SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001572

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PINR ASEC KDEM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING

REF: A. BANGKOK 01390 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)

B. BANGKOK 01385 (MARCH 8 UPDATE)

C. BANGKOK 01288 (ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND RELIGION)

D. BANGKOK 01037 (REALITY ON THE GROUND)

Classified By: Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. A series of high-profile incidents in
southern Thailand since March 11 is inspiring growing concern
among South-watchers that the prospect for violent, sectarian
clashes between Muslims and Buddhists in that troubled region
is increasing. These incidents are provoking public outrage
and may lead to reprisals. According to one of our contacts,
elements in the Ministry of Interior are working to inspire
broader, nationwide Buddhist outrage over the violence, in
order to pressure Prime Minister Surayud to toss aside his
reconciliation platform. Surayud publicly reiterated his
support for this policy on March 15 saying "we will solve
southern unrest only with peaceful means." Security
officials on the ground, meanwhile, are increasingly
frustrated by the lack of government action in response to
these attacks, according to a Western contact of ours. These
dynamics increase our concern that local Buddhists, or even
security forces--in particular the irregular paramilitary
"Ranger" units--may cross the line, inspiring further
bloodshed, and ushering in a new, more dangerous era of
sectarian conflict. End Summary.


LONGSTANDING CONCERNS
--------------


2. (C) As noted in reftel reports, many local observers of
the southern conflict have noted the lack of overt sectarian
conflict since the January 2004 upsurge in violence. While
Buddhist-Muslim ties in the South have been frayed by the
violence--resulting in significant mistrust between these
groups--for most locals, the fighting has largely not been
defined in religious terms, nor has it resulted in
tit-for-tat attacks between Buddhists and Muslims. Indeed,
despite public statements by some members of the royal family
for Buddhists throughout the nation to support their cousins
in the South, the southern violence has not attracted that
much attention in the rest of the country. That may be
changing.

A DARK DAY IN YALA
--------------


3. (C) In a story that landed on the front pages of Bangkok's
newspapers the next day, a commuter minibus carrying
passengers from Yala to Songhkla on a small rural short-cut
was ambushed by suspected insurgents at approximately 8: 00
am on March 14. While hundreds of people have been killed in
drive-by shootings and official vehicles (i.e. those with
uniformed military or police escorts) have taken fire in
similar circumstances, this appears to the first case where
suspected militants blocked the road, forced passengers out
of the vehicle and executed them on the spot. Eight people
were killed and one was critically injured--all were
Buddhists. According to initial press accounts, the driver
of the vehicle was spared after the gunmen determined that he
was Muslim. It is not clear why this van was targeted.
According to Thailand Human Rights Watch adviser Sunai Phasuk
(protect),the militants knew the route and schedule for this
commuter company, and targeted it specifically because most
passengers are usually Buddhist, and as an effort to "cut
off" travel between the deep South and the rest of the
country. Local police officers, however, characterized the
attack as "random."


4. (C) The van ambush was followed by two separate attacks on
Malay-Muslims on the evening of March 15. According to Yala
police, at 8:30 pm, a grenade was thrown into a shelter
outside of the Almu Baroh mosque in Yaha district, Yala.
Twelve Malay-Muslim men, ranging in age from 25-73, were
wounded. One hour later, unidentified suspects in a sedan
threw at least one grenade and fired several shots into
crowded tea house in Katong sub-district, Yala. Two men were
killed and another 12 were injured. All were Malay-Muslim.

BANGKOK 00001572 002 OF 003




5. (C) All three incidents inspired public outrage.
According to press reports, Buddhists as far as away as the
Northeastern provinces of Si Sa Ket and Roi Et protested the
attack on their co-religionists. Meanwhile, police report
that a group of 50 local villagers organized near the mosque
in Yaha on March 15 to protest the grenade attack and demand
an investigation.


6. (C) Prime Minister Surayud admitted to reporters on March
15 that the attacks represented a deterioration in the
situation, but reiterated his support for conciliatory
measures. "We cannot solve this problem in anger...we will
solve southern unrest only with peaceful means." According
to press reports, Surayud ordered Interior Minister Aree
Wong-Araya to travel to the South to inspect the region; the
PM also announced his plan to transfer National Intelligence
Agency (NIA) chief Waipot Srinual back to the Ministry of
Defense--it was not clear whether this was tied to the Yala
attacks.


7. (SBU) Late afternoon on March 15, GEN Wiroj Buacharoon,
the commander of the 4th Army Region covering the South,
announced on television: a curfew is in effect from 8:00 pm
until 4:00 am in two districts in Yala, local people hosting
overnight visitors must report their guests, citizens should
carry identification cards at all times, and civilians are
prohibited from having personal two-way radios or dressing
like military or police officers.


FIRST BUDDHIST COUNTERPROTEST IN PATTANI
--------------


8. (C) These vicious attacks in Yala were preceded by a
disturbing event in Pattani on March 11. For the first time,
a group of Malay-Muslims protesting the recent arrests of
suspected insurgents was challenged by a Buddhist
counter-protest. According to local police contacts, six
local Malay-Muslims came to the Na Pradu police station on
the morning of March 11 to discuss the recent arrest of their
relatives. Soon after their arrival, almost 100
Malay-Muslims--mostly women, some from Pattani, some from
Yala--arrived to protest the arrests. In response, a crowd
of approximately 100 Buddhists soon gathered, with many
verbally challenging the Muslim crowd. Security
forces--including the all-female Ranger unit--were able to
keep the two sides apart, but according to local police and
press contacts who were at the scene, both sides exchanged
heated words. One elderly Buddhist man attempted to attack
the Muslim side, but was held back by the Rangers. According
to the local chief of police, the counter-protest was not
exclusively Buddhist, but included local Malay-Muslims as
well. (Note: we cannot confirm this. End Note.) After
several hours of peaceful--if boisterous--protest, both sides
dispersed at 11:45 am.


BOTH SIDES GEARING FOR A CLASH?
--------------


9. (C) Human Rights Watch's Sunai--who has a strong network
of contacts in the Malay-Muslim and Buddhist communities in
the South--is increasingly worried that the specter of
sectarian violence is approaching. Citing the four incidents
mentioned above, Sunai believes that the insurgents are
focused on provoking a Buddhist backlash, so as to inspire
overly harsh tactics by the government and destroy the idea
of peaceful coexistence between the two faiths--both of which
would increase popular Muslim-Malay support for separation.
According to Sunai, the separatists are switching from
widespread, multiple target attacks (such as the August 2006
Yala bank bombings) to increasingly vicious attacks like the
Yala minibus ambush, that will attract more Buddhist outrage
and, hopefully, reprisals.


10. (C) Both Sunai and Janes Intelligence's Anthony Davis
(protect) are concerned about the rising potential for
Buddhist reprisals. Sunai believes that elements in the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Army--frustrated by the

BANGKOK 00001572 003 OF 003


reconciliation approach of the Surayud government--are
agitating for more direct crackdowns on suspected
separatists. Indeed, Sunai says that elements of MOI have
been behind the recent protests in the rural Northeast, and
that the Pattani Governor organized the Buddhist
counter-protest in Pattani on March 11. According to Sunai,
MOI officials are trying to sideline those figures--such as
Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) chief
Pranai--who advocate a "soft" approach, in part by building
nationwide Buddhist outrage over the violence in the South.
"They (MOI) are out of control."


11. (C) Local security officials are frustrated with the
Surayud government's "soft approach" according to Davis,
especially in light of recent separatist attacks. "They are
close to mutinous." (Note: this characterization reflects
frustration with RTG policy and local leadership, not support
for the overthrown of the current government. End Note.)
While not necessarily advocating a severe or overly harsh
crackdown on local separatist suspects, these officials are
frustrated by the lack of action, any action, in response to
the attacks. Sunai is even more pessimistic. While he is
relatively confident that regular Army units and senior
commanders in the South will resist internal pressure to lash
out at the local population, ("they learned the lesson of
Krue Se and Tak Bai",) he is concerned that the irregular
Rangers--whether on their own or as a proxy for regular
forces--may "cross the line." Sunai says that most local
Muslims believe that non-uniformed paramilitary Rangers were
behind the Yaha mosque and tea shop attacks.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Surayud's "reconciliation policy" has garnered praise
and support from many with long experience in the southern
provinces, who understand that it will take years to restore
peace to the troubled region. For security forces in the
South, and the broader public, reconciliation is a hard sell,
and getting harder all the time. It appears that the
insurgents are intentionally shaping their policies to
provoke a violent response from security forces, furthering
the cycle of violence and disrupting the government's efforts
to reach out to the Malay-Muslim population. MOI efforts to
undermine the PM's reconciliation policy would not be
surprising, given that local MOI officials and their elected
subordinates are doing a lot of the dying in the South. Open
conflict between the Malay-Muslim and Thai/Sino-Buddhist
communities in the South would represent a major escalation
of the conflict (and would be another blow to the beleaguered
PM.) The situation has not deteriorated to this point yet,
but the trends are disturbing.
BOYCE