THAI GOVERNMENT ASCRIBES BOMBINGS TO POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000015

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINS KISL ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI GOVERNMENT ASCRIBES BOMBINGS TO POLITICAL
OPPONENTS

REF: A. BANGKOK 3 (WINAI ON BOMBINGS)

B. BANGKOK 2 (BOMBINGS)

C. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (CASE AGAINST THAKSIN)

D. 06 BANGKOK 6689 (TAK BAI CHARGES DROPPED)

E. 06 BANGKOK 5747 (HAT YAI BOMBINGS)

F. 06 BANGKOK 5610 (ANALYZING BOMBS)

G. 06 BANGKOK 5349 (YALA BANKS BOMBED)

H. 06 BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

I. 06 BANGKOK 1845 (BOMB AT DEMOCRAT HQ)

J. 06 BANGKOK 1521 (UPDATE: BOMB AT PREM'S HOUSE)

K. 06 BANGKOK 684 (NO ATTACKS OUTSIDE SOUTH)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Thailand's Prime Minister said publicly on January 1
that political opponents linked to deposed Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra likely carried out the New Year's Eve
bombings in Bangkok. Other credible theories exist, however,
and the physical evidence does not yet implicate a particular
group. The bombs appear similar to those built by southern
militants, who have a history of conducting multiple,
simultaneous bomb attacks, although they have not previously
shown a desire or capability to operate outside of the
southern region. Some people will suspect that the security
forces themselves staged the bombings as a provocation to
justify remaining in power. Whoever the culprit, we are not
optimistic the perpetrators will be caught, and the Prime
Minister's ascribing the bombings to political opponents
could impede the investigation. Barring arrests, the
perpetrators may retain the capability and motive to conduct
further attacks. While foreigners were injured in the
December 31 bombings, none of the bombing sites appear to
have been selected in order to target foreign interests. End
Summary.

SURAYUD POINTS A FINGER AT THAKSIN'S CAMP
--------------


2. (SBU) On the evening of December 31, six bombs exploded at
various sites in Bangkok between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.; two more
exploded seconds after midnight. Three Thais died from blast
injuries, and up to 55 other people were injured, including
nine foreigners (no Americans). In a January 1 public
statement, Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont said: "From
the evidence we have gathered, there is a slim chance that
(the string of bombings) is related to the southern
insurgency. It is likely related to people who lost their
political benefits." The latter reference clearly pointed
toward deposed Prime Minister Thaksin and his associates.


3. (SBU) Council for National Security (CNS) Chairman Sonthi
Boonyaratglin publicly echoed Surayud's remarks later the
same day, saying the government had detected "some links to
the masterminds but never expected they would do something
like this." Sonthi said the CNS had summoned for questioning
four former aides of Thaksin: close Thaksin advisor Prommin
Lertsuridej; former Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai
Vanasatidya (retired Police General); former National
Intelligence Agency Director (and retired Police General)
Chumphol Manmai; and Police Lieutenant General Chalor
Chuwong. According to media reports, however, none of the
four appeared for questioning; Prommin reportedly excused
himself, claiming the timing of the summons was inconvenient.


4. (C) In the days prior to the bombings, Thaksin and his
allies had stepped up their political attacks on the Surayud
administration. While interim Thai Rak Thai party leader
Chaturon Chaiseng criticized the continued imposition of
restrictions on political freedoms, an associate of former
Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (who has moved closer to
Thai Rak Thai) fed reporters allegations that Surayud had
undeclared assets. While this claim appeared to lack
substance, it raised tangential questions about how Surayud
had acquired a plot of land on which he maintains a
residence. Meanwhile, a figure heading an anti-coup group
made headlines by complaining that General Sonthi had
committed bigamy.


5. (C) These political maneuvers came in the context of the
RTG intensifying its efforts to find grounds for prosecuting
Thaksin, targeting members his immediate family as well as

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the former Prime Minister himself (ref C). We had detected
indications that Thaksin hoped to reach an accommodation with
the CNS and RTG leaders, but the authorities appear
uninterested in negotiations, as the legitimacy of their coup
d'etat depends in part on establishing extensive wrongdoing
by Thaksin.

THAKSIN'S FOES WERE TARGETED BEFORE...
--------------


6. (C) Many observers will find it plausible that Thaksin or
his supporters may have orchestrated bombings in order to
discredit those who overthrew him. During the last two years
of Thaksin's administration, there were numerous incidents in
which bombs were placed at Bangkok sites associated with
Thaksin's opponents, including:

- On March 27, 2006, an unexploded bomb was discovered next
to the Democrat Party headquarters (ref I);

- On March 9, 2006, a small bomb exploded at a guardpost
outside the house of Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda (ref
J); on the same day, a bomb exploded at the Royal Vajiravut
College, targeting anti-Thaksin academic Chai-anan
Samutthawanit;

- On February 22, 2006, a small bomb exploded at the Santi
Asoke Buddhist Sect, associated with leading Thaksin opponent
Chamlong Srimuang;

- On December 8, 2005, a small bomb exploded at a phone booth
outside of Lumpini Park, which had become a site for recent
anti-Thaksin rallies; and

- On November 3, 2005, a small bomb exploded on property of
the Manager Media Group, owned by leading Thaksin critic
Sondhi Limthongkul.


7. (C) Additionally, security officials reported the
discovery of explosive material in a car parked close to
Thaksin's residence on August 24, 2006 (ref H). At the time,
many people suspected Thaksin's loyalists engineered the
incident in order to generate sympathy for Thaksin, or to
justify imposing a state of emergency. The truth behind this
incident remains unclear.

... BUT THAKSIN'S DENIAL NOT IMPLAUSIBLE
--------------


8. (C) While it is not difficult to imagine pro-Thaksin
operatives carrying out the earlier bombings, the devices
used were significantly less powerful than the December 31
bombs, and the Thaksin-era detonations clearly targeted the
Prime Minster's opponents. Thaksin has publicly denied
having a role in the New Year's Eve bombings, and this denial
seems plausible, given the differences in the modus operandi;
the extensive scrutiny the government was already applying to
Thaksin and his loyalists; indications from open sources that
Thaksin wanted to return to Thailand; and the fact that
political allegations against the CNS (see above) had
successfully garnered prominent coverage and put the CNS and
RTG on the defensive, seemingly obviating the need at this
stage for Thaksin to order desperate measures.

SOUTHERN MILITANTS NOT RULED OUT
--------------


9. (C) In a January 1 discussion with the Ambassador (ref A),
CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul acknowledged a
possibility that southern militants had carried out the
attacks, noting the bombs used on New Year's Eve were similar
to those constructed by the militants in the past. To date,
however, southern militants have not attacked targets outside
of the South. (Ref K noted several reasons, including
organizational, linguistic, and ethnic factors, why militant
activities generally have been restricted to the southern
border provinces.) Nevertheless, in recent months -- albeit
prior to the September 19 coup -- the militants have
conducted coordinated bombings that would have an economic
impact:

- In a September 16 attack (ref E),six bombs exploded in
stores and streets in Hat Yai, a Buddhist-majority city which
serves as a commercial center in southern Thailand and draws

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foreign tourists from Malaysia. Several people died, and at
least 60 were injured. (Hat Yai has been the target of
significant separatist attacks before.)

- In an August 31 daylight attack, at least 23 bombs exploded
at banking facilities in the southern province of Yala (ref
G),marking a significant expansion of attacks against
commercial targets.


10. (SBU) Prime Minister Surayud has made a concerted effort
to promote reconciliation with disaffected Muslims in
Thailand's southern provinces. In early November, visiting
the South, he offered a public apology for the deaths of
scores of people during and after demonstrations at Tak Bai
in 2004. (This apology, welcomed by Thai Muslims, was
controversial; some Thais deemed it too strong of an
acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the security forces.)
Shortly afterwards, the Office of the Attorney General
dropped all charges against 81 protesters involved in
demonstrations at Tak Bai (ref D),and Surayud ordered
government agencies to destroy any existing "blacklists" of
suspected troublemakers in the South.


11. (C) Despite these gestures, militant activity in the
South has continued at a steady pace, indicating that some
separatists are disinclined to accept the olive branch which
Surayud extended. Some of our contacts assess that the
continued violence in the South since the coup is, in part,
an effort by separatists to undermine Suryayud's attempt at
reconciliation. A widespread perception that southern
separatists carried out the Bangkok bombings would entail a
significant loss of face for Surayud and could result in
public demand for more aggressive security tactics in the
South.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES: JUSTIFYING MILITARY RULE...
-------------- --------------


12. (C) We cannot at this stage rule out another theory, that
persons associated with the current regime carried out the
bombings to create a pretext for extending military rule.
Small pieces of circumstantial evidence could bolster this
idea. Critics might point out that the authorities have been
slow to ease political restrictions. The administration has
not yet forwarded for royal endorsement the decree to lift
martial law in much of the country. In late December, the
authorities considered but rejected a proposal to annul
restrictions on political party activities, claiming the
situation was not yet sufficiently stable -- despite the CNS
having just secured over 550 million Baht (over 15 million
USD) to form a new "Special Operations Centre," over
13,000-strong, accountable directly to the CNS.

... OR A MANIFESTATION OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY?
-------------- ---


13. (C) The hypothetical involvement of members of the
security forces in the bombings might not necessarily have
been at the behest of the CNS. We note that, since the coup,
the new regime has generated ideas about how to reorganize
(read: marginalize) the national police force. When a member
of a Surayd-endorsed working group floated a decentralization
proposal in mid-November, media reports quoted National
Police spokesman Lieutenant General Achirawit Suphanphesat as
saying "Please don't treat the police organization with
contempt. Give us some respect. The day we are transferred
to local organizations, the country will go up in flames."


14. (C) It is possible to imagine that figures in the police
might have been complicit in the December 31 attacks. We
have heard scattered reports consistent with this theory; for
example, some of the police booths which were bombed should
have been manned around the clock but were empty when
attacked. We also have heard some closed circuit television
cameras near targeted areas became dysfunctional shortly
before the bombings.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
--------------


15. (C) Prior to the bombings, many of our contacts predicted
political instability in the coming months. Assessing the
interim administration as likely to prove relatively
ineffective, they believed students, NGOs, and other groups

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would hold large demonstrations to advance their agendas,
particularly to influence the shape of the next constitution.
None of our contacts foresaw a bombing campaign, however.


16. (C) We do not rule out the possibility that the December
31 attacks might prove to be a one-off event. Without
knowing the culprits and their motives, we cannot assess
whether they would deem further attacks to be in their
interests. However, the perpetrators remain on the loose,
and, in the absence of significant changes to the political
environment, they may well retain the same motive that
prompted the first wave of bombings.


17. (C) The areas targeted on December 31 do not represent
foreign interests. The target selection, the nature of the
bombs, and the bombers' seeming intention not to maximize
casualties, lead us to doubt strongly the involvement of the
Jemaah Islamiyah international terrorist network. We note,
however, that if the bombers wanted to damage the Thai
economy, tourist areas, or other high-profile sites where
foreigners gather, could become targets.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) The physical evidence from the bombings is under
examination. Many of the specialists with the metropolitan
police, which has jurisdiction in this matter, have received
USG training, and we are optimistic they can conduct a
capable forensic analysis. We worry, however, that the
authorities jumped to a conclusion and announced their views
prematurely. Their credibility now depends on showing the
involvement of Thaksin or his associates, who, whether
involved or not, will surely try to spin recent events to
advance their own interests. The stakes are high, and the
investigation could be politicized down to the working level.
Given that many previous bombings, attempted bombings, and
alleged attempted bombings remain unsolved, we are not
optimistic that the perpetrators -- or the mastermind -- will
be uncovered.
BOYCE