THAI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES BOMBINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINS KISL KJUS KCRM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES BOMBINGS

REF: A. BANGKOK 3 (WINAI ON BOMBINGS)

B. BANGKOK 2 (BOMBINGS)

C. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (CASE AGAINST THAKSIN)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Thai Foreign Minister Nitya "Nit" Pibulsonggram told
the Ambassador the cabinet was consumed with speculation
about the New Year's Eve bombings and believed former Prime
Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to be involved. Nit expressed
low confidence that the RTG could build a case against the
perpetrators. He bemoaned public criticism of the interim
administration as ineffective and noted journalists had given
coverage to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's denial
of involvement in the bombings. The Ambassador urged Nit to
encourage security and prosecutorial officials to focus on
building an evidence-based case against the bombers. End
Summary.

FM BLAMES CHAVALIT
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2. (C) Thai Foreign Minister Nitya "Nit" Pibulsonggram met
with the Ambassador at the Embassy on January 3, when
visiting to offer RTG condolences on the death of Former
President Ford. Nit said the cabinet had devoted that day's
morning meeting entirely to theorizing about the perpetrators
of the December 31 bombings. Nit said it was clear that the
Surayud administration's political opponents had orchestrated
the bombings. The RTG's speculation focused intensively on
former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chavalit had
publicly signaled his interest in assuming a leadership
position in Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party, presumably in
order to become Thailand's next Prime Minister. He had
publicly criticized the interim administration and the
Council for National Security, presumably because he and his
allies were excluded from the post-coup cabinet. And
Chavalit had the character and nefarious network to carry out
such attacks.


3. (C) The Ambassador remarked that Nit's views tracked with
those expressed by General Winai Phattiyakul on January 1
(ref A). The Ambassador repeated to Nit the counsel he had
provided Winai, that the RTG would need more than just a
theory, however persuasive that theory might be. The RTG
could not appear to be disregarding forensic evidence that
implied the involvement of southern separatists. Nit
expressed doubt that the RTG, being bound to uphold the rule
of law, could build a case that would implicate Chavalit or
other allies of former Prime Minister Thaksin in the
bombings. The Ambassador, citing the investigations of
public transportation bombings in London and Jemaah Islamiyah
bombings in Indonesia, said he did not see that following
legal procedures would necessarily hamper the investigation.


4. (C) Nit, increasingly exasperated, bemoaned the public
beating that Surayud's administration was taking. The media,
which of late had not been particularly charitable toward the
cabinet, was claiming the administration had not done enough
in response to the bombings. Newspapers had published in its
entirety a letter from Thaksin in which the former Prime
Minister denied culpability for the New Year's Eve attacks.
Nit had also heard Thaksin wanted to make his case on
television -- but the government would not allow this, Nit
said.


5. (C) The longer that the government continued to make
allegations without presenting strong evidence, the more this
process would look like a witch hunt, the Ambassador
cautioned. And although the RTG might not want Thaksin on
Thai television, barring him from the local airwaves might
just lead him to speak out on CNN or other international
networks. Dejected, Nit asked quasi-rhetorically, "What can
we do?" The Ambassador again advised that the government
focus on building a legal case based on the evidence.

OTHER AVENUES AGAINST THAKSIN LOOK PROMISING
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6. (C) Nit remarked that the government's efforts in other
areas were proceeding well. Investigators were progressing
with approximately 50 different cases relating to Thaksin's

BANGKOK 00000016 002 OF 002


abuse of power while in office. Irregularities involved in a
substantial loan to the Burmese government, as well as in a
passport modernization program, offered promising avenues.
These might come to fruition around March 2007, at which
point the RTG could revoke Thaksin's diplomatic passport.

COMMENT
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7. (C) Although Nit closed on an optimistic note, his
inability to envision a strong case against the New Year's
Eve bombers reinforces the impression -- indeed, commonly
expressed in the press, much to Nit's dismay -- that the
cabinet's performance remains unimpressive. Despite having
all the tools of the government apparatus at their disposal,
top RTG officials seem not to realize the need to go beyond
elucidating conspiracy theories (whether accurate or not).
The rush to judgment about the bombings (examined in further
detail septel) illustrates a lack of sophistication and, with
the government's position on the matter now public, could
have serious and deleterious ramifications as further facts
about the attacks come to light.
BOYCE