FORMER PM CHUAN REVIEWS POLITICAL SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001465 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC KISL KDEM TH SUBJECT: FORMER PM CHUAN REVIEWS POLITICAL SITUATION REF: 06 BANGKOK 1845 (BOMB AT DEMOCRAT HQ) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai told the Ambassador Thais are increasingly dismayed with the current leadership and have lost much of their initial enthusiasm for the September coup d'etat. Chuan, who remains highly influential in the Democrat Party (DP),discussed potential constitutional reforms, noting he would be willing to dispense altogether with the Senate and the use of party lists. He advocated multi-member electoral districts and a requirement that the Prime Minister be an elected legislator. Chuan worried that the DP might face an adverse ruling in ongoing proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal but expressed confidence about electoral prospects. He also expressed concern about increasing violence in the South. End Summary. GROWING DISCONTENT -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador opened a March 12 lunch with Chuan and six other senior DP figures by asking the former PM for his view of the situation. Chuan noted that many of those who had supported the September coup d'etat have had second thoughts. The interim administration and the Council for National Security had failed to address the four issues (social divisions, corruption, interference with independent state bodies, and lese majeste) that the Generals had claimed justified seizing power. In light of the administration's ineffectiveness, support for the coup had faded dramatically, and Thais looked forward to the transition back to democratic governance. Chuan sardonically said this was the only good thing about the coup -- that its inept followup made future coups less attractive. REFORMING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM -------------- ¶3. (C) Chuan appeared prepared to be flexible regarding certain provisions that might be included in the draft constitution. Echoing the views of his protege, DP Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, Chuan said the Constitution should require that the Prime Minister be an elected member of parliament. In a "normal," mature parliamentary democracy, such a provision would not be necessary, as it was understood that the elected leader of the majority would become Prime Minister. In today's Thailand, unfortunately, such a clause was indeed necessary. (Comment: Provisions allowing non-elected person s to be PM appear to have the potential to generate substantial opposition to the constitution, from both political and activist circles. End Comment.) Chuan also opposed the idea of imposing term limits, which he said would be inconsistent with a parliamentary system. ¶4. (C) Although current debate has focused on the merits of different systems for appointing or electing Senators, Chuan said he would support abolishing the Senate -- over the course of modern Thai political history, the Senate had yet to serve much of a function beyond providing military officers with a political role. Also, unlike other senior figures from the DP and other parties, Chuan advocated the abolishment of party lists. When the Ambassador raised the argument that a party list enables some capable figures who Cdislike campaigning (e.g., intellectuals) to win seats in the legislature, Chuan said he felt that the willingness and ability to campaign was an important qualification for a member of parliament. ¶5. (C) The highest priority, Chuan said, was abolishing vote buying. Vote buying had reached new levels during the Thaksin era, when the authorities also employed the police and military to influence election results. One way to reduce vote buying would be to go from single-member to multi-member electoral districts; the larger size of multi-member districts would make vote-buying too expensive and unlikely to succeed. The Ambassador asked whether Chuan worried that reverting to multi-member districts would allow small parties to gain seats and acquire disproportionate influence when coalition governments are formed, as had happened in the past. Chuan said he did not view this as a BANGKOK 00001465 002 OF 003 concern. ¶6. (C) Chuan acknowledged it was impossible at this juncture to predict with confidence how the constitution would fare in the upcoming (likely August or September) referendum. He said that former legislators, including from the Thai Rak Thai party, retained influence in their communities. If they were to oppose the constitution, it might not pass. If the constitution was good, Chuan thought that it would likely pass. CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked Chuan's outlook on the ongoing case before the Constitutional Tribunal that could lead to the dissolution of the DP (which has been charged with undertaking various undemocratic acts relating to the April 2006 election). Chuan said he was concerned that many officials involved in the process were holdovers from the Thaksin era. Their bias might lead the Tribunal to rule against the DP and order its dissolution. Like many, Chuan did not seem worried by the possibility of dissolution, as the DP is prepared to re-form. He also dismissed the significance of a possible dissolution of Thai Rak Thai, saying that Thaksin's money and influence still gave him deep roots and the possibility of continued political influence with or without Thai Rak Thai. OUTLOOK FOR THE ELECTION -------------- ¶8. (C) Looking ahead to eventual elections, although their parameters remained unclear, Chuan envisioned the DP retaining its dominant position in the South, improving its standing in Bangkok, and possibly polling better in the Central region. It would be difficult for the party to make significant inroads in the Northeast, but they had some hope of improving their standing in the North. THE SOUTH, AND BANGKOK BOMBINGS -------------- ¶9. (C) Chuan acknowledged that the interim administration had a better policy toward the Muslim-majority southern border provinces. However, it would be important to ensure that the RTG selected officials of high quality and ability to implement those policies. This had yet to happen. ¶10. (C) Chuan noted the growing level of violence in the South -- perhaps an attempt to undermine Prime Minister Surayud's effort at reconciliation -- and the increasing outward manifestations of Middle East-style Islam (e.g., women donning Muslim headscarves). Chuan acknowledged that southern insurgents were largely motivated by particular historical and cultural factors; he cited the insurgents' rhetorical focus on "Siam" -- which, as predecessor of the modern Thai state, had assimilated the southern provinces -- as an important indicator of their motivation. He agreed with our assessment that the South had as yet not been directly influenced by Jemaah Islamiyah or other international terror organizations. ¶11. (C) Admitting he had no hard facts about the New Year's Eve bombings in Bangkok, Chuan declined to rule out the participation of southern insurgents. When the Ambassador noted that it was hard to see that the insurgents benefited from attacking Bangkok, which they had not done previously, Chuan said that, in the current environment, one could not assume that the insurgents acted rationally -- they were simply bloodthirsty. However, Chuan also referred to the bombs set last year at the DP headquarters (reftel) and at Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda's house, and thought the Bangkok bombs might have been set by the same perpetrators. (Note: These incidents were never solved, but suspicion rested on officials close to Thaksin. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Surprisingly, some of Chuan's views (e.g., a preference for abolishing the party list system and a willingness to live without a Senate) diverged from the positions expressed by DP Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva. Many of our interlocutors are very pessimistic about the BANGKOK 00001465 003 OF 003 political situation, but this group seemed more sanguine, and ready to believe that the transition back to democratic government would succeed, despite many difficulties ahead. BOYCE