Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK1875
2007-03-29 23:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

WILL HE OR WON'T HE?: BACKGROUND TO DEBATE ON

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001875 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: WILL HE OR WON'T HE?: BACKGROUND TO DEBATE ON
EMERGENCY DECREE

REF: A. BANGKOK 1845 (SONTHI ASKS FOR EMERGENCY POWERS)

B. BANGKOK 1177 (PTV)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton reason 1.4 (b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001875

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: WILL HE OR WON'T HE?: BACKGROUND TO DEBATE ON
EMERGENCY DECREE

REF: A. BANGKOK 1845 (SONTHI ASKS FOR EMERGENCY POWERS)

B. BANGKOK 1177 (PTV)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton reason 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY and INTRODUCTION: According to breaking
news reports, Prime Minister Surayud announced this evening
that he would not agree to institute emergency measures in
Bangkok in advance of a demonstration to be held tomorrow.
The PM was responding to a request from GEN Sonthi, head of
the coup council, who said asked for emergency powers to fend
off instability caused by anti-government demonstrations.
Although we welcome the PM's decision, this issue is unlikely
to go away, as demonstrations against the government and coup
leaders are likely to continue and probably grow. The root
causes of the junta's anxiety remain. The background
information below provides insights into this week's debate
from a variety of sources. Based on these reports, it
appears that the CNS pressed hard for the PM to invoke the
2005 Emergency Decree, to block the next in a series of
anti-CNS demonstrations spearheaded by politicians loyal to
former PM Thaksin. According to one story, Surayud offered
to resign rather than support the introduction of emergency
measures. Opinion among political contacts is strongly
against the measure, and most of the press loudly condemned
the proposal, although there are some voices arguing the need
for "stability." The demonstrators appear determined to go
ahead with their protest, although they may be forced to
change the venue. End summary and introduction.

HOW DID THIS START?
--------------


2. (C) According to one credible source, GEN Sonthi contacted
the ringleader of the pro-Thaksin demonstrators at the
beginning of the week. He asked that the demonstrators leave
the Palace (and Privy Counselor Prem) out of their speeches.
(This group targeted the Privy Councilor before, marching on
his house during their March 18 protest). The general was
also concerned that they would publicly disclose the

not-so-secret fact that Sonthi (a Muslim) has two wives.
(According to one source, this violates military rules and
could lead to pressure for disciplinary action against
Sonthi.) Demonstration leader Veera Musikaphong reportedly
declined these requests.


3. (C) CNS Secretary-General Winai and GEN Sonthi then began
floating the idea of invoking the 2005 Emergency Decree in
Bangkok to prevent the protests from gathering steam. (Septel
provides information on the contents of the Emergency
Decree.) They spoke to several news outlets, raising
concerns about the demonstrations gaining momentum and
leading to "chaos." GEN Sonthi told the press on Wednesday
that he had asked PM Surayud to invoke the Emergency Decree
to give the security forces the powers they needed to
preserve stability.

PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION
--------------


4. (C) Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn (protect),a noted scholar
on security issues and a long-time contact, gave us a
read-out on the PM's meeting with academics on Wednesday.
This regularly-scheduled meeting turned into a discussion of
the emergency decree proposal. Panitan said that the CNS was
pressing the PM hard to invoke the decree. The media has
reacted very strongly against the CNS suggestion, sending the
PM a good signal. Panitan said that the academics advised
the PM that, in order to invoke the Emergency Decree, there
should first be a clear emergency. For the public to support
this measure, they must see that the situation is getting out
of control. The recent small demonstrations do not justify
the introduction of emergency measures, and the public will
not accept it, Panitan said.


5. (C) Panitan noted that Surayud is a cautious man and he

BANGKOK 00001875 002 OF 003


wanted to consider the matter carefully, even as the CNS
pressed for the decision "very soon" -- before the
demonstration on March 30. "This is exactly what we needed
the PM for, so he can face pressure," Panitan said, adding
that Surayud may not know much about finance or economics,
but he understands security issues. "Like the King said, he
is difficult to move either way." Panitan said that the
government/CNS were very perturbed about the effects of
upcoming TRT dissolution case, and the possible opposition to
the draft constitution, suggesting these factors were
important in the request for emergency powers.


6. (C) Former TRT Parliament speaker Bhokin also told us
that, in his opinion as well, Surayud did not want to invoke
the emergency decree. He wants to use soft measures, but the
CNS is afraid things will snowball and get out of control.
Several well-placed business contacts had heard that Surayud
had offered to resign rather than agree to Sonthi's request.
PM Surayud's refusal had caused GEN Sonthi to lose face.
They said that some business leaders had expressed support
for the emergency declaration because they were concerned
about stability, and also because they believed that Sonthi
would be "the next prime minister" and they wanted to get on
his good side.


7. (C) Former TRT Minister Suranand had also heard that
Surayud offered his resignation, and said, "it could happen
this weekend." He added that the CNS and the government are
very far apart, and the CNS might not care anymore if Surayud
resigned. TRT's Bhokin was unhappy with the prospect of
Surayud resigning, saying he was "the best one" and
"democratic." Sonthi as PM would be "dangerous;" there were
already divisions within the junta, and they would increase
if Sonthi made a power grab. A Chart Thai member, on the
other hand, thought that a new PM would be a good thing - but
he had no idea who might replace Surayud.


8. (C) Another academic predicted that Surayud would
ultimately cave in to CNS pressure, whatever he decided
today. The CNS's very public demand for emergency power
would be hard for the PM to resist in the longer run. The
CNS is clearly overreacting, but they are less afraid of the
size of the demonstrations than they are of what the group
will say. They are particularly sensitive about discussions
of Privy Councilor Prem's role in the coup and current
politics, and fear the criticism might "go beyond Prem to the
King. Or the Queen. The Queen is more the target." (Note:
One recurrent rumor has the Queen and Prem quietly supporting
the September coup, while keeping the King, recuperating from
his back surgery, out of the picture. End note.)


9. (C) The academic was concerned that the emergency
declaration could "boomerang" and provoke wider protest, a
worry echoed by human rights contacts. He raised the
prospect that the CNS was looking for the opportunity to
launch a repeat coup, since they have completely botched the
September coup and they are "in a corner." The generals were
prepared for war, but not Thai politics, "and Thai politics
are tougher." Even if the emergency decree is not invoked
this week, "the ultimate problem is that the coup has gone
wrong."


10. (U) According to breaking news reports this evening,
following Surayud's meetings with the CNS this afternoon, the
PM announced that the situation, "has yet to reach the point
that required a state of emergency be implemented." He
reiterated that it was in his authority to decide the matter.


PROTESTERS' PLANS
--------------


11. (C) According to news reports, the police, Bangkok
Metropolitan Authority and First Army have jointly decided to
ban all activities that include the use of a PA system at the
planned demonstration site at Sanam Luang. The protesters
announced that they would move their demonstration to the

BANGKOK 00001875 003 OF 003


front of the Bangkok governor's house. The demonstration will
include about a dozen groups. Estimates of participants range
from about 4,000 to 10,000.


10. (C) The generals are particularly worried about the
Thaksin loyalists who have tried to start a cable TV station,
PTV; this group, led by Weera Musikaphong, is the nucleus of
the protest movement (ref B). News reports claim there is
evidence that the group is directly funded by former PM
Thaksin. Weera's colorful history may be part of the reason
the generals are so worried about his group. A former deputy
minister and government spokesman, Weera was involved in the
abortive 1977 coup, and jailed for 8 months before being
granted an amnesty. He was prosecuted for lese-majeste while
he was deputy interior minister, in connection with his 1986
campaign for the general election (NFI),he was sentenced to
4 years imprisonment, but was granted a royal pardon after
one month. He was also arrested for opposing former dictator
GEN Suchinda in 1992. Although he claims to have quit TRT
recently in order to run PTV, he is still viewed as a close
Thaksin supporter.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Although it appears that the Prime Minister has made
the right call today, it will be difficult for him to resist
the CNS's request for additional powers in the longer run, if
the demonstrations grow larger and more provocative -- which
they are likely to do. Surayud's decision also brings out
into the open the rift between himself and CNS chief Sonthi,
which may contribute further to the general concerns about
stability. While we welcome today's decision, we recognize
that it does not solve the underlying problem. As our
contact said, 'the ultimate problem is that the coup has gone
wrong." Neither Sonthi nor Surayud appears to know how to
set it right again.
ARVIZU