SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001390 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR (VINCENT) NSC FOR MORROW PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS PINR ASEC TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR 2006 REF: A. BANGKOK 1037 (REALITY ON THE GROUND) ¶B. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS) ¶C. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS) Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The number of separatist-related incidents in southern Thailand did not dramatically increase in 2006, as some press accounts have suggested, but the attacks appear to have been more brutal and lethal. According to newly available statistics, there were slightly fewer attacks in 2006 than 2005. More people were killed and injured in 2006, however, than in previous years; possibly as a result of increasingly frequent shooting and bombing--vice arson--attacks. From January 2004 through February 2007, approximately 2,088 people have been killed and 3,290 injured due to separatist violence. AQ"9Qw remains cyclic, the ceiling for this statistic may be rising. More important, the increasingly lethality of these attacks is driving a rapidly rising sense of fear in the South. End Summary. BACK TO THE NUMBER CRUNCHERS -------------- ¶2. (C) As an update to reftel B and C reports providing statistical perspective on the violence in southern Thailand, we recently obtained the latest catalogue of statistics compiled by Dr. Sisomphop Chitphiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University. While portions of police and Army statistics on the violence are sometimes made public, those numbers are rarely comprehensive, or collected and vetted in a consistent manner. Dr. Sisomphop's figures, while far from perfect, are the result of a three-year, ongoing effort to compile reasonably accurate data on the violence. Sisomphop and his research assistants are longtime residents of the South and actively work to ensure that criminal and other non-separatist violence is not included. ¶3. (C) The latest data set from Sisomphop is the most comprehensive to date, and, it should be noted, includes some revisions to data from 2004 and 2005. This slight shift in numbers forces us to revise a key judgment from ref C, namely that 2004 may have been slightly more violent than 2005. According to these new numbers, there were 1789 separatist related attacks in 2004, and 2164 such incidents in 2005. CYCLIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES -------------- ¶4. (C) Refs outlined the cyclic nature of insurgent-related violence in 2004 and 2005, with the number of attacks regularly rising and falling each month within a relatively stable range. Previously, such factors as the weather or politics (e.g. severe flooding or elections, respectively) appeared to cause a decrease in the number of attacks during a given time period. This dynamic continued in 2006. The number of attacks see-sawed through the first seven months of the year: January, 165 incidents, February, 118, March, 173, April, 124, May, 107, and June, 167. In July, during the monumental nationwide celebration of King Bumiphol's 60th year on the throne, the number of attacks dropped to their lowest point that year, with 84 incidents. But two major incidents in August--a series of over 100 coordinated bombings through all four southern provinces and a separate raft of attacks on commercial targets in Yala later in that month--drove the monthly incident total to 286, the high point for 2006 and the third most violent month since the upsurge in violence began in 2004. The number of attacks in September--the month of the coup--plummeted once again, to ¶86. In October, there were 104 incidents. Finally, following widely publicized calls by senior government officials for new reconciliation efforts in the South, the number of attacks rose again, with 208 and 193 incidents in November and December. FEWER ATTACKS THAN 2005... -------------- ¶5. (C) The number of separatist-related incidents of violence BANGKOK 00001390 002 OF 002 in 2006, reported by Dr. Sisomphop--1815 in total--is lower than the number of attacks in 2005 (2164 cases). The average number of attacks per month in 2006 was also lower than 2005: 151 compared to 180. 2006 likewise did not set new high or low points for numbers of attacks in a month. According to Sisomphop's revised statistics, May 2005 remains the high point, with 345 incidents, followed by June 2005 with 313 attacks. August 2006 (286 incidents),April 2004 (266) and March 2004 (222) round out the top five. The quietest month in the past three years was December 2005--when severe flooding struck the South--with only 44 cases of insurgent violence. That said, July and September 2006 were among the four quietest months in the last three years. All of these high and low-points aside, the number of attacks per month over the past three years fits within a range of 100-200 incidents. Three of the four months since November 2006 have been near the top of this range, with preliminary information suggesting 132 and 210 attacks in January and February 2007, respectively. ...BUT MORE VICTIMS -------------- ¶6. (C) While the total number of attacks may be slightly lower, the number of victims--those injured or killed in the violence--in 2006 was higher, however. In 2004--the year of both the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, which resulted in hundreds killed and injured--there were 1438 victims; 686 killed and 758 wounded. In 2005, 1643 people were victims of the southern unrest, with 585 dead (less than the year before) and 1068 wounded. In 2006, 1877 people were victims of southern violence, with 681 killed and 1196 injured. When sorted by religion, Dr. Sisomphop lists 54% of all victims since 2004 as Buddhist, 36% as Muslim and approximately 10% of victims with no clear religious affiliation. Of those injured, 60% were Buddhist and 27% were Muslim. For those killed in the violence, 44% were Buddhist and 50% were Muslim. MORE DIRECT TACTICS? -------------- ¶7. (C) One explanation for the increased number of victims relative to each attack may be a shift in insurgent tactics. According to the same data set, the number of arson attacks has dropped over the past three years, even as the number of bombing and shooting attacks grows. The following is the percentage of each type of attack in the last three years: for 2004, 51% shooting, 34% arson, and 15% bomb attacks. For 2005, 58% shooting, 21% arson and 21% bomb attacks. Finally, for 2006, shootings increased to 63% of all attacks, with arson dropping to 15% and bomb attacks barely increasing to 22%. This apparent shift from "casual" violence such as arson attacks on government offices to direct assassination attempts is likely resulting in more victims. Though not captured in statistics, we are likewise concerned by the apparent increase in larger and more effectively placed bombs, and the concurrent rise in casualties from this type of attack. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) We've become accustomed to press reports or private analysts commenting that, after each new attack, violence has risen dramatically in the South. Sisomphop's statistics offer some small comfort in confirming that the number of attacks has not in fact "exploded." These numbers, however, do highlight the most worrisome dynamic in the southern conflict: the increasingly bold and brutal tactics of the separatists, who in the past three years have slowly moved beyond nuisance attacks to more frequently direct and, at times indiscriminate, attempts to intimidate, maim and kill. Indeed, as useful as these statistics are in understanding the violence, numbers can only go so far in explaining the state of fear that increasingly haunts the people of the South (ref A). BOYCE