VISIT OF SENK SENIOR ADVISOR CHRISTIAN WHITON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001575 SIPDIS SIPDIS GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM TH KS KN SUBJECT: VISIT OF SENK SENIOR ADVISOR CHRISTIAN WHITON Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN SUTTON, REASON 1.5 (B, D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Christian Whiton, Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea (SENK), explained to Thai government and UNHCR officials the objectives the SENK was pursuing related to refugees, North Korean human rights, and political change in North Korea. He expressed appreciation for Thailand's humanitarian treatment of North Korean refugees, noted that the USG was pushing other regional countries on the issue, and said that the USG wanted to be part of the solution by offering U.S. resettlement. Thai officials stated their concern about the increasing numbers of North Koreans entering Thailand and the involvement of commercial brokers. Under Thai law, the refugees were illegal immigrants and would be treated accordingly. At the same time, the officials noted, no North Koreans had been sent back to North Korea. Once they reached Thai soil, the humanitarian solution of third country resettlement was possible. The RTG was also concerned that U.S. resettlement was a pull factor. An NSC staffer said the USG could approach the MFA about the possibility of additional North Korean refugee resettlement to the U.S. but did not give any commitment on what the response would be. UNHCR reviewed recent developments regarding North Korean refugees in Thailand. Whiton also met with North Korean refugees who have expressed interest in U.S. resettlement. His discussions with them focused on the increasing difficulties for North Koreans in their homeland and in China. End summary. ¶2. (C) Christian Whiton, Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, visited Bangkok from March 7-9 and met with Thai government and UNHCR officials and North Korean refugees. ¶3. (C) In his meetings, Whiton explained that President Bush has a personal interest in North Korean refugees and had named his former aid, Jay Lefkowitz, as the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea (SENK). S/E Lefkowitz had three broad goals: to do more for North Korean refugees; to raise the international status and build an international consensus on North Korean human rights issues; and to work for a long-term peaceful political transformation in North Korea. The SENK had sought to achieve these objectives in various ways, including raising North Korean refugee issues with foreign government officials, getting the message out in speeches, op-eds, and through work at the United Nations, and seeking to increase radio transmissions into North Korea. Whiton noted that President Bush had also raised North Korean refugee issues with Chinese leader Hu Jintao. Whiton expressed appreciation for Thailand's humanitarian treatment of North Korean refugees and said he understood that the issue was difficult for Thailand for a number of reasons. The USG wanted to be part of the solution by accepting North Korean refugees, though most would likely choose resettlement in South Korea, and would be discreet in its efforts. The USG had no quota. Thailand's agreement to permit resettlement of North Korean refugees to the U.S. had been noted at high levels in the USG. The U.S. was also pushing other countries in the region on the North Korean refugee issue so Thailand would not have to carry the burden alone. Meetings with Thai Government Officials -------------- ¶4. (C) The Director of the Social Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),Dusit Manapan, said that the Thai government understood the mandate to carry out the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA). He stated that China was a key actor and signatory of the refugee convention. Thailand did not share a border with North Korea. It was well downstream from the source of the problem. Dusit urged that the USG convince China to adopt a more humanitarian approach to the North Korean refugee issue. ¶5. (C) According to Dusit, the number of North Koreans entering Thailand in recent years had increased sharply, particularly last year when there was a 500 percent increase. However, he noted it has since stabilized. Nonetheless, this made it harder to explain the humanitarian nature of the issue to RTG security agencies, which saw a threat from the presence between commercial brokers (in addition to aid BANGKOK 00001575 002 OF 003 workers). The RTG had taken measures to prevent North Koreans from entering Thailand, but when refugees were turned back on the Mekong River, which forms the boundary between Thailand and Laos, they often tried again the next day and were successful. No effective measures had really been found to prevent them from entering Thailand. The intervening countries such as China, Laos, and Burma appeared not to be taking any measures to slow the flow, though the Thai military reported that Laos and Burma had deported refugees. Once North Korean refugees entered Thailand, Dusit stated that a humanitarian solution of third country resettlement was possible. The RTG had not sent any North Koreans back to their homeland. Dusit asked the USG not be too forceful in implementing the NKHRA provision regarding refugees. He said that when the USG began implementing the NKHRA, the number of North Koreans coming to Thailand had increased. At the same time, he said that a Thai immigration official had recently told him that the current number is "not alarming." Dusit said the RTG will limit the numbers permitted to resettle to the U.S. If there were an open door for U.S. resettlement, the number of North Korean refugees in Thailand would increase even more. ¶6. (C) The Thai MFA Director responsible for Korean affairs, Singthong Lapisatepun, said that the RTG knew that something had to be done to address the human rights situation in North Korea, but it was unclear how best to do it. He reiterated that the RTG had never returned a North Korean asylum seeker to their homeland and would continue to address the refugee issue on a humanitarian basis. Nevertheless, North Koreans were illegal migrants under Thai law. They would be treated according to the law and then sent to third countries. The RTG had also tried to tighten up its borders and did not want too many North Koreans to enter the country. Unlike refugees from Laos or Burma, North Koreans had an option to go to South Korea. The RTG was concerned that the number of North Koreans kept increasing. ¶7. (C) Singthong said that Thai officials had noted that the North Korean refugees did not seem that bad off when they entered Thailand. They seemed well-fed and clothed and some had money to pay "brokers." The North Korean government has never approached the RTG about the refugee issue. Singthong added that Thai-North Korean relations were somewhat difficult currently because of the North Korean abduction of a Thai citizen, Anocha Panjoy, from Macau and North Korea had also not paid Thailand about $300 million, including interest, for rice shipments. Resolution of these issues is necessary before Thailand is willing to open an embassy in Pyongyang, although it already has formal relations with the DPRK. In response to a question, Singthong said that North Korean diplomats did not seem to be engaged in illegal activities in Thailand, though they did conduct commercial activities such as operating a Korean restaurant. ¶8. (C) Thai National Security Council staff person, Sing Visetpojchanakit, said that the RTG had given careful consideration to the North Korean refugee issue. It understood the humanitarian aspect and that conditions in North Korea and China were not good. It knew about the NKHRA, but was uncomfortable with the application of the law. The RTG was concerned about trafficking and a negative North Korean government reaction. Nonetheless, North Korean refugees who reached Thailand would be resettled to South Korea or the U.S. and Sing indicated to Refcoord, without giving any commitment on what the response would be, that the USG could approach the MFA about the next group of refugees it wished to process. Overall, discretion was stressed as a necessity. Meeting with UNHCR -------------- ¶9. (C) UNHCR's Deputy Regional Representative Giuseppe de Vincentis told Whiton that the RTG was "obsessed with" the pull factor that might be caused by U.S. resettlement. The RTG had tried to tighten up its borders, but without success. UNHCR was not aware of any cases of refoulement. De Vincentis stated that the numbers of North Korean refugees interested in U.S. resettlement had declined somewhat because of the long waiting time, He said that arrivals still exceeded the rate of departures. He described the problems BANGKOK 00001575 003 OF 003 between the South Korean Embassy and the RTG regarding the issue of shelters for North Koreans and overcrowding at the Bangkok Immigration Detention Center. About 20 North Koreans a week depart for South Korea. Most refugees bound for Thailand transit Laos, whereas most bound for Cambodia transit Vietnam. One North Korean refugee had recently expressed interest in resettlement to the United Kingdom. When asked by UNHCR, the UK Embassy had responded that it would not consider the case. De Vincentis said that the Thai had asked the Lao government to tighten up its borders but was unsure whether the request had yielded any results. He noted that the South Koreans had asked Laos for permission to process North Koreans for resettlement in Laos but had been turned down. He noted that the South Korea has "internal limits" on the number of refugees it will accept, and recently rescinded an offer to the RTG to house refugees when it could not reach agreement with the RTG on the matter. (Note: The ROK Embassy told us that after the police raided their safehouse twice, they decided they could no longer maintain a separate house. End Note.) Discussions with North Korean Refugees -------------- ¶10. (C) Whiton also met with North Korean refugees under consideration for U.S. resettlement in two shelters: the YWCA and the Durihana NGO shelter. Durihana's house is presently run by a South Korean pastor and his wife, who look after the refugees and teach them English. The conversations were focused on the increasing difficulties for North Koreans in North Korea and China. The refugees said that the food situation in North Korea was getting worse. However, the border crossing situation remained unchanged as bribes could be used to sway border guards. The North Koreans also felt that due to the upcoming 2008 Olympics, crackdowns in China were getting worse. The Chinese issuance of new residency cards, which are more difficult to copy, also created problems. When asked if they had heard radio broadcasts of international programs such as VOA, or secretly had access to radios while in North Korea, the refugees said no. They added that the North Korean government required all televisions and radios rewired upon purchase to receive transmission only from within the country. Whiton asked for their impressions of what can be done to promote change in North Korea. In his response, an older North Korean man stressed that the USG should stop providing assistance to the North Korean government. He further stated that the assistance is not getting to the people and that the USG can help by pressuring China to permit North Koreans to have some legal status in China. Refugees also expressed frustrations with uncertainty entailed in processing to the U.S. Whiton concluded the meetings by reassuring the groups that the USG is very concerned about North Korean human rights issues and remains committed to helping North Koreans in the region through assistance and resettlement. ¶11. (U) This message was cleared by Christian Whiton. BOYCE