UPDATE ON MAY 11 ATTACK AT TINZAWATENE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000554 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ML SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAY 11 ATTACK AT TINZAWATENE REF: A. BAMAKO 00505 ¶B. BAMAKO 00524 ¶C. BAMAKO 00369 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) Summary: Tuareg sources close to Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) dissident Ibrahim Bahanga provided further information on Bahanga's May 11 attack against Malian military forces in Tinzawatene (refs A and B). Kidal based sources report 4 Malian government soldiers killed and 13 wounded. Bahanga reportedly lost 6 men along with 5 wounded. If these numbers are correct, the Malian military suffered greater losses on May 11 than it did on May 23, 2006, when the ADC attacked military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. On May 21 ADC leaders again condemned Bahanga's actions, and the ADC also reportedly issued an order to its often unpredictable number two, former army deserter Col. Hassan ag Fagaga, to act "responsibly" during the aftermath of the Tinzawatene attack. While ADC leaders Iyad ag Ghali and Ahmada ag Bibi have publicly distanced themselves from Bahanga, Fagaga's sentiments remain unclear. End Summary. -------------- Aftermath of Tinzawatene Attack -------------- 3.(C) According to sources based in Kidal, four Malian government soldiers were killed in the attack along with 13 wounded. Many of these were apparently ethnic Tuareg. The wounded are reportedly in Kidal. One serious case was evacuated to Point G hospital in Bamako. On May 23 the Malian military's Director of Public Affairs said he was unsure of the number of military casualties but suggested that three Malian soldiers had been killed. Of these, one was an ethnic Tuareg, another an ethnic Arab/Moor and a third was from southern Mali. Kidal sources said six of Bahanga's men were killed along with five wounded. Reports indicate that all of Bahanga's wounded were from Niger rather than Mali and were transported to the Algerian town of Tamanrasset and are now in the custody of the Algerian military, who are providing medical treatment. After the May 11 skirmish, Bahanga and his group, which is believed to include 12 to 15 individuals, fled to the Nigerien town of Assamakka and then to the Air mountains. The Malian military reportedly followed Bahanga as far as Assamakka. Malian Tuareg sources claim that Bahanga has linked up with members of the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ),including Agali Alambo and Captain Cherif Mohamed. 4.(C) Prior to the attack, Bahanga was reportedly attempting to set up a personal fiefdom in Tinzawatene, the home of his in-laws, to control the local smuggling trade. ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi reiterated to the Embassy on May 21 that the ADC condemned Bahanga's actions and said Bahanga had isolated himself from other Malian Tuaregs. Ag Bibi stated that ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali also condemned the attack. Less clear is the reaction of former army deserter and fellow ADC leader Col. Hassan Fagaga. According to ag Bibi, the ADC has instructed Fagaga to act "responsibly" - in other words, not to follow Bahanga's lead or attempt to incite further unrest in the north. -------------- -------------- Comment: ADC Condemns Attack, Tells Fagaga to Behave -------------- -------------- 5.(C) If casualty figures of 4 dead and 13 wounded Malian soldiers are correct, the Malian military paid a heavier price during its battle with Bahanga than it did during the ADC's May 23, 2006, attack on military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. We have not received any clear indications of how, or if, the Malian government intends to respond. One possibility suggested by some Tuaregs in Kidal is the deployment of all-nomad military units (called for by the Algiers accords) to frontiers with Algeria and Niger to prevent Bahanga or any of his men from re-infiltrating Malian territory. It is unclear, however, whether any all-nomad units, when and if they are created, will be sufficiently equipped or organized to undertake border patrols. 6.(C) Despite Bahanga's March 18 election as one of Kidal's eight representatives to Mali's largely ceremonial High Council of Territorial Collectivities (ref C),many in southern and northern Mali regard Bahanga as a criminal and a bandit. The battle on May 11 likely cemented this perception. If there is a positive side to the attack, it is that Bahanga appears to have isolated himself from fellow BAMAKO 00000554 002 OF 002 Kidal Tuaregs. On the other hand, Tuareg sources are hesitant to write Bahanga off as a political player and note that Col. Hassan Fagaga, who is officially the ADC's second in command, was also regarded as isolated when he deserted from the Malian army prior to the May 23 attacks in Menaka and Kidal. After he deserted, however, Fagaga remained in Mali. It is difficult to envision Bahanga having much influence on Kidal Tuaregs when he is several hundred kilometers away in Niger. This could make Fagaga, once again, the man to watch. The ADC's warning to Fagaga to remain calm suggests that ADC leaders have made similar calculations. McCulley