DFM ARAZ AZIMOV DOWNBEAT ON TRACK II MISSION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000864

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: DFM ARAZ AZIMOV DOWNBEAT ON TRACK II MISSION TO
NK, ARMENIA, AND AZERBAIJAN

REF: A. BAKU 00837


B. BAKU 00836

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) In a July 5 meeting with Charge, Deputy Foreign
Minister Araz Azimov suggested that the recent Track II
mission by Armenian Ambassador to Russia Armen Smbatian and
Azerbaijani Ambassador to Russia Polad Bulbuloglu had limited
GOAJ support. (NOTE: Per Refs A and B, Smbatian and
Bulbuloglu led a group of Armenian and Azerbaijani
intellectuals to Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan on
June 28-29. The group met with the unofficial NK President
Arkadi Ghukasian, Armenian President Kocharian, and
Azerbaijani President Aliyev. END NOTE.)


2. (C) Azimov argued that the trip occurred largely at
Smbatian and Bulbuloglu's personal initiative. Azimov
explained that Smbatian and Bulbuloglu were both former
culture ministers and had good personal contacts in Russia.
For example, Azimov commented that Smbatian and Bulbuloglu
had been instrumental in calming unspecified "clashes" in
Russia. Azimov also noted that Bulbuloglu's idea of
traveling to Nagorno-Karabakh -- particularly to see his
father's home in Shusha -- was not new; Bulbuloglu floated
the idea two years ago, asking the MFA if he could travel to
his family's hometown. Azimov specified that the idea for
the trip was not a Russian, Presidential, or OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chair initiative.


3. (C) Azimov sought to minimize GOAJ sanction of the track
II mission. Azimov said the MFA had no involvement with the
visit, "until the last minute." President Aliyev was not in
full support of this initiative either, according to Azimov.
While President Aliyev did not disallow Smbatian and
Bulbuloglu's trip, he was not fully supportive of the visit
either, said Azimov.


4. (C) Throwing cold water on the near-term prospects for
future track II visits, Azimov said the recent trip was a
"specific one-time action by two Ambassadors." Azimov was
more broadly downbeat on the OSCE Minsk Group process, noting
that "the process may die." Azimov observed that the French
and RussianCo-Chairs were largely disinterested in the
procss. Azimov then argued that one of the problems for the
process is that Karabakhi Armenians control the Armenian
position in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
(NOTE: Azimov was referring to the fact that Kocharian and
Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian are Karabakhi
Armenians. END NOTE)


5. (SBU) COMMENT: Whether Azimov's account is true or not,
the GOAJ publicly has sought to put some distance between
itself and Smbatian and Bulbuloglu's trip. It is possible,
however, that the GOAJ allowed this trip primarily as a test
balloon to gauge the Azerbaijani public reaction. Because
President Aliyev's legitimacy is intimately connected to the
GOAJ position on NK and because President Aliyev and the GOAJ
generally prefer cautious policy options that aim to minimize
risks, it is not surprising -- albeit unfortunate -- that the
GOAJ has not adopted a more positive public and private
stance on the Track II mission.
LU