RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN BRUNEI: HOW ST. ANDREW GOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000051 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 TAGS: PHUM PREL BX SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN BRUNEI: HOW ST. ANDREW GOT HIS CHURCH BACK Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.5 (B,D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Anglican Parish of St. Andrew,s has finally received a permit to resume rebuilding its church in Bandar Seri Begawan, the first major construction project on a non-Muslim house of worship to be approved in Brunei in decades. This follows several months in which the congregation was in limbo, having torn down their old church on the basis of a previously issued renovation permit, only to have that permit revoked before reconstruction of the building could begin due to concerns by conservative Muslims about abetting Christian worship. The Government of Brunei (GOB) agreed to allow a resumption of work on the church only after direct intervention by the Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Sultan,s brother; the final decision had to be made by the Sultan himself. The saga of St. Andrew,s illustrates the ongoing behind-the-scenes influence of an Islamic clerical establishment determined to maintain tight controls on non-Sunni Muslim religious practice despite the guarantee of freedom of worship contained in Brunei,s constitution. End Summary. -------------- -------------- ST. ANDREW'S: A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED PILLAR OF THE COMMUNITY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) St. Andrew's Anglican parish is one of the oldest and most prestigious non-Muslim denominations in Brunei. It was founded seventy years ago and counts among its congregation several prominent members of the ethnic Chinese merchant families that are the backbone of Brunei's private business sector. Its school, which accepts students of any faith, has long been considered one of the more prestigious educational institutions in Bandar Seri Begawan; both the current Crown Prince and his wife received their primary education there. ¶3. (C) None of this prestige was reflected in St. Andrew's church building. A small wooden structure that was built in 1950, it had no air conditioning, was badly in need of repair, and had long been outgrown by its congregation. For several years St. Andrew's had sought a building permit from the Bandar Seri Begawan Municipal Board to build a new, larger church, without success. This reflected an unspoken GOB policy of keeping strict limits on Christian worship in the Sultanate, which many Bruneians trace to a 1964 fatwa issued by the then-State Mufti that advised Muslims against any action that would help non-Muslims to spread their faith. Bruneian contacts tell us this policy was quietly enforced by the office of the State Mufti, the highest ranking Muslim cleric in Brunei. (Tight control also extends to any practice of Islam outside the Sunni Sha'afi school; no Shia mosques are permitted, for example.) -------------- -------------- A MARGINAL ADVANCE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IS QUICKLY REVERSED -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In September 2005 the Bandar Seri Begawan Municipal Board took one of the sudden and, at least to an outsider, inexplicable actions so characteristic of Bruneian bureaucracy, and informed St. Andrew's that it was willing to consider issuance of a limited building permit. The offer was far short of what the parish was seeking. St. Andrew's would not be allowed to build a new, larger church as it had requested. It could, however, renovate its rickety old building, as long as the end result had the exact same dimensions as the old church. Quickly deciding that half a loaf was better than none, the parish executive council accepted the limitations and engaged an architect to draw up plans that would form the basis for issuance of a permit for renovation work. ¶5. (C) After investigating the condition of old St. Andrew's Church, the architect decided that it was essentially unsalvageable and drew up plans for the old structure to be rebuilt from the ground up with all new materials. These plans were submitted to the Municipal Board and a letter was issued granting permission for renovation work to begin. On that basis, worship services were moved to a temporary home in the parish administrative hall and the old structure of St. Andrew's was taken apart until, in October of 2006, nothing was left but the foundation. The members of the congregation optimistically hoped that they might even be able to celebrate the Christmas of 2006, or certainly Easter of 2007, in a reconstructed church. BANDAR SER 00000051 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Those hopes were dashed when the Municipal Board suddenly notified St. Andrew's that the building permit had been revoked and all work had to cease. The explanation was that the parish was going beyond the bounds of its original renovation permit by undertaking new construction. St. Andrew's executive council argued that the architect's plans for completely reconstructing the unsafe old structure had already been submitted to the municipal authorities and approved before the renovation permit was issued. This protest was to no avail, however. The parish board was told that it could apply for a new construction permit, but was given no advice on what might be acceptable and no assurances that a new permit would ever be issued. -------------- -------------- A CONGREGATION LEFT IN LIMBO DUE TO CONCERNS OF MUSLIM CLERICS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Although details remain murky, informed Bruneians tell us that the State Mufti's office was almost certainly behind the revocation of the original permit. They maintain that the Mufti and conservative clerics in his office had agreed not to stand in the way of the original construction permit only as long as it was strictly limited to renovation and allowed for no expansion of church facilities. When they saw that the old church had been completely razed -- a development that St. Andrew's made no effort to hide and which was plainly visible from the street in front of the church grounds -- they assumed that the Anglicans were trying to use the cover of a renovation project to sneak in the new, larger church they had long desired. That was apparently beyond the pale, and so the Mufti's office quietly advised officials at the Municipal Board to do their religious duty as good Muslims and revoke the permit. ¶8. (C) As the head of another established (non-Anglican) Christian church in Brunei told us, the problem with St. Andrew's was that it failed to play the game as Christians needed to play it in Islamic Brunei. Had the Anglicans built a large wall around the church site to mask what they were doing, or found some way to prop up the old church's wooden frame while reconstruction went on, they probably could have gotten away with completing the work on the basis of their original renovation permit. By proceeding in plain view, however, the work on the church was an affront to pious Muslims who had been taught to beware the threat of Christian missionary "crusaders," and an invitation to a backlash. The leaders of St. Andrew's parish had forgotten that they had to keep their heads down and remain unobtrusive if they wanted to continue practicing their faith in Brunei. Because they did not, they found themselves in limbo, with their old church building gone and work halted on its planned reconstruction. -------------- THE U.S. EMBASSY GETS INVOLVED... -------------- ¶9. (C) The Embassy had been following the saga of St. Andrew's closely from the start. When the original construction permit was revoked, we let it be known to members of the parish council that we would be willing to intervene with the GOB on their behalf if they wished. Initially, the reply was that they were grateful for our interest but preferred to submit a new permit request and try to work things out quietly with the government, for fear of digging themselves into an even deeper hole if they were seen to be enlisting the aid of a foreign embassy against the GOB. We respected their wishes, recognizing that what would pass for paranoia in many other countries constituted realism in Brunei. Embassy officers never met officially with church leaders to discuss their situation, but rather stayed abreast of developments via the Ambassador's conversations with parish council members he saw at various social events and official functions. ¶10. (C) Finally, in early December, one of the members of the parish council discreetly let the Ambassador know that the parish was becoming so pessimistic about the possibility of resolving the impasse on its own that it would welcome any low-key help we might provide. Accordingly, the Ambassador asked to see First Deputy Permanent Secretary Datin Maimunah at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to discuss a human rights issue. At a December 5 meeting he outlined the St. Andrew's problem for Datin Maimunah, and told her the Embassy would have no choice but to include a description of the situation in its draft of the Human Rights Report due to Washington in early January. If a new building permit was issued beforehand, we would give the GOB credit for allowing the first major construction project on a non-Muslim house of worship for many years. If it was not, however, we would BANDAR SER 00000051 003 OF 004 report that fact forthrightly and it would probably be interpreted by many as evidence that the GOB was deliberately suppressing Christian worship. ¶11. (C) Datin Maimunah told Ambassador she was not aware of the St. Andrew's situation and would have to look into it. Two days later, she phoned Ambassador and related a legalistic justification of the GOB action, stating that St. Andrew's had exceeded the terms of its original construction permit and therefore had to halt work on the church while its application for a new permit was reviewed in accordance with existing laws and regulations. Ambassador thanked her but said that he did not wish to debate the details of Bruneian zoning law; he only wanted the MFAT to be aware that Brunei's international image was going to be affected by the St. Andrews' situation because we were obligated to report on it in our Human Rights Report, one way or the other. -------------- ...AND THE ROYAL FAMILY JOINS IN -------------- ¶12. (C) Datin Maimunah's anodyne response to the Ambassador belied other behind-the-scenes developments. The day after her phone call to the Ambassador, a prominent Bruneian businessman who was also a member of St. Andrew's parish went into a meeting with His Royal Highness Prince Mohamed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Sultan's brother, to discuss economic issues in conjunction with Prince Mohamed's role as Chairman of the Ministerial Economic Council. He had determined to use the opportunity to raise the St. Andrew's issue, only to have Mohamed cut him off by saying he knew all about the problem because the American Ambassador had already "complained" to the Ministry. As the story was later related to the Ambassador by someone who was at the meeting, an obviously agitated Mohamed told Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Pehin Lim Jock Seng, who was also present, to work with other ministries to get a new building permit issued. When Pehin Lim replied that he had already started the "due diligence" required to understand the facts of the matter, Mohamed reportedly barked "We don't need due diligence. We know the facts. Just fix it." -------------- -------------- AT THE SULTAN'S ORDER, ST. ANDREW GETS HIS CHURCH BACK -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) As things turned out, "fixing it" took considerable time and effort, even with the Sultan's brother pushing for the issue to be resolved and Second Minister Lim, considered one of the most effective members of Cabinet, working for the issuance of a new building permit. A GOB source told us the decision went "to the top," meaning the Sultan himself, who finally ordered that work on the church be allowed to continue. Even after that instruction was issued, however, there was difficulty in finding an appropriate GOB official willing to sign the required letter notifying St. Andrew's that it could resume construction. The old fatwa warning against abetting the spread of Christian worship apparently had lingering potency in the minds of many Bruneian officials. Ambassador was told that, at one point, the draft letter had to be redone because the official scheduled to sign it had decided to take early retirement; the source of this information speculated, only half in jest, that the bureaucrat in question made this decision after deciding that his continued employment was not worth putting his immortal soul at risk. ¶14. (C) Finally, on January 31, St. Andrew's received a letter renewing the construction permit for its church. The parish member who conveyed this news to Ambassador was generous in conveying the church's gratitude to the USG, stating that our intervention was one of the keys to getting the permit issued, and that the low-key way in which it was done had avoided a backlash that could have caused even worse trouble for St. Andrew's. This parishioner believed the other key was the determination of Prince Mohamed himself. In his view, His Royal Highness was motivated not only by a desire to avoid the international approbation that would have resulted from leaving St. Andrew's in limbo without a church building, but also by a genuine conviction that the GOB had to respect the rule of law and provisions of its own constitution, including that which allowed religions other than Islam to "be practiced in peace and harmony by the person professing them in any part of Brunei Darussalam.". -------------- -------------- COMMENT -- THE BOUNDARIES OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN BRUNEI -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) In our view, there are three lessons from this episode: BANDAR SER 00000051 004 OF 004 -- First, although it is not readily visible to non-Bruneians, the pervasive influence of the conservative Islamic clergy here should not be underestimated. In this case, for example, not even a prominent member of the royal family could immediately override clerical interests. This is largely because the national philosophy of the country as a "Malay Islamic Monarchy" is drummed into Bruneians from an early age and instills a sense of near-awe about the authority of those who interpret Islam for the lay community. -- Second, as a result of this clerical influence, while there may be widespread tolerance for the personal practice of other faiths in this officially Islamic nation, tolerance does not equate to freedom for those religions to do what they please. Limits on their activity may be unspoken but are still expected to be respected and not questioned. -- Third, in the Bruneian context, the most productive human rights advocacy is often that which, while forceful, takes place quietly behind the scenes and avoids the public confrontations that are such anathema in this society. In this regard, post requests that information in this cable not be cited publicly in any recounting of USG human rights policy, particularly not until reconstruction of the Anglican church in Brunei is complete and St. Andrew really does get his church back. End Comment. SKODON