THAILAND'S NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE: BETTER LIVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001754 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) NSC FOR MORROW E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAILAND'S NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE: BETTER LIVING THROUGH ISOC REF: BANGKOK 01715 (SURAYUD ON CIVIL LIBERTIES) Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Since taking power in September 2006, the Army-dominated interim government has publicly moved to re-engineer the old, communist-era Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) into the key internal security coordinating mechanism for the Thai government. While the exact nature and role of this new version of ISOC appears to be a work in progress, critics have denounced it as a thinly-veiled power grab by the Army. We recently met with a military officer deeply involved with ISOC, who put to rest several of the more sensational rumors surrounding the new security body, but outlined a mechanism that could strengthen the Army's role in all aspects of internal security, including police functions. End Summary. THE BEAST THAT WOULDN'T DIE -------------- ¶2. (C) ISOC's roots lie in the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) of the 1960s. CSOC was established under the Anti-Communist Activity Act to provide Ministry of Defense (MOD) coordination for military, police and Ministry of Interior (MOI) operations against the communist movement in Thailand. A series of military governments in that era also used CSOC--in 1969 renamed ISOC--to facilitate their rule, including the bloody suppression of student-led protests in 1976. ¶3. (C) By the 1980s, with the dissolution of the communist threat and Thailand's move towards increased democratic governance, ISOC was an organization without a mission. While ostensibly having oversight over border areas that were still under martial law--in effect giving the Royal Thai Army (RTA),which dominated the ISOC structure, precedence in those areas--ISOC became a dumping ground for generals without portfolio. ¶4. (C) In 1999, then-PM Thaksin dissolved the old ISOC and re-instituted it as a coordinating body formally charged with defending Thailand's borders and fighting illegal narcotics. Under this new formula, the PM served as head of ISOC, which was no longer subordinate to MOD. Thaksin's Deputy PM, Chawalit Yongchaiyudh tried to push passage of a new internal security act, which would give ISOC personnel (Note: soldiers, police and civilians on rotation to ISOC. End Note.) broader domestic security powers, but the law inspired political opposition and died. ISOC briefly reappeared in the news in 2006, after several RTA officers serving in ISOC slots were implicated in the alleged car-bomb attempt on then-Prime Minister Thaksin. WE CAN REBUILD IT. STRONGER, FASTER... -------------- ¶5. (C) Following the September 19, 2006 coup, leaders on the Council on National Security (CNS) began to publicly propose reinvigorating the old ISOC, ostensibly to better coordinate operations in the restive South and to deter public "undercurrents;" for example, school-burnings attributed to pro-Thaksin supporters in the countryside, which GEN Sonthi has called "domestic terrorism." Given Sonthi and his allies' penchant for invoking the successes of the anti-Communist campaign, and the need to apply the lessons learned back then, this made sense. In an October 2006 order, interim PM Surayud Chulanont reorganized ISOC, placing RTA and CNS Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin in charge. ...THE MONSTER IS ALIVE! -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite having existed on paper in this new incarnation for nearly five months, the exact nature and role of ISOC remains publicly unclear. Critics have publicly labeled ISOC a power grab by the Army, or an attempt to institutionalize military governance. One subset of this criticism alleges that the new ISOC will allow the CNS to BANGKOK 00001754 002 OF 004 maintain control even after a democratic government is elected later this year. Local media has also reported variations on the rumor that ISOC will have its own pool of personnel--separate from Army or civilian bodies on loan from other ministries--ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands. Several press reports focused on an alleged proposal by GEN Sonthi to establish an ISOC "Special Operations Command," with as many as 60,000 personnel at its disposal. ¶7. (C) RTG leaders have not added much clarity to the debate over ISOC, with conflicting public statements over the new organization. Some have characterized ISOC as similar to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with others denying that the new organization will absorb other agencies as DHS did. "LIKE MOVING A MOUNTAIN" -------------- ¶8. (C) Earlier this month Polcouns and poloff met with Major General Surapong Suwana-adth, Director of Policy and Plans at Supreme Command to discuss ISOC. Surapong, who is one of the key players in establishing the new security body, painted a picture of a coordinating command still in flux. According to Surapong, there is a "misunderstanding in the media" about the scope and role of ISOC. While the vision for ISOC remains relatively unchanged, the details surrounding its organization and capabilities are rapidly in flux; Surapong complained that even government officials have trouble understanding it. As Surapong outlined it, ISOC is the government's attempt to provide better coordination and policy implementation in the face of several non-traditional security issues, ranging from illegal immigration to narcotics and terrorism. "ISOC is a new vehicle to tackle these non-traditional threats." ¶9. (C) Surapong bemoaned the difficulty the RTG has in coordinating responses to these challenges--given the host of rival agencies and organizations with overlapping responsibilities and resources. In the Thai cultural context, effective coordination depends on face-to-face contact and personal relationships, which means that relevant agencies must be brought together in an institutionalized manner to produce results. Surapong added that fixing this problem is even harder, saying, "changing the government structure is like moving a mountain." Past attempts to rectify these shortcomings led to ad-hoc fixes that failed to produce effective coordination. For a given problem, a temporary working group was established. But that working group often focused on the interests of whichever ministry or department led the effort, leading to suboptimal results. Surapong admitted that the Army effectively dominates the current ISOC structure. HOW ISOC WORKS -------------- ¶10. (C) Surapong explained that the Thai National Security Council (NSC) will continue to formulate policy, but "NSC is only 100 people." ISOC will serve as "the eyes and ears of NSC" in implementing that policy. He emphasized that the vast majority of people working for ISOC, were dual-hatted, i.e. serving in other staff positions in their parent career service, but responsible for attending ISOC coordinating meetings. Surapong dismissed press reports that anywhere from 60,000 to one million civil servants worked for ISOC, saying that this number reflected personnel serving in their career ministries, sitting in their "old jobs," but with new responsibilities under ISOC. When asked if Thai leaders, in comparing ISOC to the U.S. DHS, envisioned a similar merging of individual agencies under one new ministry, Surapong appeared somewhat surprised by this concept, and denied any such plan. ¶11. (C) In explaining ISOC's structure, Surapong emphasized that it is different from the "old" ISOC. The only full-time ISOC body is a coordinating center in Bangkok with representatives from 22 ministries and 10 independent BANGKOK 00001754 003 OF 004 agencies. This center serves as a clearing house for information and allows RTG leaders to coordinate policy implementation. The center is supplemented by separate, regular meetings of inter-agency officials on specific issues of concern. CNS and RTA Chief Sonthi serves as ISOC commander, with RTA Chief of Staff Montri as secretary-general. Eight deputy ISOC SIPDIS commanders--representing the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, Supreme Command, Police, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice--serve under Sonthi. The four chiefs of each Army region concurrently serve as ISOC regional commanders, with Army subordinates in each province serving as provincial ISOC commanders. (Note: this appears to have had the most impact in the restive South, where ISOC is technically in charge of the reconstituted Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43, although the SBPAC legally reports directly to the PM. Surapong was unable to explain this contradiction, which we understand has further muddled the already confused chain of command in the South. End Note.) DEPUTY GOVERNORS? -------------- ¶12. (C) When asked about GEN Sonthi's proposal to place Army officers as deputy governors in each province--which has been publicly criticized as an Army power grab--Surapong was dismissive, saying that such critics don't "get the whole picture." He characterized the proposal as similar to placing U.S. National Guard liaison officers in each U.S. statehouse. As Surapong explained, the Army is traditionally responsible for a host of non-traditional security issues, particularly in border areas. For example, during seasonal flooding or forest fire outbreaks, the Army is responsible for mobilizing the government's response. Surapong cited his personal experience with the difficulty in coordinating the Army relief efforts--Governors (who are MOI careerists) often call Army headquarters in Bangkok asking "what do I do?" Surapong says that the new system will allow for swifter and smoother responses to these issues; "it may save lives." He added that the police and other ministry representatives serve in the governors' offices, "why not the military?" Besides, he continued, the officer filling the deputy governor slot would have no troops under his control "just a car and a driver." Surapong says that he understands that some local politicians are concerned that an ISOC deputy governor could serve "as a check on them," but added "if local politicians don't do anything wrong, this shouldn't be a problem." (Note: we have seen no actual progress in implementing this plan outside of the South--where ISOC deputy governors appear to be in place. Expanding this program throughout the country is likely to remain controversial. End Note.) SO, HOW'S IT WORKING? -------------- ¶13. (C) When asked what, if any issues, ISOC has achieved success on, Surapong admitted none, saying that ISOC was only in its "beginning stages." According to Surapong, initial ISOC meetings are improving the coordination of information flows--he also hopes to develop a central database for sharing reports--but has not led to much action. Surapong admitted that most of the RTG still depends on hard copy reports, and that sharing information--even at the ground level in the South--remains difficult. Alluding to the New Year's Eve bombings and subsequent threat rumint leaked to the press, PolCouns asked if ISOC was playing a role in vetting and circulating threat information. Surapong replied in the affirmative, but added that some senior officials "talked too much." Such information is "difficult to filter," according to Surapong. NEW SECURITY LAW -------------- ¶14. (C) Surapong confirmed that ISOC operates under a Prime Minister's order and that officials are currently discussing whether Thailand needs a law establishing ISOC and its BANGKOK 00001754 004 OF 004 authorities (see ref for PM Surayud's comment to the Ambassador that just such a law is in the works.) When pressed for hypothetical examples of these new authorities, Surapong described a scenario where military personnel discovered some illegal immigrants. The ISOC structure would facilitate coordination with the police and immigration authorities to ensure their arrest. Surapong emphasized that even under the new system, soldiers would not have powers of arrest. "That is not our job." Instead, Surapong repeatedly cited the need for adequate legal "protection" for military officers serving on the border. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Surapong certainly did his best in trying to portray ISOC as a much needed effort to improve RTG policy coordination and implementation. Everyone agrees that breaking down stovepiping, particularly in the South, is long overdue. Much of the more sinister rumint surrounding the new organization--secretive special operations groups and the like--appears to be false. But there is no doubt that the PM's order re-engineering ISOC gives the Army greater authority over internal security enforcement than it has had in the recent past, and that will be cause for concern for many Thai. How ISOC's expansion is codified in law, and whether these new powers are used in a responsible manner, will remain key issues for debate in the coming months. This, as in so many other initiatives undertaken by the interim government, may prove impossible to implement. BOYCE