AMBASSADOR AND CNS GENERAL WINAI DISCUSS POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND CNS GENERAL WINAI DISCUSS POLITICAL
SITUATION

REF: A. BANGKOK 1036 (SOMKID RESIGNS)


B. BANGKOK 1034 (CHATURON DEFIES BAN)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador cautioned the Council for National
Security (CNS) against responding harshly to political
activities by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party leader. In a
February 26 lunch with CNS Secretary General Winai
Phattiyakul, the Ambassador also expressed USG interest in
the CNS lifting restrictions on political activities as soon
as possible. Winai discussed the CNS's plan to educate the
citizenry about the constitution in advance of the referendum
likely to take place in August or September. Winai admitted
he had a hand in the recent decision of some senior officials
to leave TRT, but he did not have insights into the Prime
Minister's much criticized decision to appoint former Thaksin
era Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak as an economic
envoy. (Somkid ended up resigning shortly after assuming his
duties.) Winai discussed rumored divisions within the CNS,
hinting that General Saprang Kalayanamitr would likely become
the next Army Commander. The RTG wanted to begin reforming
the national police but did not expect to complete the job in
the coming months. Winai said the RTG had no evidence of
future terrorist attacks in Bangkok. The Malaysian
government could help facilitate -- but not mediate -- RTG
dialogue with southern insurgents by creating an environment
more conducive to talks. Winai assured the Ambassador the
RTG would not deport Hmong refugees in Nong Khai to Laos.
End Summary.

OUTLOOK ON THE CONSTITUTION
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2. (C) The Ambassador hosted CNS Secretary General (and
Defense Ministry Permanent Secretary) Winai Phattiyakul for
lunch on February 26. Appearing relaxed and confident, Winai
first discussed the ongoing constitution drafting process.
Winai believed the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC),and
CDC Chairman Prasong Soonsiri, understood clearly how to
produce a good document. The result would be an improved but
not dramatically changed version of the 1997 Constitution.
The form of the Senate -- whether composed of elected or
appointed officials -- remained to be determined, Winai said.
He predicted modifications to the provisions allowing for a
party list for House of Representatives elections, although
he believed that the party list might not be abolished
entirely.


3. (C) Winai said the authorities had ample time to educate
and inform the public about the new constitution before the
upcoming referendum (likely in August or September). The
authorities would devote much of their attention in this
effort to Thai Rak Thai (TRT) supporters. If the public were
to reject the constitution, Winai said, it would be
politically disastrous, but, in that event, as provided by
the interim constitution, the CNS and the Cabinet would
simply prepare a new constitution and submit it to the King.
Winai predicted that such a constitution would not differ
dramatically from the Constitution Drafting Assembly's
version, but it would be better for the charter to emerge
from a relatively transparent process which involved
extensive give-and-take with the public and interest groups.

RESPONDING TO TRT LEADER'S CAMPAIGNING
--------------


4. (C) The CNS would meet on the afternoon of February 26,
Winai said, to discuss how to respond to the political
gatherings held by TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng, who
had recently flouted a ban on party activities (ref B).
Winai said Chaturon had acted highly inappropriately, and the
authorities were very upset. The government would have to
respond in some fashion, Winai said, and would do so after
reviewing the relevant laws. Winai acknowledged Chaturon
might have deliberately sought to provoke a harsh response.


5. (C) The Ambassador urged Winai to consider carefully how
best to respond to Chaturon, and to weigh the possible
international repercussions. Cracking down on Chaturon
appeared unnecessary, the Ambassador said, if the CNS would

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lift the ban on political party activities in the near
future. Lifting the ban as soon as possible would help
improve Thailand's standing, the Ambassador conveyed. Winai
said the ban would likely be repealed in June at the latest
-- and Chaturon should have waited until then to hold such
gatherings. Tangentially, Winai noted resentfully that the
TRT populist policies that Chaturon advocated in his meetings
represented a significant financial burden on the government,
which had spent billions of Baht (hundreds of millions of
USD) to continue some of Thaksin's programs.

DEFECTIONS FROM TRT
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the recent defection from
Thai Rak Thai of Deputy Party Leader Suwat Liptapanlop and
others, who recently formed a "Reconciliation Alliance" (ref
B). Winai readily admitted that he had pressed Suwat to
leave TRT; according to Winai, Suwat and his allies were
reluctant to break from the party, saying they preferred to
wait and see the new mechanism established by the next
constitution. Winai had recounted to his TRT contacts that
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had an opportunity
in early 2006 to take a break from politics; had Thaksin made
his move early enough, he would have commanded a degree of
sympathy from the public and could have returned successfully
to political life in the future. Suwat and his allies seemed
to take on board Winai's message and decided to jump ship.


7. (C) Winai expressed strong confidence that the
Constitutional Tribunal would dissolve TRT, after hearing all
the evidence that the party had committed undemocratic acts.
(Note: The legal case against TRT began during Thaksin's time
in office; it was not initiated by the coup leaders, although
the coup leaders strengthened the sanctions that could apply
to party executives. End Note.) Winai predicted the
Tribunal would hand down its ruling in May.


8. (C) When the Ambassador asked about the recent appointment
(and quick resignation) of former Thaksin era Deputy Prime
Minister Somkid Jatusripitak as Chairman of a government
commission to explain the King's "sufficiency economy"
principles, Winai admitted that Prime Minister Surayud's
decision to appoint Somkid had generated widespread
disappointment. Winai said he had no role in Somkid's
appointment, and he did not know the details behind it.

SECURITY IN BANGKOK
--------------


9. (C) Turning to security issues, the Ambassador asked Winai
about recent public statements by RTG officials that unnamed
perpetrators might carry out bombings in Bangkok.
Dismissively, Winai said the government had no evidence of
planned attacks. Discussing Defense Minister Boonrawd
Somthat's public claim that students from Ramkhamhaeng
University might be involved in attacks, Winai said that
Ramkhamhaeng -- which has many southern Muslims -- typically
fell under suspicion whenever government officials focused on
terrorism, and surveillance activities at the university has
risen as a matter of course after the New Year's Eve bombings
in Bangkok.

DIVISIONS IN THE CNS
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador asked about continuing rumors of
divisions within the CNS. Winai said he did not see any
meaningful rifts, but General Saprang Kalayanamitr and
General Anupong Paojinda seemed to be warily eyeing each
other, wondering which of them might be selected to replace
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin as Army Commander in September.
Winai remarked that some people felt Saprang would not be the
best candidate, but he was senior to Anupong. In any case,
Saprang would have to retire after a year, and Anupong seemed
willing to defer to Saprang, hoping then to replace him in

2008.


11. (C) The Ambassador then raised the bitter public dispute
in January between Saprang and former Prime Minister Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh. Winai said this dispute had ended after Privy
Council President Prem Tinsulanonda told Chavalit to stand
down. Winai relayed that Chavalit's political ambitions had
revived after the coup, when it became unclear who among the

BANGKOK 00001187 003 OF 003


civilian politicians might be able to fill the vacuum left by
Thaksin's removal.

POLICE REFORM
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12. (C) The Ambassador asked Winai for his assessment of the
RTG's intentions for institutional reforms of the Royal Thai
Police (RTP). Winai disclaimed responsibility in this
matter, noting the Prime Minister's office was managing the
issue. When asked whether it would be best for an interim,
unelected administration to carry out such an effort, Winai
said it was important for the current leadership to initiate
the process. He did not expect the RTP to be restructured by
the time Surayud leaves office, but if the interim government
did not start the ball rolling, future administrations would
not have the will to carry out necessary reforms.


13. (C) Citing a characterization of new Police Chief
Seripisuth Temiyavet as a maverick in the mold of Saprang,
the Ambassador asked Winai's view. Winai said Seripisuth was
even more independent-minded than Saprang -- Seripisuth was
known to have criticized his senior officers, Winai said,
whereas Saprang would not do so.

MALAYSIAN ROLE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND
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14. (C) The Ambassador asked Winai what type of role the
Malaysian government might play in helping to end the
insurgency in southern Thailand. Winai said the Malaysians
could not mediate between the RTG and insurgents, but the GOM
could help to facilitate dialogue. Specifics steps the GOM
could take included establishing a joint committee to examine
dual nationality; resolving the disposition of 131 Thai
villagers from the border area who sought refuge in Malaysia
in August 2005, claiming they feared Thai government
persecution; and sharing information with the RTG on
insurgent leaders. Bilateral Thai-Malaysian cooperation
could make the environment more conducive to talks, but Winai
emphasized that the Malaysians would not be directly involved
in any dialogue.

HMONG REFUGEES
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15. (C) Acknowledging that Winai no longer had formal
responsibility for refugee issues (as he had previously, when
serving as NSC Secretary General),the Ambassador
nevertheless explained USG interest in having access to Hmong
refugees at Nong Khai. Winai was not in a position to
facilitate this access, but he assured the Ambassador without
qualification that the Hmong refugees would not be refouled
to Laos.

COMMENT
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16. (C) We will continue to raise at the highest levels our
interest in seeing the early restoration of civil liberties.
We note Winai is well aware of the political hazards
surrounding the constitutional referendum, and are encouraged
that the authorities are already planning extensive voter
education.
BOYCE