OUR LATEST CHALLENGE: INTRODUCTION OF EMERGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: OUR LATEST CHALLENGE: INTRODUCTION OF EMERGENCY
DECREE

REF: A. JOHN-ARVIZU E-MAIL 3/28

B. BANGKOK 1587

Classified By: CDA Alex A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge urged the foreign minister and the
coup council Secretary-General not to invoke emergency rule
in Bangkok. GEN Winai explained that the government needed
the additional measures, which fell short of reinstituting
martial law, to prevent further destabilizing efforts from
pro-Thaksin elements. The foreign minister asked the US to
support Thai during the difficult transition period. He
expressed concern over the activities of former PM Thaksin in
the US. Other embassy offices have also underscored our
concerns about the emergency decree with counterparts. End
Summary.


2. (C) Charge met March 28 with Council for National Security
Secretary-General Winai Phattiyakul on the margins of a

SIPDIS
social event. Charge asked GEN Winai whether the emergency
measures would be applied in Bangkok. Winai responded that
he believed they would be. He agreed with our assessment that
the demonstrations carried out so far were small and not
threatening, but warned that future demonstrations could be
destabilizing. He distinguished between the various groups
of demonstrators: the government/CNS has no problem with the
"pure" democrats, like some of the academic-led protests (ref
B). They also understood that some groups, like the poor
farmers currently protesting, had economic grievances (from
the debt they had piled up due to former PM Thaksin's
policies, he emphasized). But they could not tolerate
"former political figures" using demonstrations in this way.
Currently, the government had limited legal means to stop the
protests. Police could confiscate microphones or other
equipment, but they could not lock the demonstrators up, so
they just returned to demonstrate again. Winai said that
they did not want to introduce martial law again, as this was
excessive. But they needed some teeth in the measures they
could use against protesters, and the 2005 Emergency Decree
would be an 'intermediate step' short of martial law. The
Charge urged the CNS to reconsider, emphasizing that we saw
no justification for the introduction of a state of emergency
now.


3. (C) Charge also spoke to Foreign Minister Nitya
Phibulsonggram on March 29, at a ceremonial event to
commemorate US-Thai law enforcement cooperation. FM Nitya
noted that the Thai Ambassador in the US had conveyed the
concerns expressed by EAP DAS John regarding the emergency
decree. Nitya asked that the US not "pre-judge" the outcome
of the process. He said that political developments would
have their "ups and downs" over the coming months, and
Thailand needed the US to offer support. Charge responded
that this was exactly what we were trying to do, by
encouraging the government to stay the course on return to
elected government, and to speed it up wherever possible.
Nitya expressed "disappointment" with the US position,
especially any consideration of canceling the upcoming Cobra
Gold exercise, a subject that had come up in DAS John's
conversation with the Thai ambassador. The Charge responded
that we were not "threatening"; rather, by raising the
possibility of invoking the emergency decree, the RTG was
introducing complications into the political process here
that could affect our relationship. The FM expressed his
unhappiness that former PM Thaksin was using his hired
consultants to gain access to opinion leaders in the US. He
threw up his hands: "So basically, you can buy access in DC?"
he asked. "Maybe we should get ourselves a PR firm." Nitya
underscored to Charge that, despite Thaksin's efforts, he
"was not coming back," adding, "He doesn't have a future
here; you know that, right?"


4. (C) Also on March 29, Charge discussed the possible
emergency decree with the Japanese Embassy DCM. Charge
explained our concerns about the effect such a step would
have on the unfolding political process. The Japanese DCM

BANGKOK 00001869 002 OF 002


agreed; he said they were surprised to read about the
emergency decree in the press, and thought it unnecessary in
light of the current political and security environment.
Charge asked if, in light of PM Surayud's visit to Japan
early next week for the Japan-Thai FTA signing, the GOJ could
look for an opportunity to register their concerns with the
PM. The DCM promised to take this on board.


5. (C) DATT and JUSMAG have also discussed concerns over
this issue with their military contacts, and emboffs have
underscored to political and civil society contacts that we
are worried about the possible results if the emergency
declaration goes forward, both on the US-Thai relations, and
on the tense political situation here.


ARVIZU