Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK1390
2007-03-08 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
VZCZCXRO9472 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #1390/01 0671005 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081005Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5393 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001390
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR (VINCENT)
NSC FOR MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PINR ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
2006
REF: A. BANGKOK 1037 (REALITY ON THE GROUND)
B. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)
C. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001390
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR (VINCENT)
NSC FOR MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PINR ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
2006
REF: A. BANGKOK 1037 (REALITY ON THE GROUND)
B. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)
C. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The number of separatist-related incidents
in southern Thailand did not dramatically increase in 2006,
as some press accounts have suggested, but the attacks appear
to have been more brutal and lethal. According to newly
available statistics, there were slightly fewer attacks in
2006 than 2005. More people were killed and injured in 2006,
however, than in previous years; possibly as a result of
increasingly frequent shooting and bombing--vice
arson--attacks. From January 2004 through February 2007,
approximately 2,088 people have been killed and 3,290 injured
due to separatist violence. AQ"9Qw remains cyclic, the ceiling for this statistic may
be rising. More important, the increasingly lethality of
these attacks is driving a rapidly rising sense of fear in
the South. End Summary.
BACK TO THE NUMBER CRUNCHERS
--------------
2. (C) As an update to reftel B and C reports providing
statistical perspective on the violence in southern Thailand,
we recently obtained the latest catalogue of statistics
compiled by Dr. Sisomphop Chitphiromsri of Prince of Songkhla
University. While portions of police and Army statistics on
the violence are sometimes made public, those numbers are
rarely comprehensive, or collected and vetted in a consistent
manner. Dr. Sisomphop's figures, while far from perfect, are
the result of a three-year, ongoing effort to compile
reasonably accurate data on the violence. Sisomphop and his
research assistants are longtime residents of the South and
actively work to ensure that criminal and other
non-separatist violence is not included.
3. (C) The latest data set from Sisomphop is the most
comprehensive to date, and, it should be noted, includes some
revisions to data from 2004 and 2005. This slight shift in
numbers forces us to revise a key judgment from ref C, namely
that 2004 may have been slightly more violent than 2005.
According to these new numbers, there were 1789 separatist
related attacks in 2004, and 2164 such incidents in 2005.
CYCLIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES
--------------
4. (C) Refs outlined the cyclic nature of insurgent-related
violence in 2004 and 2005, with the number of attacks
regularly rising and falling each month within a relatively
stable range. Previously, such factors as the weather or
politics (e.g. severe flooding or elections, respectively)
appeared to cause a decrease in the number of attacks during
a given time period. This dynamic continued in 2006. The
number of attacks see-sawed through the first seven months of
the year: January, 165 incidents, February, 118, March, 173,
April, 124, May, 107, and June, 167. In July, during the
monumental nationwide celebration of King Bumiphol's 60th
year on the throne, the number of attacks dropped to their
lowest point that year, with 84 incidents. But two major
incidents in August--a series of over 100 coordinated
bombings through all four southern provinces and a separate
raft of attacks on commercial targets in Yala later in that
month--drove the monthly incident total to 286, the high
point for 2006 and the third most violent month since the
upsurge in violence began in 2004. The number of attacks in
September--the month of the coup--plummeted once again, to
86. In October, there were 104 incidents. Finally,
following widely publicized calls by senior government
officials for new reconciliation efforts in the South, the
number of attacks rose again, with 208 and 193 incidents in
November and December.
FEWER ATTACKS THAN 2005...
--------------
5. (C) The number of separatist-related incidents of violence
BANGKOK 00001390 002 OF 002
in 2006, reported by Dr. Sisomphop--1815 in total--is lower
than the number of attacks in 2005 (2164 cases). The average
number of attacks per month in 2006 was also lower than 2005:
151 compared to 180. 2006 likewise did not set new high or
low points for numbers of attacks in a month. According to
Sisomphop's revised statistics, May 2005 remains the high
point, with 345 incidents, followed by June 2005 with 313
attacks. August 2006 (286 incidents),April 2004 (266) and
March 2004 (222) round out the top five. The quietest month
in the past three years was December 2005--when severe
flooding struck the South--with only 44 cases of insurgent
violence. That said, July and September 2006 were among the
four quietest months in the last three years. All of these
high and low-points aside, the number of attacks per month
over the past three years fits within a range of 100-200
incidents. Three of the four months since November 2006 have
been near the top of this range, with preliminary information
suggesting 132 and 210 attacks in January and February 2007,
respectively.
...BUT MORE VICTIMS
--------------
6. (C) While the total number of attacks may be slightly
lower, the number of victims--those injured or killed in the
violence--in 2006 was higher, however. In 2004--the year of
both the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, which resulted in
hundreds killed and injured--there were 1438 victims; 686
killed and 758 wounded. In 2005, 1643 people were victims of
the southern unrest, with 585 dead (less than the year
before) and 1068 wounded. In 2006, 1877 people were victims
of southern violence, with 681 killed and 1196 injured. When
sorted by religion, Dr. Sisomphop lists 54% of all victims
since 2004 as Buddhist, 36% as Muslim and approximately 10%
of victims with no clear religious affiliation. Of those
injured, 60% were Buddhist and 27% were Muslim. For those
killed in the violence, 44% were Buddhist and 50% were
Muslim.
MORE DIRECT TACTICS?
--------------
7. (C) One explanation for the increased number of victims
relative to each attack may be a shift in insurgent tactics.
According to the same data set, the number of arson attacks
has dropped over the past three years, even as the number of
bombing and shooting attacks grows. The following is the
percentage of each type of attack in the last three years:
for 2004, 51% shooting, 34% arson, and 15% bomb attacks. For
2005, 58% shooting, 21% arson and 21% bomb attacks. Finally,
for 2006, shootings increased to 63% of all attacks, with
arson dropping to 15% and bomb attacks barely increasing to
22%. This apparent shift from "casual" violence such as
arson attacks on government offices to direct assassination
attempts is likely resulting in more victims. Though not
captured in statistics, we are likewise concerned by the
apparent increase in larger and more effectively placed
bombs, and the concurrent rise in casualties from this type
of attack.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) We've become accustomed to press reports or private
analysts commenting that, after each new attack, violence has
risen dramatically in the South. Sisomphop's statistics
offer some small comfort in confirming that the number of
attacks has not in fact "exploded." These numbers, however,
do highlight the most worrisome dynamic in the southern
conflict: the increasingly bold and brutal tactics of the
separatists, who in the past three years have slowly moved
beyond nuisance attacks to more frequently direct and, at
times indiscriminate, attempts to intimidate, maim and kill.
Indeed, as useful as these statistics are in understanding
the violence, numbers can only go so far in explaining the
state of fear that increasingly haunts the people of the
South (ref A).
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR (VINCENT)
NSC FOR MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PINR ASEC TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
2006
REF: A. BANGKOK 1037 (REALITY ON THE GROUND)
B. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)
C. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS)
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The number of separatist-related incidents
in southern Thailand did not dramatically increase in 2006,
as some press accounts have suggested, but the attacks appear
to have been more brutal and lethal. According to newly
available statistics, there were slightly fewer attacks in
2006 than 2005. More people were killed and injured in 2006,
however, than in previous years; possibly as a result of
increasingly frequent shooting and bombing--vice
arson--attacks. From January 2004 through February 2007,
approximately 2,088 people have been killed and 3,290 injured
due to separatist violence. AQ"9Qw remains cyclic, the ceiling for this statistic may
be rising. More important, the increasingly lethality of
these attacks is driving a rapidly rising sense of fear in
the South. End Summary.
BACK TO THE NUMBER CRUNCHERS
--------------
2. (C) As an update to reftel B and C reports providing
statistical perspective on the violence in southern Thailand,
we recently obtained the latest catalogue of statistics
compiled by Dr. Sisomphop Chitphiromsri of Prince of Songkhla
University. While portions of police and Army statistics on
the violence are sometimes made public, those numbers are
rarely comprehensive, or collected and vetted in a consistent
manner. Dr. Sisomphop's figures, while far from perfect, are
the result of a three-year, ongoing effort to compile
reasonably accurate data on the violence. Sisomphop and his
research assistants are longtime residents of the South and
actively work to ensure that criminal and other
non-separatist violence is not included.
3. (C) The latest data set from Sisomphop is the most
comprehensive to date, and, it should be noted, includes some
revisions to data from 2004 and 2005. This slight shift in
numbers forces us to revise a key judgment from ref C, namely
that 2004 may have been slightly more violent than 2005.
According to these new numbers, there were 1789 separatist
related attacks in 2004, and 2164 such incidents in 2005.
CYCLIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES
--------------
4. (C) Refs outlined the cyclic nature of insurgent-related
violence in 2004 and 2005, with the number of attacks
regularly rising and falling each month within a relatively
stable range. Previously, such factors as the weather or
politics (e.g. severe flooding or elections, respectively)
appeared to cause a decrease in the number of attacks during
a given time period. This dynamic continued in 2006. The
number of attacks see-sawed through the first seven months of
the year: January, 165 incidents, February, 118, March, 173,
April, 124, May, 107, and June, 167. In July, during the
monumental nationwide celebration of King Bumiphol's 60th
year on the throne, the number of attacks dropped to their
lowest point that year, with 84 incidents. But two major
incidents in August--a series of over 100 coordinated
bombings through all four southern provinces and a separate
raft of attacks on commercial targets in Yala later in that
month--drove the monthly incident total to 286, the high
point for 2006 and the third most violent month since the
upsurge in violence began in 2004. The number of attacks in
September--the month of the coup--plummeted once again, to
86. In October, there were 104 incidents. Finally,
following widely publicized calls by senior government
officials for new reconciliation efforts in the South, the
number of attacks rose again, with 208 and 193 incidents in
November and December.
FEWER ATTACKS THAN 2005...
--------------
5. (C) The number of separatist-related incidents of violence
BANGKOK 00001390 002 OF 002
in 2006, reported by Dr. Sisomphop--1815 in total--is lower
than the number of attacks in 2005 (2164 cases). The average
number of attacks per month in 2006 was also lower than 2005:
151 compared to 180. 2006 likewise did not set new high or
low points for numbers of attacks in a month. According to
Sisomphop's revised statistics, May 2005 remains the high
point, with 345 incidents, followed by June 2005 with 313
attacks. August 2006 (286 incidents),April 2004 (266) and
March 2004 (222) round out the top five. The quietest month
in the past three years was December 2005--when severe
flooding struck the South--with only 44 cases of insurgent
violence. That said, July and September 2006 were among the
four quietest months in the last three years. All of these
high and low-points aside, the number of attacks per month
over the past three years fits within a range of 100-200
incidents. Three of the four months since November 2006 have
been near the top of this range, with preliminary information
suggesting 132 and 210 attacks in January and February 2007,
respectively.
...BUT MORE VICTIMS
--------------
6. (C) While the total number of attacks may be slightly
lower, the number of victims--those injured or killed in the
violence--in 2006 was higher, however. In 2004--the year of
both the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, which resulted in
hundreds killed and injured--there were 1438 victims; 686
killed and 758 wounded. In 2005, 1643 people were victims of
the southern unrest, with 585 dead (less than the year
before) and 1068 wounded. In 2006, 1877 people were victims
of southern violence, with 681 killed and 1196 injured. When
sorted by religion, Dr. Sisomphop lists 54% of all victims
since 2004 as Buddhist, 36% as Muslim and approximately 10%
of victims with no clear religious affiliation. Of those
injured, 60% were Buddhist and 27% were Muslim. For those
killed in the violence, 44% were Buddhist and 50% were
Muslim.
MORE DIRECT TACTICS?
--------------
7. (C) One explanation for the increased number of victims
relative to each attack may be a shift in insurgent tactics.
According to the same data set, the number of arson attacks
has dropped over the past three years, even as the number of
bombing and shooting attacks grows. The following is the
percentage of each type of attack in the last three years:
for 2004, 51% shooting, 34% arson, and 15% bomb attacks. For
2005, 58% shooting, 21% arson and 21% bomb attacks. Finally,
for 2006, shootings increased to 63% of all attacks, with
arson dropping to 15% and bomb attacks barely increasing to
22%. This apparent shift from "casual" violence such as
arson attacks on government offices to direct assassination
attempts is likely resulting in more victims. Though not
captured in statistics, we are likewise concerned by the
apparent increase in larger and more effectively placed
bombs, and the concurrent rise in casualties from this type
of attack.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) We've become accustomed to press reports or private
analysts commenting that, after each new attack, violence has
risen dramatically in the South. Sisomphop's statistics
offer some small comfort in confirming that the number of
attacks has not in fact "exploded." These numbers, however,
do highlight the most worrisome dynamic in the southern
conflict: the increasingly bold and brutal tactics of the
separatists, who in the past three years have slowly moved
beyond nuisance attacks to more frequently direct and, at
times indiscriminate, attempts to intimidate, maim and kill.
Indeed, as useful as these statistics are in understanding
the violence, numbers can only go so far in explaining the
state of fear that increasingly haunts the people of the
South (ref A).
BOYCE