BRUNEI - DEMARCHE ON ENSURING ROBUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000258 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR ISN/RA (RNEPHEW) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 TAGS: PARM KNNP IR BX SUBJECT: BRUNEI - DEMARCHE ON ENSURING ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC-IMPOSED SANCTIONS ON IRAN REF: A. STATE 101574 ¶B. STATE 231829 (DEC 2006) ¶C. STATE 014071 (FEB 2007) ¶D. STATE 037801 (MAR 2007) Classified By: Ambassador Emil M. Skodon; Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is still working on the implementation reports to the UNSC Sanctions Committee called for in UNSCR's 1737 and 1747. Its discussions with other agencies of Brunei's government have so far turned up no prohibited activities, but the MFAT wants to acquire all necessary data before submitting comprehensive reports to the Committee. Ambassador urged early completion of the reports, stressing the political importance of demonstrating international unity and resolve on the issue of Iran's covert drive for a nuclear weapons capability. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Ambassador raised need for robust implementation of UNSC sanctions on Iran during his August 23 introductory call on Adnan Jaafar, the new Head of the MFAT Department of International Organizations. Jaafar has just completed a tour as Deputy Permanent Representative at the Bruneian Mission to the United Nations in New York. Also present from the MFAT IO Bureau were Deputy Director Florence Chong and Princess Mansurah Izzul Bolkiah (Foreign Minister Prince Mohamed's daughter, who is a junior MFAT officer). ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador reviewed history of international community's steps to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, noted that the announcement of its new agreement with the IAEA did not obviate the need for Iran to comply with the terms of previous UNSCR's, and stressed that implementation of UNSCR requirements by all states was essential for the success of this diplomatic effort. Ambassador told Jaafar we were concerned that Brunei had not yet submitted the implementation reports required under UNSCR 1737 and requested under UNSCR 1747, and asked when Brunei intended to fulfill the requirement. ¶4. (C) Jaafar acknowledged that Brunei had not submitted the requisite reports, but said both were being worked on within the IO Department. The MFAT had sent notices to the Finance and Defense Ministries and other relevant agencies stipulating the requirements of UNSCR's 1737 and 1747, and asking them to report any prohibited activities and to put in place procedures to prevent such activities from occurring. Those agencies that had replied, such as the Ministry of Defense, all reported that no prohibited activities had been identified in areas under their purview. The MFAT wanted to be sure it submitted "high-quality" reports to the UN, however, and so was waiting to hear from all relevant agencies so that it could provide a comprehensive picture of Bruneian compliance. ¶5. (C) Jaafar said the MFAT had reviewed reports submitted by other ASEAN countries and found some to be of low quality and not very useful, and wanted to do a better job with its own reports. Ambassador agreed that comprehensive reports would be preferable, but pointed out that there was also a political dimension to the submission of the required reports. The more countries that were seen to be complying with the UNSCR's, the less credible were Iran's arguments that the international community was not united behind the sanctions. Jaafar took the point and agreed to look into finalizing reports related to both UNSCR 1737 and 1747 as soon as possible. ¶6. (C) Asked to summarize his government's view of Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, Jaafar replied that Brunei supported the legitimate pursuit of a civilian nuclear power program but opposed any nuclear weapons program. He said Brunei placed great stock in the IAEA. It believed that the IAEA's work should not be politicized and that it should be allowed to reach its own conclusions and submit objective reports to the UNSC. He also asked for an assessment of how the "big powers" were holding together as discussions progressed toward another UNSCR on Iran. Ambassador replied that the USG respected the technical expertise of the IAEA and supported its work but that the proper place for political decisions was in the Security Council. He also noted that while it was no secret that Russia and China had had some concerns with the original drafts of previous UNSCR's on Iran, the fact that UNSCR's 1737 and 1747 were adopted unanimously showed the unity and resolve of the international community on this issue. BANDAR SER 00000258 002 OF 002 SKODON