SENIOR LEGISLATOR ON POLITICS, SECURITY, AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000151 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER ASEC KDEM TH SUBJECT: SENIOR LEGISLATOR ON POLITICS, SECURITY, AND THE COUP REF: BANGKOK 111 (PRESSING ON MARTIAL LAW) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Senior legislator Prasong Soonsiri told the Ambassador he believed political opponents of the Surayud administration, working with disgruntled policemen, carried out the December 31 bombings. Prasong admitted he lacked evidence to support this theory, however, and he acknowledged the expertise of a Privy Councilor who recently told the Ambassador he suspected southern separatists carried out the attacks. Prasong, who claims to have helped organize the coup, working with two retired Generals and then-Army Commander Sonthi, spoke pessimistically about the Surayud administration's lack of political experience and inability to handle the various challenges it faced. Reftel reported the Ambassador's discussion with Prasong on martial law. End Summary. SPECULATING ABOUT BOMBINGS -------------- ¶2. (C) In a January 8 meeting with the Ambassador, Prasong Soonsiri -- former Foreign Minister, former National Security Council Secretary General, and now a prominent member of the National Legislative Assembly -- speculated about the likely perpetrators of the New Year's Eve bombings in Bangkok. Prasong noted that there were four main groups of suspects, according to theories in general circulation: - Persons associated with the Thaksin regime, including former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; - Southern Thai separatists, who were experienced producers of the types of IEDs used in the attacks; - Disgruntled members of the Royal Thai Police (RTP), concerned by administration efforts to reorganize the RTP; - The Council for National Security (CNS) itself, to distract from its lagging popularity, and/or tighten its grip on power. ¶3. (C) Prasong said that he personally suspected the bombings had involved a mixed group of culprits. He guessed that Thaksin himself might have funded the operation. It would take a crafty figure like Chavalit, however, to select the targets and design the operation. (Chavalit and Prasong have known each other for many years, if not decades, although their relationship has soured.) Prasong believed that elements of the Police were most likely involved in the construction and placement of the IEDs. THINKING ABOUT THE SOUTHERN SEPARATISTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Having explained his perspective, Prasong acknowledged that he had no evidence to back it up. The only real evidence available consisted of remnants and traces of the IEDs, which did appear similar to those previously used by separatists in the South. But Prasong believed that the southern groups lacked the familiarity with (and base of support in) Bangkok to carry out the coordinated attacks of December 31. Furthermore, he believed these attacks would not serve the interests of the separatists, who did not want to alienate Thais outside of their area of operations. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador mentioned to Prasong that he had spoken the day before with Privy Counselor Palakorn Suwanrath -- a trusted, knowledgeable observer of southern Thailand. Palakorn had said his instincts led him to believe southern separatists had carried out the bombings; the southerners -- whom he considered to be of particularly violent disposition -- would have no reservations about carrying out such attacks, while Palakorn found it extremely difficult to envision any Thai politician acting so ruthlessly and endangering innocent lives. PROBLEMS AILING THE ADMINISTRATION -------------- BANGKOK 00000151 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) When the Ambassador recounted his discussion with Palakorn, Prasong said he respected Palakorn's views and stressed that his own theory on the bombings was just that -- a theory. Whoever might turn out to be culpable, however, Prasong thought it troublesome that Prime Minister Surayud and Council for National Security Chairman Sonthi had been willing to claim publicly, in the absence of evidence, that opposition political figures had carried out the attacks. While noting tangentially that he remained very supportive of and close to Sonthi and Surayud, both of whom he viewed as well-intentioned, Prasong noted the current administration was encountering difficulties on several fronts: - Politically, the current leadership was fairly passive, inexperienced, and had poor instincts, while their adversaries -- Thaksin, Chavalit, and other Thai Rak Thai politicians -- were serious and ruthless. - Economically, the strengthening Thai Baht would likely lead to a downturn in exports, while other factors -- like the bombings -- would harm tourism. RTG efforts to amend the Alien Business Act appeared likely to inflict further harm on the economy. Finance Minister M.R. Pridiyathorn Devakula's policies on capital controls, the "above ground" lottery, and other matters seemed inept and riddled with conflicts of interest. The administration's economic woes were self-inflicted, Prasong observed. - Socially, the administration had yet to address in a meaningful way some of the negative factors that had become increasingly burdensome over the past few years, such as mounting household debt, unemployment, and a general sense of malaise. - Security problems -- principally in southern Thailand -- persisted. BACKGROUND ON THE COUP -------------- ¶7. (C) In this and prior meetings, Prasong provided the Ambassador with details about the planning of the September 19 coup d'etat. Prason's claims are consistent with what we observed before and during the coup, and Prasong's status and background lend credibility to his account. Prasong has claimed that approximately five or six months before the coup, he met with General Sonthi and two retired generals whom Prasong refused to identify. (He stated unequivocally, however, that Surayud was not involved in the plot; no one would have suggested bringing Surayud in on the planning, as Thais knew well his opposition to coups and preference for the military not to take on a political role.) After discussing the political situation, Prasong, Sonthi, and their associates decided to begin planning for a coup on a contingency basis. ¶8. (C) On September 13, according to his account, Prasong and his associates decided the situation was sufficiently urgent that they would have to proceed with their plan for a coup. One of the unnamed Generals met with Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, to seek his approval. Prasong, who was not in the meeting, did not recount Prem's precise response, but the group understood that Prem had accepted their decision. The group assumed that, by consulting Prem, they were assured at least that the King did not oppose their action. The Ambassador asked whether Chavalit had played a role in the coup; Prasong said that he had not. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Prasong was one of the instigators of the September 19 coup, so his disappointment with the current administration strikes us as all the more significant. While taking on board his theory about the possible perpetrators of the New Year's Eve attacks, we also note he recognizes that it is not enough to have a plausible or persuasive theory about who orchestrated the bombings -- the government needs concrete evidence in order to act against the culprits. BOYCE