AZERBAIJAN ON AN AHMADINEJAD VISIT AND ENERGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000919 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC, NEA/IR, AND EEB/ESC E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017 TAGS: ENRG EPET ETTC PREL IR BA AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN ON AN AHMADINEJAD VISIT AND ENERGY LINKS WITH IRAN REF: A. STATE 098631 ¶B. BAKU 000721 BAKU 00000919 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to all key Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) interlocutors involved in Iran-related foreign and energy policy decisions except President Aliyev, who is away on vacation. Foreign Minister Mammadyarov assured the Ambassador that the GOAJ had no interest in expanding political cooperation with Iran, but noted that Azerbaijan had already twice put off the Ahmadinejad visit. Concerning energy sector cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI),State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) President Rovnag Abdullayev said that Azerbaijan had only entered into a very limited energy swapping arrangement with Iran out of necessity and that the GOAJ opposes broader cooperation. Presidential Administration (PA) Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev told the Ambassador that it would be difficult for Baku to continue to stall Tehran's repeated requests for a visit. PA International Relations Advisor Novruz Mammadov said that Iran had "demanded" a visit July 22-23, but the GOAJ has not replied; while Iran has "often" alluded to increased energy cooperation, President Aliyev "pretends he has not heard" and has not replied. All of these senior officials were at pains to describe why Azerbaijan has been put into a corner over accepting this visit. No one here wants to suggest that a delay or cancellation is possible with the President out of town. End Summary. Foreign Ministry - We've Already Postponed Twice -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Ambassador delivere reftel demarche to Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on July 19 (other topics discussed with FM will be reported septel). Mammadyarov said that the GOAJ had managed to postpone the Ahmadinejad visit twice, to include delaying a proposed July 24-25 (sic) visit. In response to the Ambassador's statement that there would be seriously adverse Washington reaction to any bilateral agreement coming out of an Ahmadinejad visit, Mammadyarov assured her that "there would be no political agreement" were Ahmadinejad to come to Baku. However, Mammadyarov said that the GOAJ has "an Iranian headache" and cannot ignore its southern neighbor, due both to the presence of the millions of Azerbaijanis in Iran and also the importance of Iran as a bridge to Nakhchivan. As such, there was a limited amount of cooperation, to include gas and electricity exchanges with Iran, which he termed "very important for Azerbaijan." Mammadyarov continued, "This is a Hill issue not a State Department issue." The Ambassador denied this forcefully, saying that an Ahmadinejad visit to Baku, especially one with any tangible positive PR for the IRI, would be working against the common strategic goals of the USG and the GOAJ. ¶3. (C) Mammadyarov reminded the Ambassador of his opinion that it would be better for the U.S. to be "in Iran and not out." If there is more U.S. involvement with/presence in Iran, "it puts them on the hook." He repeated again the GOAJ position that the U.S. lost an opportunity to influence Iran when the USG prevented the 1996 Conoco-Phillips announced participation in the Iranian energy sector. ¶4. (C) Mammadyarov told the Ambassador that based on a recommendation from GOAJ Ambassador to the U.S. Yashar Aliyev, he had raised the case of the four imprisoned Iranian-Americans with Iranian FM Mottaki when he visited Tehran in late June. He did so "on the side, so no one else could hear" while sharing a cab ride with the Iranian FM. Mottaki told Mammadyarov that this issue was indeed an "unnecessary irritation" and that "Iran didn't need this headache." Mammadyarov said Mottaki told him he thought that a decision would be made to release the four, while agreeing with the Ambassador that the Iranian Foreign Ministry was not in the lead on this issue. Mammadyarov told the Ambassador that it was important to "have a communications venue to Iran," with the clear implication that Mammadyarov could be such a channel. BAKU 00000919 002.2 OF 003 SOCAR - Limited Cooperation on Nakhchivan -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel talking points to SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev on July 17. Abdullayev said that there is no cooperation between the GOAJ and the IRI energy sector, and that the GOAJ opposes any such cooperation. During the most recent winter, when Gazprom gas was unavailable, SOCAR explored the possibility of buying gas from Iran, but the price was too high. The only other cooperation was that both SOCAR and Iran were partners in the Shah Deniz consortium, although Abdullayev said SOCAR has offered to buy Iran's share of Shah Deniz. (Note: As reported, SOCAR had a one point recently begun to explore the possibility of purchasing Turkmen gas, which would be delivered through Iran. Before doing so it had sounded out Embassy as to possible USG reaction. After getting guidance from Washington, Embassy responded that the USG would be strongly opposed. Later, SOCAR told the Embassy that shortly after informing the U.S. of these talks, SOCAR learned that although the Iran National Gas Company liked the deal, it was killed at higher, political levels. End note.) ¶6. (C) Abdullayev said the only exception to this policy is Azerbaijan's energy swap agreement with Iran, with Azerbaijan supplying natural gas to Iran's Astara region while Iran supplies an equivalent amount to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. According to Abdullayev, without this gas, the 300,000 occupants of Nakhchivan (including Rovnag's mother) would freeze in the winter. To ensure that this arrangement doesn't lead to other cooperation, President Aliyev has ordered that this contract not be linked with any other contracts. Abdullayev stressed this vital Iranian provision of gas to Nakhchivan was a real "pressure point" the Iranians could use, one which would disappear as soon as the regional conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh was settled. Presidential Apparat - Postponing Tactic is Wearing Thin -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador met with Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev on July 18 (Mehdiyev's comments on other issues will be reported septel). In response to the Ambassador's review of reftel talking points, Mehdiyev said the GOAJ has been delaying Ahmadinejad's visit for two years and that Baku can no longer continue postponing the trip. While the U.S. is Azerbaijan's "most strategic ally," the GOAJ cannot afford to have strained relations with an important neighbor because Azerbaijan's geopolitical position is like "balancing on the edge of a razor." Mehdiyev reiterated his long-standing claim that Iran uses narcotics trafficking and the export of radical Islam to pressure Azerbaijan. He reported that the GOAJ had just apprehended a group of Iranians trying to cross the border with drugs and weapons, including $250,000-300,000 night vision goggles unavailable even in Europe. ¶8. (C) Mehdiyev gave no indication that there would be any new energy deals announced with Iran. Mehdiyev said the GOAJ has an energy barter agreement with Iran because the citizens of Nakhchivan need Iranian gas; Baku has to be "more flexible" with Tehran on this issue because Iranian pressure on Nakhchivan is greater than Azerbaijan's other regions. Mehdiyev was non-committal about whether the government would again seek to delay the visit, but said that he would brief the President on the USG view. Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov separately told the Ambassador that Azerbaijan will continue to push back on Iranian requests to purchase refined oil from Azerbaijan. ¶9. (C) After the meeting with Mehdiyev, Mammadov offered more background on the GOAJ's position in a private conversation with the Ambassador. Mammadov said Tehran understands that the GOAJ has been delaying an Ahmadinejad visit for at least year, and that Tehran recently demanded a visit this summer, "announcing" it would occur July 23-24. According to Mammadov, the GOAJ has not yet responded to this request; President Aliyev will respond when he returns to Baku from vacation. ¶10. (C) Mammadov emphasized the GOAJ's concern over BAKU 00000919 003.2 OF 003 increasing tensions in the international system, pointing to Russia's recent actions on missile defense, CFE and the extradition case with the UK, noting that it is not clear to the GOAJ the implications for Azerbaijan's stability, but this dynamic is clearly not in Azerbaijan's interests. Iran and Russia respectively are Azerbaijan's first and second most important security problems, according to Mammadov. He also reiterated Mehdiyev's concerns about Iran's ability to destabilize Azerbaijan by exporting radical Islam, noting that Iran "has money" and is willing to use it to politicize religion in Azerbaijan and gain a political opening. He said the Iranian Ambassador meets with him often, and regularly presses as to why Azerbaijan "has let the U.S. into Azerbaijan" and supports a U.S. presence in the Caspian. He recalled Ahmadinejad's statement to President Aliyev that if Iran ever sees U.S. troops in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan will be "destroyed." ¶11. (C) Mammadov also said that Iran has "alluded to" increased energy cooperation with Azerbaijan "often." President Aliyev simply "pretends he has not heard and does not reply," he said. Azerbaijan's strategic choice is the Trans-Caspian pipeline through cooperation with the U.S., Europe and Turkey, Mammadov continued. "If we accept energy cooperation with Iran it will break all our plans." He said that Azerbaijan has pushed back on repeated Iranian requests to purchase refined products from Azerbaijan, saying that Azerbaijan does not want to increase cooperation on energy with Iran. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Our GOAJ interlocutors did not pledge to cancel or postpone an Ahmadinejad visit. These senior officials were at pains to reassure the USG, however, that no significant cooperation would occur and that Azerbaijan is being pressed hard into accepting the visit. Interestingly, while all were trying to dampen expectations that the President would postpone or cancel the visit, none came out categorically and said that further delay was impossible. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that President Aliyev is out and must be consulted on next steps. We will continue to press the case for delay of the visit if possible, and a low profile if not. We urge Washington to do the same in contacts with GOAJ officials. ¶13. (C) In earlier discussions, GOAJ officials have alluded to mounting Iranian pressure for a visit (ref b). The timing of this possible visit, however, seems poor for Azerbaijan. Ahmadinejad will be irate over the possibility that the U.S. could have access to the Qabala Radar Station as a result of a missile defense deal with Russia. Both President Aliyev and his foreign policy advisor Novruz Mammadov have told the Embassy that they hope to ride out this storm over Qabala because they view it as unlikely that the U.S. and Russia will actually come to an agreement on the use of the radar station. DERSE