THAI RAK THAI LEADER ADDRESSES THREAT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI RAK THAI LEADER ADDRESSES THREAT OF
PROSECUTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 1187 (AMBASSDOR'S LUNCH WITH WINAI)


B. BANGKOK 1034 (CHATURON DEFIES RESTRICTIONS)

C. BANGKOK 232 (GENERALS TAKE STRONGER LINE)

D. 06 BANGKOK 6366 (CHATURON ON POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT)

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor David R. Greenberg, reason: 1
.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng
said the authorities' decision to prosecute him for political
activities was unwarranted and generated extra publicity for
his views. In remarks before a packed house at the Foreign
Correspondents Club of Thailand on February 28, Chaturon also
said that, to promote an early return to normalcy, TRT would
support the draft constitution, barring egregious flaws or
provisions allowing the coup leaders to retain political
power. Chaturon discouraged speculation about the outcome of
the Constitutional Tribunal proceedings that could lead to
TRT's dissolution. He noted TRT retains substantial popular
support, and had a net influx of members since the coup.
Despite recent defections, many former legislators remain in
the party, although the party's leadership has changed
significantly. Having threatened to prosecute Chaturon, the
authorities are now in a somewhat difficult position, but it
is unclear whether they will pursue him vigorously;
Chaturon's case may remain but a sideshow compared to the
continuing decline in the government's credibility. End
Summary.

AUTHORITIES THREATEN PROSECUTION
--------------


2. (C) On February 27, a Council for National Security (CNS)
spokesman announced that the CNS had asked the government to
prosecute TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng for flouting a
government ban by engaging in political activities during a
visit to Thailand's Northeast (ref B). (Note: CNS Secretary
General Winai Phattiyakul had told the Ambassador on February
26 that the CNS felt impelled to respond to Chaturon's
actions; the Ambassador cautioned Winai against responding
harshly -- ref A. End Note.)


3. (C) As of March 1, the government's intended course of
action remains unclear. The ban on political activities is
based on a broadly worded announcement (forbidding political
parties from carrying out "any political activities") issued
by the coup leaders two days after the coup. The interim
constitution (Article 36) provides that such announcements
"as well as any actions taken under them, whether before or
after the promulgation of the Constitution, shall be deemed
lawful and constitutional." However, the meaning of
"political activities" is undefined, and leaders of other
parties have engaged repeatedly in activities of a political
nature (ref B). The coup council's announcement specified
neither a range of potential penalties for violating the ban,
nor which government body has enforcement responsibilities.
The current administration has generally sought to adhere to
established legal standards and practices, even when these
standards have impeded corruption investigations targeting
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thus, it remains
unclear whether police or prosecutors will be eager to
initiate proceedings against Chaturon.


4. (SBU) In a February 28 appearance at the Foreign
Correspondents Club of Thailand, Chaturon portrayed his
recent actions in the Northeast as innocuous. He stated he
had visited the office that managed a village fund (the
village fund program having been a Thaksin administration
initiative). Approximately 80-100 people appeared at the
office, having heard from the media of his planned visit, so
Chaturon addressed the group. Chaturon also claimed he
greeted people when he had breakfast at a local market; he
accepted an invitation to deliver remarks at a school (since
he formerly served as Education Minister); and he attended a
cremation. (Note: This account is essentially consistent
with press stories. End Note.)


5. (SBU) Chaturon observed that the CNS and the government
have been widely criticized as slow and ineffective. He
speculated that the authorities may have targeted him in an

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effort to demonstrate they could take firm and rapid action.
Chaturon claimed he was not worried about the threat of
prosecution, as he had done nothing wrong, and he would rely
on the justice system to produce a fair outcome.


6. (C) The threat of prosecution seemed ironic, Chaturon
noted, since TRT's recent policies had benefited the
authorities by calming the party's supporters. Since
becoming party leader, he had sought to promote
reconciliation, had not confronted the CNS, and had not
instigated efforts to overthrow the interim administration.
(Soon after becoming Party Leader, he met with the Ambassador
and described these as basic approaches he would follow --
ref D.)


7. (SBU) Chaturon said he thought the CNS's approach appeared
"confused," and he noted it had generated more extensive
publicity for TRT. Chaturon said that, before this incident,
CNS pressure on the media (ref C) had sharply reduced
coverage of TRT press conferences; when he made himself
available to the press, only "two or three" journalists would
show up, and some would not air their footage but simply
provided reports to the CNS. On February 28, however, after
the controversy erupted, over 30 journalists had come to hear
him speak at TRT's headquarters. Now, Chaturon quipped, if
he were to go to northern Thailand and simply shop at the
local market, he would garner extensive press coverage.
(According to local media reports, Chaturon has canceled a
prior plan to travel to northern Thailand; the authorities
objected publicly to this proposed trip, after his visit to
the Northeast.)

TRT'S POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION
--------------


8. (SBU) TRT hoped for a speedy return to normalcy, Chaturon
said, and, therefore, the party would hold the Constitution
Drafting Assembly (CDA) to a reasonably low standard; the
draft charter need not be perfect, simply "acceptable."
Chaturon said the constitution would prove unacceptable if it
allowed someone who was not elected to the parliament to
become Prime Minister, or if it were to provide other
mechanisms for the coup leaders to retain political power.
Mirroring some other politicians' views, he also said the
Senate should not be appointed or "semi-appointed," but it
was unclear whether this represented a redline for TRT.


9. (SBU) Chaturon said it would have been wiser to have
included political parties in the constitution drafting
process; had they been involved, party figures would have a
more difficult time opposing the constitution when the
authorities hold their constitutional referendum. Chaturon
reiterated it was not in TRT's interest to prolong the status
quo, or to generate turmoil, so only if it was "very
necessary" would TRT advocate the constitution's defeat in
the referendum. (Like many others, Chaturon envisioned the
constitution could later be amended by an elected parliament;
a member of the CDA recently told us that the new
constitution will likely retain the 1997 Constitution's
provisions for future amendment.)

TRT'S PERSISTENT INFLUENCE
--------------


10. (SBU) TRT had substantially revamped its leadership since
the coup, Chaturon noted. Of approximately one dozen top
figures, only Chaturon had held a cabinet position in
Thaksin's administration. Responding to a journalist's
question, Chaturon said he had only spoken with Thaksin twice
since the coup, most recently two months ago. Thaksin had
said he left the party's management to Chaturon and his
colleagues; Chaturon joked he (Chaturon) was "following his
order not to listen to him." But he observed that Thaksin
still deserved a degree of credit and TRT should not cut its
ties with him; many of the former Prime Minister's ideas
persisted in the party. "I should talk to him more often,"
Chaturon said, seemingly sincere.


11. (SBU) Addressing the defection of many high-ranking
figures from TRT, Chaturon remarked that, while 100
parliamentarians had left the party, 200 remained. Some who
had quit might return, or might fail to win election with
another political machine. TRT remained popular and had 14
million members -- the party had a net inflow of members from

BANGKOK 00001249 003 OF 003


the time of the coup to the present day. Chaturon said that
the CNS had sent soldiers to rural areas, trying to dissuade
people from supporting TRT, but Chaturon maintained that
Northeasterners already had decided they would vote for TRT,
if given the option. He emphasized TRT had revolutionized
Thai politics by developing and following through on a
platform meaningful to the peasantry. He also noted there
was no precedent in Thai history for a party continuing to
struggle for democracy after being evicted from power by a
military coup.


12. (C) Chaturon only briefly addressed his party's ongoing
legal case, which could potentially result in TRT's
dissolution. (The CNS Secretary General recently assured the
Ambassador TRT would be dissolved -- ref A.) Citing some
authority figures' public predictions of TRT's dissolution,
Chaturon said it was inappropriate to make such comments
while the Constitutional Tribunal's procedures were ongoing.
The case would have to run its course, he said.

"THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY"
--------------


13. (SBU) A foreign journalist asked Chaturon to explain his
view of "Thai-style democracy," noting that many Thais tried
to fend off foreign criticism of the coup by claiming Thais
were entitled to maintain distinctive political practices.
Chaturon replied that the term "Thai-style democracy" was
nothing more than jargon that a small group of elite figures
deployed to justify a non-democratic system. Chaturon
asserted that "democracy" was a largely universal value, and
foreigners should not be fooled into deference.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Chaturon's activities in the Northeast put the CNS in
a bind. Had the authorities failed to respond, Chaturon and
others likely would have continued to push the envelope,
potentially knocking this already shaky administration
further off balance. In signaling they will take action,
however, the authorities enable Chaturon to claim
victimization. This could have a significant impact, if the
CNS pursues the case vigorously. But we note the CNS has not
staked significant credibility on this matter; discord within
the cabinet and the government's declining popularity are
receiving much more attention than Chaturon's case. (Opinion
poll results reported in late February placed Bangkok
residents' favorability rating of Prime Minister Surayud at
just under 35 percent, while Thaksin received almost 29
percent.) The prospective Chaturon prosecution -- like many
other investigations -- could simply fade away.


15. (C) Chaturon may well have been sincere when stating that
TRT is inclined to support the constitution, in order to
speed a return to political normalcy. One can easily see how
this would promote TRT interests. However, we also note
reports that CNS foes have begun agitating for the
constitution's defeat in the referendum, and we believe it
will take much more than Chaturon's public position to
reassure the administration.
BOYCE