GENERAL SONTHI ASKS FOR EMERGENCY POWERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001845 SIPDIS SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA HUSO NSC FOR MORROW E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: GENERAL SONTHI ASKS FOR EMERGENCY POWERS REF: A. BANGKOK 1598 (AMBASSADOR MEETS PRASONG) ¶B. BANGKOK 1587 (ANTI-COUP PROTESTS) ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 4653 (EMERGENCY DECREE UNVEILED) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alex A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Coup council head General Sonthi has said publicly that he has requested emergency powers to preserve security in Bangkok. The military is concerned that anti-government demonstrations, spearheaded by Thaksin loyalists, could snowball and provoke "chaos." Prime Minister Surayud would have to agree to invoke provisions of the 2005 Emergency Decree, and it is not clear that he would be prepared to do so. General Sonthi's response to what have been rather small demonstrations seems like another overreaction from the government/CNS, and is probably rooted in deeper anxieties about opposition from Thaksin loyalists and coup opponents, and the uncertain reception expected for the draft constitution. Sonthi's statements are unhelpful and unsettling, even if the government does not take action on his proposal. We intend to register our very deep concern about this proposal with government and CNS contacts as soon as possible. End summary. ¶2. (C) General Sonthi Boonyartglin, Royal Thai Army Chief and head of the Council for National Security (CNS) told the press today that he had asked the prime minister for emergency powers to ensure security in Bangkok. Sonthi cited the anti-CNS demonstrations taking place in Bangkok as justification, reportedly arguing that the protest movement could "gather steam" and lead to "mutiny and chaos in the country." Sonthi said that it was up to the prime minister whether to declare emergency rule in the capital. (See para 7 for background on Emergency Decree). According to some reports, Sonthi was particularly concerned about demonstrations scheduled for Friday, March 30, by supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin. This group has been holding small demonstrations for the past several weeks. ¶3. (C) The CNS appears to be especially worried that various groups are beginning to band together to stage these demonstrations. In addition to the Thaksin supporters (from his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party),there are also the "pure" democratic opponents of the coup, who are acting on principle, and a group of farmers, who have come to town seeking debt relief. Several groups identified as representing taxi drivers (a vocal pro-Thaksin constituency in Bangkok) are also reported to be participating. Although recent demonstrations never topped 2-3,000 participants, the authorities were by some accounts very unsettled when the group marched on the home of Privy Council President Prem. (It is not clear what role, if any, Prem had relative to the coup, but several Thais we have spoken to - by no means Thaksin supporters -- are critical of Prem for being so excessively involved in politics.) ¶4. (C) There has so far been no response from Prime Minister Surayud to Sonthi's public statement. Given the many reports of tensions and disagreements between the two, it is not clear that Surayud would agree to the proposal. He should be aware that invoking emergency powers in Bangkok could provoke a very negative response across the political spectrum. (Note: Surayud is scheduled to visit Japan next week, for the signing of the Thai-Japan free trade agreement, itself a controversial subject here, and one that may provoke separate demonstrations. end note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Our sense is that the skittishness on the part of Sonthi and the CNS is due to the gnawing uncertainties of the coming weeks, particularly concerning the effect of the expected dissolution of TRT by the courts, and the public reception of the draft constitution, which should be completed in first draft shortly. BANGKOK 00001845 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) We will seek out opportunities over the next few days to register our very deep concern about any discussion of further limitations on civil liberties with military and government officials. We are mindful that Thai political figures often resort to floating trial balloons; pronouncements such as Sonthi's do not necessarily become done deals. However, Sonthi's comments are most unwelcome, particularly in raising the spectre of "mutiny and chaos." This echoes uncomfortably one CNS justification of its September coup, as an intervention to ward off clashes and violence that could result from ongoing demonstrations. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶7. (C) The Emergency Decree on Government Administration in States of Emergency was enacted in July, 2005, in response to the growing violence in the Malay-Muslim southern provinces. It authorizes the Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency which grants enhanced powers to security forces and limits some civil rights. The decree has heretofore been used only in the far south, although it can legally be invoked anywhere. The decree was widely criticized by human rights advocates when it was introduced. The government justified it as a less severe than martial law, which had been in force in the southern provinces up until that time. ARVIZU