PRIME MINISTER SURAYUD DISCUSSES SECURITY ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000179 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER PHUM ECON EINV MOPS ASEC KDEM, TH SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER SURAYUD DISCUSSES SECURITY ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR REF: A. BANGKOK 152 (FOREIGN BUSINESS ACT) ¶B. BANGKOK 113 (BURMA UNSC RESOLUTION) ¶C. BANGKOK 110 (CDA LIKELY TO WORK FAST) ¶D. BANGKOK 59 (DIPLOMATIC CORPS BRIEFING) ¶E. BANGKOK 3 (DISCUSSION WITH WINAI) ¶F. 06 BANGKOK 7484 (CAPITAL CONTROLS) ¶G. 05 BANGKOK 4653 (EMERGENCY DECREE) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Surayud told the Ambassador he remained committed to lifting martial law in the near future. However, technical issues had delayed the issuance of a royal command that would rescind martial law in a majority of Thailand's provinces. The Ambassador reiterated strong USG interest in Surayud fulfilling his commitment to President Bush to lift martial law. Surayud explained that a nationwide lifting of martial law would await the passage of a new internal security law. Surayud indicated he had no concrete evidence that further acts of terrorism would occur in Bangkok. He discussed his intention to reform the Royal Thai Police, as well as the formation of a new Special Operations Center. Surayud echoed the Ambassador's hope that the President of the Constitution Drafting Assembly would follow through on public predictions that the new constitution could be drafted ahead of schedule. Surayud explained the RTG felt it imperative to amend the Foreign Business Act in order to address the Thaksin-era sale of Shin Corp to a Singaporean firm; the Ambassador expressed concern about the amendments' impact on U.S. investors. End Summary. PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶2. (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, called on Prime Minister Surayud at Government House on January 10. Surayud was joined in the meeting by his Chief of Staff, General (ret) Pongthep Tesprateep; MFA Permanent Secretary (and Ambassador-designate to the United States) Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn; and a notetaker. CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the meeting by expressing condolences for the victims of the December 31 bombings in Bangkok and noting our issuance of a public announcement informing the public of the attacks. The Ambassador then requested further details of the information that had prompted Surayud to state at the National Legislative Assembly on January 4 that people should "get ready for a new form of threats which may occur and last for a period of time..." Surayud declined to flesh out his remark, saying that he had to wait until the police provided him with further information. The Ambassador pressed whether Surayud's warning of further attacks reflected assumptions rather than intelligence reports. Surayud replied: "I don't have any confirmation at all." ¶4. (C) The Ambassador described his January 1 discussion with General Winai, Council for National Security (CNS) Secretary General (ref E),in which Winai accepted an offer of assistance from a USG explosive forensics expert. Surayud said he welcomed this cooperation on the bombing investigation. The IEDs appeared similar to those used in southern Thailand, the Ambassador remarked, although it would be easy for others to copy that type of bomb. The placement of the bombs and timing of the explosions indicated that the perpetrators sought to promote instability and lessen confidence in the government, rather than to kill or injure as many people as possible. Surayud's body language indicated he agreed that this was the bombers' primary goal. MARTIAL LAW -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting he was acting on instructions from Washington, the Ambassador expressed concern over the RTG's continuing BANGKOK 00000179 002 OF 003 failure to lift martial law. While acknowledging that a high-level CNS spokesman had assured the diplomatic community that the bombings would not impede plans to rescind martial law (ref D),the Ambassador emphasized that more than a month had passed since Surayud promised President Bush at the APEC Summit that he would lift martial law, and yet this had not happened. ¶6. (C) Surayud confirmed that the recent bombings would not derail his plan to lift martial law. He said that one of his Ministries had not concurred with some of the terminology used in the draft royal command that would lift of martial law in a majority of Thailand's provinces. This dispute did not mark a deliberate stalling tactic, Surayud said, insisting that his administration would proceed with the recision. (Subsequent to the meeting, PermSec Krit sent the Ambassador a text message explaining that the objections came from the Ministry of Defense, which had requested corrections of "nomenclature inconsistencies" in the naming of localities affected by the decision. Krit said the Cabinet Secretariat anticipated the Cabinet would reconsider a revised draft of the royal command "by the end of this month at the latest.") ¶7. (C) Surayud assured the Ambassador that his administration would not use martial law powers, even while martial law remained in effect. Even if further acts of terrorism were to occur, the government would take action under the authority provided by the July 2005 Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations (ref G),which provides a legal basis for the Prime Minister to exercise special powers in parts of Thailand where a state of emergency exists. However, neither the Emergency Decree, nor any other law, permitted the military to perform the types of operations it conducted in border areas where martial law had been in effect prior to the September 19 coup d'etat. Thus, martial law in those border areas would need to remain in effect until passage of a new internal security law, currently being prepared by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). This law would appear somewhat similar to the laws governing homeland security in the U.S., Surayud said. After passage of the new law, the government could rescind martial law nationwide. DISMAY WITH POLICE -------------- ¶8. (C) Surayud remained committed to reforming the Royal Thai Police, he said. Referring to the New Year's Eve bombings, Surayud said, "A lot of people think the police didn't work (as) hard as before," hinting that he agreed with that assessment. He related that, prior to the attacks, a contact had informed him of rumors from former colleagues in the intelligence community that bombings would take place in Bangkok on New Year's Eve, at specific locations, including the Seacon Square mall and the vicinity of the Central World mall (which, in the event, were targeted). Surayud said he had warned the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) chief on December 19 that the NIA should take action to reinforce areas where the metropolitan police might appear ineffective. Surayud said he had sought to hint publicly about his security concerns when he had stated that he would remain in Bangkok for New Year's Eve. ¶9. (C) If the police had received threat information and not acted on it, this might imply some important figures should be subject to disciplinary action, the Ambassador remarked, alluding to rumors that RTP Chief Kowit Wattana might lose his job. Surayud said that he had to wait for a report, expected the following week, from a committee on police reform. NEW CNS SPECIAL OPS CENTER -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador then asked why the RTG in December established a new Special Operations Center, reported to be over 13,000-strong, that would report directly to the CNS. Surayud said he did not know the details of this new Center, only that it would comprise of personnel from the three military service branches and police. The concept, Surayud said, was that the Center was to operate nationwide and work BANGKOK 00000179 003 OF 003 with the population at the grassroots level, to assure people that the government was not carrying out purges of Thaksin supporters or eliminating popular programs for the rural areas. The Ambassador requested further information on the Center. CONSTITUTION ASSEMBLY FORMED -------------- ¶11. (C) Noting the recent formation of the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA),the Ambassador highlighted the new CDA President's public statement that the draft constitution might be completed in four months, ahead of schedule (ref C). The Ambassador said accelerated promulgation of the new constitution (and elections) would be welcomed "by everybody." "Especially me," replied Surayud. THE FOREIGN BUSINESS ACT -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador then raised planned amendments to the Foreign Business Act (ref A),noting the Embassy was still studying the likely effect but was concerned that the changes might focus negative attention on the U.S.-Thai bilateral Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. Citing the recent debacle when the Bank of Thailand imposed capital controls (ref F),as well as complaints from the foreign business community about the lack of consultation on the FBA amendments, the Ambassador suggested that the RTG clarify its intentions as soon as possible. ¶13. (C) Surayud replied that amending the FBA was critical in order to address aspects of the highly controversial Thaksin-era sale of Shin Corp to Singaporean firm Temasek; closing the loopholes bared by the Shin Corp deal was politically impebative. Inevitably, some other foreign companies would come under pressure, but the business community would have time to adjust. The cabinet had discussed the FBA amendments for two hours on January 9, Surayud related. Finally, Surayud concluded that the RTG had to move forward and should be as transparent as possible. Surayud expressed confidence that foreign investors and the diplomatic corps would have a better understanding of the situation after a January 10 briefing from Finance Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula. (Septel will report on the briefing, which did not allay concerns.) COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Surayud is increasingly disengaged on a number of issues we believe are important. His administration is being pummeled in the press for the lack of progress on the bombing investigation, but Surayud shows no sense of urgency. The intelligence services apparently blew off a threat warning, capricious economic decisions are hurting the Thai economy, but Surayud does not appear to feel that he needs to respond in any way or hold anyone accountable. His pledge to lift martial law is hung up on some bureaucratic glitch, and Surayud is taking a hands-off approach. This does not augur well for the interim government's ability to steer Thailand through the very difficult months ahead. We will be raising the same points with members of the CNS and other influential figures in the coming days, in an effort to spark some sense of urgency in addressing our concerns. BOYCE