AZERBAIJANI CONSIDERING CFE MORATORIUM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000841

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PARM PBTS PGOV PREL KCFE RU AM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI CONSIDERING CFE MORATORIUM

REF: A. USOSCE 00272


B. IIR 6 941 0074

Classified By: Charge Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b, c, d)


1. (C) Summary. Recent events indicate that the GOAJ is
considering suspending its implementation of the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Deputy Foreign Minister
Araz Azimov told Charge D'Affairs on July 5 that the GOAJ
would seriously consider freezing implementation of the
treaty if Russia takes this step first. Several factors
appear to be shaping the GOAJ's approach toward this
decision. First, the GOAJ sees the treaty as disadvantageous
to its military position vis-a-vis Armenia. Second, the GOAJ
is carefully taking its cues from a possible Russian decision
to place a moratorium on Russia's compliance with the treaty;
Baku sees opportunities and risks in a Russian decision to
place its CFE commitments on ice. Finally, Azerbaijan seeks
to keep in good standing with the West and understands that a
decision to put a moratorium on its CFE commitments would
create problems in the U.S.-Azerbaijani relationship. On
balance, we believe the GOAJ will not freeze its CFE
obligations unless Moscow takes this step first. End Summary.

BAKU WEIGHING PROS AND CONS OF SUSPENSION
--------------


2. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov told Charge on
July 5 that the GOAJ would seriously consider freezing
implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty if Russia takes this step first. Azimov
clarified that the Azerbaijani "force majeure" statement at
the June 15 Extraordinary CFE conference did not/not signify
that the GOAJ had ceased implementing the treaty. (NOTE:
Per Ref A, the Azerbaijani representative at the Conference
obliquely suggested that Azerbaijan may follow suit if Russia
suspends implementation of the CFE. END NOTE.) Azimov
noted, however, that he would personally advise President
Aliyev to take this step if Russia does so.


3. (C) Azimov argued that Azerbaijan historically has
articulated its problems with the treaty. Azimov singled out
Russian military assistance to Armenia and the continued
occupation of NK and the other seven occupied provinces as
the key sticking points for Azerbaijan. The GOAJ believes
that much of Armenia's weaponry has illegally gone to NK and
the occupied territories. Azimov also argued that it is
unjust for Azerbaijan's CFE ceilings to be equal to Armenia
and Georgia because Azerbaijan is larger than both states
from a territorial and population perspective.

GIVING NOTICE
--------------


4. (S/NF) According to recent intelligence reporting, the
Azerbaijani MFA and MoD have been considering declaring a
moratorium on Azerbaijan's compliance with the CFE Treaty for
the past several weeks. While the Azerbaijani
representative's statement could be interpreted as a bluff,
Azimov's clarification and other recent intelligence suggest
the Azerbaijanis genuinely are considering suspending their
compliance with CFE treaty obligations. On balance, we
believe the Azerbaijanis have effectively given us advance
notice of their policy direction if Russia suspends its
implementation of the CFE treaty.


5. (C) While we lack specific numbers, Azerbaijan
historically has exceeded its CFE Treaty-Limited equipment
(TLE) ceilings. Azerbaijan's number of tanks and artillery
pieces has traditionally been a particularly problematic
issue. Per ref B, Azerbaijan exceeded the limits of the
Tashkent agreement -- as part of the CFE process -- by 41
tanks and 58 artillery pieces.

VARIABLES BEHIND A POTENTIAL MORATORIUM
--------------


6. (C) There are several drivers shaping the GOAJ's approach
to a potential suspension of its CFE treaty implementation.
First, the GOAJ perceives that the CFE treaty limits its
military capability vis-a-vis Armenia. During the last few
years, Azerbaijan has increasingly sought to showcase its
growing military budget, both as a negotiating tactic and to
increase its deterrent posture toward Armenia. For example,

BAKU 00000841 002 OF 002


President Aliyev, speaking at a June 22 military graduation
ceremony, stated: "We do not want to solve this issue in a
military way, but we have to be ready for this. Our policy
is open. We are not hiding anything. We say - yes, we are
loyal to the negotiations, but this has certain limits.
These negotiations cannot last forever. . . It is necessary
to clarify things within a short period of time to see where
we are and where are going." (NOTE: The quotation is taken
from ANS TV coverage of the speech. END NOTE.) Aliyev in
the same speech emphasized the need to develop a multifaceted
military, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda approach
toward Armenia, according to Radio Free Europe's coverage of
the speech.


7. (C) A corollary of this first factor is Azerbaijan's fear
about the level of Russian military support to Armenia. Most
recently, the GOAJ has expressed concern that Russian
military units and equipment leaving Georgia are being sent
to Armenia, thereby increasing the latter's military
capabilities and, according to the GOAJ, leaving Armenia in
violation of its own CFE obligations (ref B). This recent
movement of Russian military equipment may in part be feeding
the GOAJ's increased fears regarding its military position
vis-a-vis Armenia. Azimov also told the Charge D'Affairs
that if Russia declares a moratorium on its CFE obligations,
this will considerably ease Moscow's ability to send arms to
Armenia.


8. (C) Most educated Azerbaijanis are skeptical that the
GOAJ would engage in a military operation to retake NK in the
next several years. Most commentators argue that the GOAJ's
rhetoric is largely intended for domestic consumption because
President Aliyev's stance on NK is critical to maintaining
his legitimacy with the Azerbaijani public. Analysts argue
that over the next few years, the GOAJ has little interest in
pursuing a military solution to the conflict because this
strategy involves significant risks for a government that is
traditionally risk adverse. Analysts noted that a war could
risk Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, fragile
independence, and -- most importantly -- the current ruling
elite's positions. Most commentators acknowledge, however,
that in the medium- to long-term, the potential for a
military solution is rising. END NOTE.)


9. (C) Second, Azerbaijan appears concerned about Russia's
threatened withdrawal from the treaty. Azerbaijan probably
views a scenario in which Russia declares a moratorium on its
CFE obligations as a mixed development. On the one hand, a
Russian moratorium poses an increased military risk to
Azerbaijan because Russia will be less constrained to limit
its forces deployed in the Caucasus region. On the other
hand, a Russian move away from the treaty would give the GOAJ
plausible political cover to free itself from a treaty that
it perceives as disadvantageous to Azerbaijan's military
interests. While Azerbaijan currently is exceeding some of
its TLE ceilings, an Azerbaijani moratorium on implementing
the CFE treaty would strike a blow to the overall treaty
regime, and give us less leverage in maintaining a military
balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan.


10. (C) A third variable is the GOAJ's desire to be in good
standing with the U.S. and European governments. The GOAJ
understands that an Azerbaijani decision to scrap or put a
moratorium on the treaty would have negative consequences for
its relations with Western partners. The GOAJ likely is
weighing how severe the blowback would be if Baku distanced
itself from the treaty.

GOAJ PROBABLY IN WAIT AND SEE MODE
--------------


11. (C) We judge the GOAJ would not declare a moratorium on
the CFE treaty unless Russia took this step first. We belive
the GOAJ is still weighing its options on the CFE. The GOAJ
frequently states that time is on its side vis-a-vis the NK
conflict. The GOAJ believes that it is growing economically
and militarily more powerful, while Armenia increasingly is
isolated. The GOAJ -- and Ilham Aliyev in particular -- also
are generally cautious in their approach to foreign policy
decisions.
DERSE