THAI RAK THAI LEADER ADDRESSES THREAT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001249 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAI RAK THAI LEADER ADDRESSES THREAT OF PROSECUTION REF: A. BANGKOK 1187 (AMBASSDOR'S LUNCH WITH WINAI) ¶B. BANGKOK 1034 (CHATURON DEFIES RESTRICTIONS) ¶C. BANGKOK 232 (GENERALS TAKE STRONGER LINE) ¶D. 06 BANGKOK 6366 (CHATURON ON POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT) Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor David R. Greenberg, reason: 1 .4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng said the authorities' decision to prosecute him for political activities was unwarranted and generated extra publicity for his views. In remarks before a packed house at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand on February 28, Chaturon also said that, to promote an early return to normalcy, TRT would support the draft constitution, barring egregious flaws or provisions allowing the coup leaders to retain political power. Chaturon discouraged speculation about the outcome of the Constitutional Tribunal proceedings that could lead to TRT's dissolution. He noted TRT retains substantial popular support, and had a net influx of members since the coup. Despite recent defections, many former legislators remain in the party, although the party's leadership has changed significantly. Having threatened to prosecute Chaturon, the authorities are now in a somewhat difficult position, but it is unclear whether they will pursue him vigorously; Chaturon's case may remain but a sideshow compared to the continuing decline in the government's credibility. End Summary. AUTHORITIES THREATEN PROSECUTION -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 27, a Council for National Security (CNS) spokesman announced that the CNS had asked the government to prosecute TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng for flouting a government ban by engaging in political activities during a visit to Thailand's Northeast (ref B). (Note: CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul had told the Ambassador on February 26 that the CNS felt impelled to respond to Chaturon's actions; the Ambassador cautioned Winai against responding harshly -- ref A. End Note.) ¶3. (C) As of March 1, the government's intended course of action remains unclear. The ban on political activities is based on a broadly worded announcement (forbidding political parties from carrying out "any political activities") issued by the coup leaders two days after the coup. The interim constitution (Article 36) provides that such announcements "as well as any actions taken under them, whether before or after the promulgation of the Constitution, shall be deemed lawful and constitutional." However, the meaning of "political activities" is undefined, and leaders of other parties have engaged repeatedly in activities of a political nature (ref B). The coup council's announcement specified neither a range of potential penalties for violating the ban, nor which government body has enforcement responsibilities. The current administration has generally sought to adhere to established legal standards and practices, even when these standards have impeded corruption investigations targeting deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thus, it remains unclear whether police or prosecutors will be eager to initiate proceedings against Chaturon. ¶4. (SBU) In a February 28 appearance at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, Chaturon portrayed his recent actions in the Northeast as innocuous. He stated he had visited the office that managed a village fund (the village fund program having been a Thaksin administration initiative). Approximately 80-100 people appeared at the office, having heard from the media of his planned visit, so Chaturon addressed the group. Chaturon also claimed he greeted people when he had breakfast at a local market; he accepted an invitation to deliver remarks at a school (since he formerly served as Education Minister); and he attended a cremation. (Note: This account is essentially consistent with press stories. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) Chaturon observed that the CNS and the government have been widely criticized as slow and ineffective. He speculated that the authorities may have targeted him in an BANGKOK 00001249 002 OF 003 effort to demonstrate they could take firm and rapid action. Chaturon claimed he was not worried about the threat of prosecution, as he had done nothing wrong, and he would rely on the justice system to produce a fair outcome. ¶6. (C) The threat of prosecution seemed ironic, Chaturon noted, since TRT's recent policies had benefited the authorities by calming the party's supporters. Since becoming party leader, he had sought to promote reconciliation, had not confronted the CNS, and had not instigated efforts to overthrow the interim administration. (Soon after becoming Party Leader, he met with the Ambassador and described these as basic approaches he would follow -- ref D.) ¶7. (SBU) Chaturon said he thought the CNS's approach appeared "confused," and he noted it had generated more extensive publicity for TRT. Chaturon said that, before this incident, CNS pressure on the media (ref C) had sharply reduced coverage of TRT press conferences; when he made himself available to the press, only "two or three" journalists would show up, and some would not air their footage but simply provided reports to the CNS. On February 28, however, after the controversy erupted, over 30 journalists had come to hear him speak at TRT's headquarters. Now, Chaturon quipped, if he were to go to northern Thailand and simply shop at the local market, he would garner extensive press coverage. (According to local media reports, Chaturon has canceled a prior plan to travel to northern Thailand; the authorities objected publicly to this proposed trip, after his visit to the Northeast.) TRT'S POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) TRT hoped for a speedy return to normalcy, Chaturon said, and, therefore, the party would hold the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) to a reasonably low standard; the draft charter need not be perfect, simply "acceptable." Chaturon said the constitution would prove unacceptable if it allowed someone who was not elected to the parliament to become Prime Minister, or if it were to provide other mechanisms for the coup leaders to retain political power. Mirroring some other politicians' views, he also said the Senate should not be appointed or "semi-appointed," but it was unclear whether this represented a redline for TRT. ¶9. (SBU) Chaturon said it would have been wiser to have included political parties in the constitution drafting process; had they been involved, party figures would have a more difficult time opposing the constitution when the authorities hold their constitutional referendum. Chaturon reiterated it was not in TRT's interest to prolong the status quo, or to generate turmoil, so only if it was "very necessary" would TRT advocate the constitution's defeat in the referendum. (Like many others, Chaturon envisioned the constitution could later be amended by an elected parliament; a member of the CDA recently told us that the new constitution will likely retain the 1997 Constitution's provisions for future amendment.) TRT'S PERSISTENT INFLUENCE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) TRT had substantially revamped its leadership since the coup, Chaturon noted. Of approximately one dozen top figures, only Chaturon had held a cabinet position in Thaksin's administration. Responding to a journalist's question, Chaturon said he had only spoken with Thaksin twice since the coup, most recently two months ago. Thaksin had said he left the party's management to Chaturon and his colleagues; Chaturon joked he (Chaturon) was "following his order not to listen to him." But he observed that Thaksin still deserved a degree of credit and TRT should not cut its ties with him; many of the former Prime Minister's ideas persisted in the party. "I should talk to him more often," Chaturon said, seemingly sincere. ¶11. (SBU) Addressing the defection of many high-ranking figures from TRT, Chaturon remarked that, while 100 parliamentarians had left the party, 200 remained. Some who had quit might return, or might fail to win election with another political machine. TRT remained popular and had 14 million members -- the party had a net inflow of members from BANGKOK 00001249 003 OF 003 the time of the coup to the present day. Chaturon said that the CNS had sent soldiers to rural areas, trying to dissuade people from supporting TRT, but Chaturon maintained that Northeasterners already had decided they would vote for TRT, if given the option. He emphasized TRT had revolutionized Thai politics by developing and following through on a platform meaningful to the peasantry. He also noted there was no precedent in Thai history for a party continuing to struggle for democracy after being evicted from power by a military coup. ¶12. (C) Chaturon only briefly addressed his party's ongoing legal case, which could potentially result in TRT's dissolution. (The CNS Secretary General recently assured the Ambassador TRT would be dissolved -- ref A.) Citing some authority figures' public predictions of TRT's dissolution, Chaturon said it was inappropriate to make such comments while the Constitutional Tribunal's procedures were ongoing. The case would have to run its course, he said. "THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY" -------------- ¶13. (SBU) A foreign journalist asked Chaturon to explain his view of "Thai-style democracy," noting that many Thais tried to fend off foreign criticism of the coup by claiming Thais were entitled to maintain distinctive political practices. Chaturon replied that the term "Thai-style democracy" was nothing more than jargon that a small group of elite figures deployed to justify a non-democratic system. Chaturon asserted that "democracy" was a largely universal value, and foreigners should not be fooled into deference. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Chaturon's activities in the Northeast put the CNS in a bind. Had the authorities failed to respond, Chaturon and others likely would have continued to push the envelope, potentially knocking this already shaky administration further off balance. In signaling they will take action, however, the authorities enable Chaturon to claim victimization. This could have a significant impact, if the CNS pursues the case vigorously. But we note the CNS has not staked significant credibility on this matter; discord within the cabinet and the government's declining popularity are receiving much more attention than Chaturon's case. (Opinion poll results reported in late February placed Bangkok residents' favorability rating of Prime Minister Surayud at just under 35 percent, while Thaksin received almost 29 percent.) The prospective Chaturon prosecution -- like many other investigations -- could simply fade away. ¶15. (C) Chaturon may well have been sincere when stating that TRT is inclined to support the constitution, in order to speed a return to political normalcy. One can easily see how this would promote TRT interests. However, we also note reports that CNS foes have begun agitating for the constitution's defeat in the referendum, and we believe it will take much more than Chaturon's public position to reassure the administration. BOYCE