SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-AZERBAIJANI JULY 9-10

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000832 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/RPM, PM, S/CT, ISN, NEA; OSD PLEASE PASS TO DASD FATA, TONY ALDWELL, AND JON CHICKY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-AZERBAIJANI JULY 9-10 SECURITY DIALOGUE REF: A. BAKU 00465 ¶B. BAKU 00280 ¶C. BAKU 00422 ¶D. BAKU 00660 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The tenth anniversary of the bilateral security dialogue is an important opportunity to take stock of our existing strong cooperation and to achieve gains for U.S. interests by expanding our security agenda with a key Eurasian security partner. The GOAJ has two goals for these security consultations: to develop the talks into an action-oriented forum and to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Azerbaijani security partnership, particularly to Iran and Russia. The Embassy prposes that we create a list of follow-up items dring the consultations as a way to keep the talk results-oriented and to issue a joint statement atthe talk's conclusion that notes our expanding security cooperation. We also provide below comments on all of the agenda items, focusing on the GOAJ's likely approach to the specific issue, along with suggested objectives or deliverables for the U.S. side. End Summary. SECURITY COOPERATION ROBUST -------------- ¶2. (C) Azerbaijan is a key Eurasian security partner, central to advancing U.S. security and strategic interests in the region. Our security cooperation with the GOAJ is strong and growing, but Azerbaijan's role as a geopolitical "corridor" or "bridge" state into Eurasia and the critical role it plays in support of coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest our security interests in this secular, majority Shia country are greater than the sum of our individual cooperative programs. Azerbaijan is a key geopolitical pivot point for projecting U.S. influence along three vectors: Eurasia to the East, Russia and the Caucasus to the north, and Iran and the Middle East to the south. Azerbaijan is also the linchpin in the existing East-West energy corridor and U.S. plans to develop a new southern gas corridor. Bolstering Azerbaijan's independence and territorial integrity advances U.S. interests of diversifying world energy sources, expanding political and economic freedom in a region that is vital to our interests, and ensuring Azerbaijan's continued strong support for operations critical to U.S. security. ¶3. (C) Because of Azerbaijan's broader geopolitical significance and against the backdrop of continuing U.S. efforts to elevate our bilateral relationship, we believe the 10th anniversary of the bilateral security consultations is a key opportunity to take stock of our existing cooperation and look for ways to expand our security agenda. In an indication of the importance the GOAJ assigns to this year's talks, the GOAJ has assembled the largest and most senior delegation in the ten year history of the consultations. Per ref A, President Aliyev, Presidential Apparat Chief Ramiz Mehdiyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov have sent the Ambassador the clear signal that the GOAJ assigns a high priority to these talks and hopes that the consultations will produce a clear focus on results, a new follow-up mechanism, and a strong public statement on the importance of our bilateral security agenda. ¶4. (C) The GOAJ has two broad goals for the security consultations. First, the GOAJ would like to see the consultations develop into an action-oriented forum for deepening our security cooperation. In particular, the GOAJ seeks to expand its capabilities to counter transnational -- especially terrorism and proliferation -- threats. Second, the GOAJ wants to use the consultations to publicly showcase our bilateral security cooperation. From the GOAJ's perspective, Iran and Russia are the key audience for this public aspect. Accordingly, the GOAJ is strongly interested in a robust public statement outlining the purpose and results of this year's security consultations. MAXIMIZING THE SECURITY DIALOGUE'S IMPACT -------------- ¶5. (C) We seek to ensure the security consultations develop into a powerful, invigorated forum that produces concrete results by creating an appropriate follow-up mechanism. In the past, the efficacy of the talks has suffered from the BAKU 00000832 002 OF 005 lack of a clear follow-up mechanism. We also believe a robust press statement after the talks would deepen our security cooperation by addressing the GOAJ's concerns regarding Russia and Iran. Accordingly, we propose the following: - Create a follow-up mechanism: We suggest a notetaker keep a log of agreed-upon follow-up items during the security consultations. This action-oriented list can be approved by both parties at the end of the consultations to serve as a clear roadmap for expanding our security cooperation. Ambassador Derse and Ambassador Yashar Aliyev could then report to the co-chairs of the security dialogue in six months on the status of these action items. - Issue a Press statement: We suggest Washington and the GOAJ issue a joint press statement at the conclusion of the July 10-11 security dialogue, marking the tenth anniversary of our consultations and noting the expansion of and the importance of this forum for addressing our growing security agenda. This type of statement would address the GOAJ's repeated requests for public support, including President Aliyev's February request to former Department of Defense A/S Peter Rodman for, and A/S Rodman's offer to provide, "more public signs" from the USG of our support for Azerbaijan's independence and security in the face of regional pressures (ref B). AGENDA OBJECTIVES AND DELIVERABLES -------------- ¶6. (C) The Embassy provides two types of comments on each agenda topic. First, we seek to provide context on the GOAJ's likely approach to each item; second, we want to highlight suggested U.S. objectives and or deliverables on each point. ¶A. NATO IPAP/SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS: (C) The GOAJ appears internally divided about the need for and the pace of implementing security sector reforms. Traditionally, the MFA -- especially DFM Azimov -- has been the key proponent for embracing such reforms, while elements in the Ministry of Defense and other officials are less receptive to reforms. This intergovernmental tension is likely to be just below the surface during the security consultations. Azimov's interest in security sector reforms stems from his genuine desire to move Azerbaijan closer toward western military standards and as a means for enhancing his personal bureaucratic stature. In this connection, we note that Azimov has been unusually successful, in the GOAJ's often divisive bureaucratic environment, in developing a broad interagency process on national security led by the MFA, which produced the GOAJ's National Security Concept (NSC) this year. Some senior officials almost certainly see reforms as a threat to their personal power base. NATO Special Representative Bob Simmons in his most recent trip to Baku said that the GOAJ is making progress on its defense reform goals. (C) The U.S. can advance its broader reform and security-sector interests by engaging with the GOAJ on its NATO IPAP, in support of NATO's very active engagement, and encouraging the GOAJ impulse to embrace security sector reforms. We believe the USG can use Azerbaijan's IPAP process as a tool to leverage our interests. For example, Azerbaijan's May 2005 IPAP contains explicit language on the GOAJ's "strategic goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic, and other structures." The GOAJ also committed itself to increased democratic control of the military in its IPAP. The new NSC contains a surprisingly detailed account of necessary political and economic reforms. (C) The Embassy proposes the following objectives for this agenda item: (a) to ask for a preview of the key issues under discussion between the GOAJ and NATO regarding Azerbaijan's new IPAP and encouraging that the new IPAP be made public; and (b) to clarify the GOAJ's specific security sector reforms. (NOTE: IPAPs are rewritten every two years. The GOAJ currently is working with NATO on its new IPAP to replace its May 2005 IPAP. END NOTE.) (C) Azimov remains interested in U.S. participation in the informal advisory group that guided the drafting of the NSC BAKU 00000832 003 OF 005 (similar to the IASB in Georgia). The UK, Germany, and Turkey have been active in this forum. The time commitment for a U.S. representative to engage in this process would be 3-4 trips per year for 4-5 days at a time, according to the UK rep, General Sir Garry Johnson. We believe it is strongly in our interest to engage in the experts groups which will continue to advise the GOAJ interagency group that has been charged by President Aliyev to draft Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy Strategy, Military Doctrine, and the other documents to support the NSC. ¶B. COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS (C) Although the GOAJ recently announced plans to double its NATO contingent in Afghanistan, we believe it currently is reluctant to take on additional coalition contributions that are of a military nature (a reluctance we recognize could complicate Train-and-Equip Program discussions, see below). The GOAJ probably perceives it has adequately demonstrated support in a number of key coalition missions -- Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq -- and seeks to showcase these contributions. The GOAJ, however, aspires to be seen as a regional power and support for coalition operations advances this goal. The GOAJ is pursuing new civilian contributions in Afghanistan. (C) The suggested U.S. objectives are to secure new non-military and military contributions from the GOAJ and for the USG to brief the Azerbaijani delegation on the status of coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Per ref C, Azimov told the Ambassador on April 12 that he will brief participants on several new non-military contributions to Afghanistan -- specifically, contributions to a Provincial Reconstruction team, funding the constructions of a girls school, and security and demining training in Baku for Afghanistan security units. In our view, these are significant non-military contributions that we should encourage the GOAJ to continue making, given its growing energy wealth and stated desire to play a larger regional security role. We should also use this opportunity to urge the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq. ¶C. CASPIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES (C) The Azerbaijani Navy and the Coast Guard are the key GOAJ interlocutors regarding our maritime cooperation. DFM Azimov perceives the goal of our bilateral cooperation in this area as "capacity-building" to address transnational threats. The Navy and the Coast Guard, however, do not cooperate extensively. (C) Our bilateral assistance cooperation in this area is outstanding. Azimov has even requested U.S. advice on crafting a comprehensive "Maritime Security Concept" for Azerbaijan, to "harmonize and synergize" the GOAJ's currently divided efforts. We suggest the DoD elements at the Embassy be the relevant POC to address Azimov's request, and this item be noted in the dialogue's list of action-items. We suggest that Washington use this agenda item to: (1) solicit the GOAJ's thoughts on next steps in advancing our maritime cooperation, including developing synergies among our existing programs to address transnational threats; (2) encourage enhanced inter-governmental cooperation; and (3) urge the maritime State Border Service to develop operational plans that include the Navy to advance our counterproliferation interests. Another suggested action item is for both sides to come up with a clear list of possible synergies in our existing maritime and border security programs. ¶D. MISSILE DEFENSE (C) The GOAJ seeks reassurances that the U.S. intends to consult closely regarding our discussions with Russia on the possible utility of using the Gabala radar facility in the U.S. missile defense architecture. President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have requested that the GOAJ be included -- in a bilateral or trilateral forum -- in developing any potential U.S.-Russian proposals for joint access to the Gabala radar station. Aside from background on the U.S. missile defense architecture, the GOAJ would be grateful for any specific updates -- as available -- on our discussions with Russia. (C) We welcome Washington's suggestion to provide a BAKU 00000832 004 OF 005 background brief on the U.S. missile defense system. As possible, we suggest the U.S. side be as transparent as possible about the status of our consultations with Moscow. ¶E. TRAIN AND EQUIP (TEP) (C) The security talks present a key opportunity to clarify both sides' positions regarding interest in a possible TEP. President Aliyev told the Ambassador on April 16 that he welcomed a discussion on TEP during the security dialogue, but said that any TEP mission could not be specifically linked to a deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan, as it was not in the case of Georgia (ref A). This misimpression appears to have been corrected by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, who later told the Ambassador that President Aliyev is prepared to commit in a TEP to deploy a trained unit to "peacekeeping operations" to Afghanistan or Iraq, but he does not want to mention specific countries in the TEP document due to the "Muslim factor." We suggest that Washington clarify to the Azerbaijani delegation the necessary linkage in our view between TEP and a coalition contribution. ¶F. CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE (C) The GOAJ seeks to strengthen its capabilities to protect Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure. According to Azimov, the Azerbaijani delegation plans a presentation on this topic, and seeks greater engagement with the U.S. Senior Azerbaijani officials were very pleased by the NATO Riga Summit statement supporting "a coordinated international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security." Azimov told us the GOAJ would welcome an international (U.S. or NATO) assessment to identify gaps in Azerbaijan's current security posture. (C) We believe the GOAJ lacks a comprehensive approach to protecting its energy infrastructure (septel). The U.S. has an inherent interest in helping the GOAJ develop such an approach, given Azerbaijan's central role in the BTC and the South Caucasus Gas pipelines and indications of Iranian threats. We recommend we discuss the feasibility of a U.S. team of experts performing a needs assessment of Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure. The GOAJ would then be responsible for implementing and funding necessary security upgrades. This session could also seek to clarify the precise roles of individual GOAJ security agencies in protecting Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, as the roles and responsibilities have been complicated by the introduction of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. ¶G. AZERBAIJAN'S WIDER ROLE (C) We suggest this agenda item be used to solicit the GOAJ's specific plans for playing an increased role in enhancing security outside of the immediate Caspian region. We believe the U.S. should largely be in listening mode to gauge how serious the GOAJ is about this issue. The GOAJ repeatedly has focused on its role as a model Muslim country that can foster the value of religious tolerance, highlighting its contributions to coalition operations and its role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. (NOTE: Azerbaijan's year-long chairmanship of the OIC's Foreign Ministers' Conference ended in May, but Azerbaijan continues to play a key role as a member of the OIC troika. END NOTE.) For example, the GOAJ sees its military contributions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo as part of its effort to promote stability. (C) We suggest Washington encourage the GOAJ to use its growing energy revenues to match its declaratory commitments to spread the value of tolerance and play a larger regional role. It would be useful to see what non-military contributions the GOAJ could bring to the table. Azimov told the Ambassador he plans to brief the USG delegation on important new non-military contributions in Afghanistan that the GOAJ proposed in May to NATO, including the construction of a girl's school, participation in a provincial reconstruction team, and demining and police training for Afghani police (ref C). The Department should also encourage the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq as a clear demonstration of its declaratory commitments to play a larger regional role. ¶H. BORDER SECURITY BAKU 00000832 005 OF 005 (C) Our border security cooperation is robust and a bilateral success story. In line with President's Aliyev's push to strengthen border security and interest in "buying equipment" from the U.S. for this purpose, Azimov told us the State Border Service will outline specific needs (ref C). A second objective for this agenda item would be to highlight for the GOAJ the critical national security aspects of a transparent effective customs service, and to secure GOAJ commitment to further consider the February 2007 US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) proposal for technical assistance (advisors) to the State Customs Committee on a fully reimbursable basis to help strengthen Customs role in border security. We suggest encouraging the GOAJ to agree during the security dialogue to engage in consultations between CBP and the State Committee to see how the proposal can be made compatible with GOAJ legislation, including the new Customs Code. The GOAJ could agree to report back on its decision within six months of the security dialogue. ¶I. NONPROLIFERATION (C) The suggested objective of this session is to clarify the GOAJ's position on PSI and solicit the GOAJ's perspectives on how to deepen our non-proliferation cooperation. The GOAJ has not yet commented substantively on our response to its detailed PSI questions (ref D),and promised that it would respond at the security talks. ¶J. OSCE, UN, GUAM, EU (C) While the GOAJ has not clearly articulated its objective for this agenda item, the Azerbaijani delegation likely will focus on gaining USG support in these multilateral forums to bolster its position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We have been clear that the OSCE Minsk Group is the key forum for resolving the conflict. We could use this agenda item to underscore to the GOAJ that we will only support a UNGA resolution on the conflicts if it will contribute to a peaceful solution. Concerning GUAM and the EU, we propose soliciting the GOAJ's goals for its participation in these two organizations. ¶K. CT COOPERATION The suggested objective is to identify specific new areas for CT cooperation, to be followed up by Ambassador Derse and Ambassador Yashar Aliyev. The Minister of National Security has expressed interest in more training and engagement on the non-intelligence aspects of our CT cooperation, including from the FBI. There is already extensive CT-related information sharing between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Azimov has suggested that both sides can do more to address the ideological roots of terrorism (ref C). Azimov also said the Ministry of National Security will propose increased operational measures and intelligence exchanges. In line with the Department's talking points sent via email from PM, we agree that it is important to encourage the GOAJ to pass an effective terrorist finance legislation and to create a financial intelligence unit. We suggest both sides agree to prepare a list of proposals and timeframes for enhancing CT cooperation in the security dialogue's minutes. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Embassy thanks PM and EUR for their leadership, interest, and support in preparing this year's security dialogue. While our security cooperation is robust, this year's consultations are the perfect forum for providing strategic-level direction to and identifying new areas for cooperation. The launch of an intensified security dialogue is a key step in implementing Secretary Rice's vision, outlined in her February 2007 letter to President Aliyev, to elevate, expand, and strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, and will contribute directly to achieving critical U.S. national security goals with this key Eurasian security partner. DERSE