with surprise that the Burmese had not yet actively
worked to derail some elements proposed for the ASEAN
Charter, including a provision that might allow the expulsion
of members. He theorized that the Burmese might be biding
their time, and planning to oppose such language later in the
process. He agreed that that Burma might be seeking to work
with Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to keep controversial
provisions out of the Charter, but noted that Cambodia had
shown no evidence of favoring cooperation with Burma along
these lines. Quite the opposite -- Cambodia had joined with
Thailand in pressuring Burma to "do something" to help ASEAN
argue against further sanctions by the international
community.
3. (C) We also spoke to a journalist and representative of
the Southeast Asian Press Alliance who had been at the ASEAN
Civil Society Organizations forum in Manila last month. He
complained that it would be very difficult to get a good
charter for ASEAN now; Thailand had previously taken a stand
on promoting human rights within ASEAN, but former PM Thaksin
had eroded that position, and sentiment overall in ASEAN had
swung back toward "non-interference." However, he gave
current PM Surayud some credit, saying that he had instructed
the foreign minister to argue for a human rights mechanism in
the new charter. The NGO consultations in Manila last month
were supposed to contribute to that goal, but they had been
hastily arranged and many countries could not send a strong
and well-prepared delegation.
WHY NOT THE TAC?
--------------
4. (C) Following up on reftels, we asked each of these
contacts about the issue of the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC). Did it still matter much, after all these
years, that the US had not signed the TAC? Both agreed that
the TAC had great symbolic value, and that the US signature
could have a real impact. We raised the obstacle that the
Senate was unlikely to ratify the treaty. The journalist
responded, "Who cares?" He said that would not be issue --
the symbol of the signing would be the main thing. The MFA
contact was more cautious. He said that it would certainly
be unfortunate if the Senate voted the treaty down, and
better if the Senate would ratify. However, he also
indicated that a middle ground -- the Senate studying the
issue for a protracted period, for example -- might
be acceptable.
ARVIZU
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MORROW
STATE FOR EAP/RSP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016
TAGS: PREL TH
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON ASEAN CHARTER, US-ASEAN RELATIONS, TAC
REF: A. MANILA 748
B. MANILA 499
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of other discussions, a
couple of post interlocutors have briefly raised issues
connected to the ASEAN charter drafting and US-ASEAN
relations. On the charter, civil society is trying to play a
role, and Burma is not (yet) blocking some controversial
provisions, but it is hard to imagine that the charter will
contain effective mechanisms for addressing human rights
problems in member states. On US-ASEAN relations, our
interlocutors say, signing the TAC would have a very high
symbolic value, and lack of ratification by the Senate, if
handled carefully, might not be an insurmountable obstacle.
End Summary
ASEAN CHARTER
--------------
2. (C) An MFA official in the East Asian Affairs division
noted with surprise that the Burmese had not yet actively
worked to derail some elements proposed for the ASEAN
Charter, including a provision that might allow the expulsion
of members. He theorized that the Burmese might be biding
their time, and planning to oppose such language later in the
process. He agreed that that Burma might be seeking to work
with Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to keep controversial
provisions out of the Charter, but noted that Cambodia had
shown no evidence of favoring cooperation with Burma along
these lines. Quite the opposite -- Cambodia had joined with
Thailand in pressuring Burma to "do something" to help ASEAN
argue against further sanctions by the international
community.
3. (C) We also spoke to a journalist and representative of
the Southeast Asian Press Alliance who had been at the ASEAN
Civil Society Organizations forum in Manila last month. He
complained that it would be very difficult to get a good
charter for ASEAN now; Thailand had previously taken a stand
on promoting human rights within ASEAN, but former PM Thaksin
had eroded that position, and sentiment overall in ASEAN had
swung back toward "non-interference." However, he gave
current PM Surayud some credit, saying that he had instructed
the foreign minister to argue for a human rights mechanism in
the new charter. The NGO consultations in Manila last month
were supposed to contribute to that goal, but they had been
hastily arranged and many countries could not send a strong
and well-prepared delegation.
WHY NOT THE TAC?
--------------
4. (C) Following up on reftels, we asked each of these
contacts about the issue of the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC). Did it still matter much, after all these
years, that the US had not signed the TAC? Both agreed that
the TAC had great symbolic value, and that the US signature
could have a real impact. We raised the obstacle that the
Senate was unlikely to ratify the treaty. The journalist
responded, "Who cares?" He said that would not be issue --
the symbol of the signing would be the main thing. The MFA
contact was more cautious. He said that it would certainly
be unfortunate if the Senate voted the treaty down, and
better if the Senate would ratify. However, he also
indicated that a middle ground -- the Senate studying the
issue for a protracted period, for example -- might
be acceptable.
ARVIZU