SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-AZERBAIJANI JULY 9-10

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000832

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/RPM, PM, S/CT, ISN, NEA; OSD PLEASE
PASS TO DASD FATA, TONY ALDWELL, AND JON CHICKY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-AZERBAIJANI JULY 9-10
SECURITY DIALOGUE

REF: A. BAKU 00465

B. BAKU 00280

C. BAKU 00422

D. BAKU 00660

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: The tenth anniversary of the bilateral
security dialogue is an important opportunity to take stock
of our existing strong cooperation and to achieve gains for
U.S. interests by expanding our security agenda with a key
Eurasian security partner. The GOAJ has two goals for these
security consultations: to develop the talks into an
action-oriented forum and to demonstrate the strength of the
U.S.-Azerbaijani security partnership, particularly to Iran
and Russia. The Embassy prposes that we create a list of
follow-up items dring the consultations as a way to keep the
talk results-oriented and to issue a joint statement atthe
talk's conclusion that notes our expanding security
cooperation. We also provide below comments on all of the
agenda items, focusing on the GOAJ's likely approach to the
specific issue, along with suggested objectives or
deliverables for the U.S. side. End Summary.

SECURITY COOPERATION ROBUST
--------------


2. (C) Azerbaijan is a key Eurasian security partner,
central to advancing U.S. security and strategic interests in
the region. Our security cooperation with the GOAJ is strong
and growing, but Azerbaijan's role as a geopolitical
"corridor" or "bridge" state into Eurasia and the critical
role it plays in support of coalition operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan suggest our security interests in this secular,
majority Shia country are greater than the sum of our
individual cooperative programs. Azerbaijan is a key
geopolitical pivot point for projecting U.S. influence along
three vectors: Eurasia to the East, Russia and the Caucasus
to the north, and Iran and the Middle East to the south.
Azerbaijan is also the linchpin in the existing East-West
energy corridor and U.S. plans to develop a new southern gas
corridor. Bolstering Azerbaijan's independence and
territorial integrity advances U.S. interests of diversifying
world energy sources, expanding political and economic
freedom in a region that is vital to our interests, and
ensuring Azerbaijan's continued strong support for operations
critical to U.S. security.


3. (C) Because of Azerbaijan's broader geopolitical
significance and against the backdrop of continuing U.S.
efforts to elevate our bilateral relationship, we believe the
10th anniversary of the bilateral security consultations is a
key opportunity to take stock of our existing cooperation and
look for ways to expand our security agenda. In an
indication of the importance the GOAJ assigns to this year's
talks, the GOAJ has assembled the largest and most senior
delegation in the ten year history of the consultations. Per
ref A, President Aliyev, Presidential Apparat Chief Ramiz
Mehdiyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Araz Azimov have sent the Ambassador the clear
signal that the GOAJ assigns a high priority to these talks
and hopes that the consultations will produce a clear focus
on results, a new follow-up mechanism, and a strong public
statement on the importance of our bilateral security agenda.


4. (C) The GOAJ has two broad goals for the security
consultations. First, the GOAJ would like to see the
consultations develop into an action-oriented forum for
deepening our security cooperation. In particular, the GOAJ
seeks to expand its capabilities to counter transnational --
especially terrorism and proliferation -- threats. Second,
the GOAJ wants to use the consultations to publicly showcase
our bilateral security cooperation. From the GOAJ's
perspective, Iran and Russia are the key audience for this
public aspect. Accordingly, the GOAJ is strongly interested
in a robust public statement outlining the purpose and
results of this year's security consultations.

MAXIMIZING THE SECURITY DIALOGUE'S IMPACT
--------------


5. (C) We seek to ensure the security consultations develop
into a powerful, invigorated forum that produces concrete
results by creating an appropriate follow-up mechanism. In
the past, the efficacy of the talks has suffered from the

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lack of a clear follow-up mechanism. We also believe a
robust press statement after the talks would deepen our
security cooperation by addressing the GOAJ's concerns
regarding Russia and Iran. Accordingly, we propose the
following:

- Create a follow-up mechanism: We suggest a notetaker keep
a log of agreed-upon follow-up items during the security
consultations. This action-oriented list can be approved by
both parties at the end of the consultations to serve as a
clear roadmap for expanding our security cooperation.
Ambassador Derse and Ambassador Yashar Aliyev could then
report to the co-chairs of the security dialogue in six
months on the status of these action items.

- Issue a Press statement: We suggest Washington and the
GOAJ issue a joint press statement at the conclusion of the
July 10-11 security dialogue, marking the tenth anniversary
of our consultations and noting the expansion of and the
importance of this forum for addressing our growing security
agenda. This type of statement would address the GOAJ's
repeated requests for public support, including President
Aliyev's February request to former Department of Defense A/S
Peter Rodman for, and A/S Rodman's offer to provide, "more
public signs" from the USG of our support for Azerbaijan's
independence and security in the face of regional pressures
(ref B).

AGENDA OBJECTIVES AND DELIVERABLES
--------------


6. (C) The Embassy provides two types of comments on each
agenda topic. First, we seek to provide context on the
GOAJ's likely approach to each item; second, we want to
highlight suggested U.S. objectives and or deliverables on
each point.


A. NATO IPAP/SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS:

(C) The GOAJ appears internally divided about the need for
and the pace of implementing security sector reforms.
Traditionally, the MFA -- especially DFM Azimov -- has been
the key proponent for embracing such reforms, while elements
in the Ministry of Defense and other officials are less
receptive to reforms. This intergovernmental tension is
likely to be just below the surface during the security
consultations. Azimov's interest in security sector reforms
stems from his genuine desire to move Azerbaijan closer
toward western military standards and as a means for
enhancing his personal bureaucratic stature. In this
connection, we note that Azimov has been unusually
successful, in the GOAJ's often divisive bureaucratic
environment, in developing a broad interagency process on
national security led by the MFA, which produced the GOAJ's
National Security Concept (NSC) this year. Some senior
officials almost certainly see reforms as a threat to their
personal power base. NATO Special Representative Bob Simmons
in his most recent trip to Baku said that the GOAJ is making
progress on its defense reform goals.

(C) The U.S. can advance its broader reform and
security-sector interests by engaging with the GOAJ on its
NATO IPAP, in support of NATO's very active engagement, and
encouraging the GOAJ impulse to embrace security sector
reforms. We believe the USG can use Azerbaijan's IPAP
process as a tool to leverage our interests. For example,
Azerbaijan's May 2005 IPAP contains explicit language on the
GOAJ's "strategic goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic
political, security, economic, and other structures." The
GOAJ also committed itself to increased democratic control of
the military in its IPAP. The new NSC contains a
surprisingly detailed account of necessary political and
economic reforms.

(C) The Embassy proposes the following objectives for this
agenda item: (a) to ask for a preview of the key issues under
discussion between the GOAJ and NATO regarding Azerbaijan's
new IPAP and encouraging that the new IPAP be made public;
and (b) to clarify the GOAJ's specific security sector
reforms. (NOTE: IPAPs are rewritten every two years. The
GOAJ currently is working with NATO on its new IPAP to
replace its May 2005 IPAP. END NOTE.)

(C) Azimov remains interested in U.S. participation in the
informal advisory group that guided the drafting of the NSC

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(similar to the IASB in Georgia). The UK, Germany, and
Turkey have been active in this forum. The time commitment
for a U.S. representative to engage in this process would be
3-4 trips per year for 4-5 days at a time, according to the
UK rep, General Sir Garry Johnson. We believe it is strongly
in our interest to engage in the experts groups which will
continue to advise the GOAJ interagency group that has been
charged by President Aliyev to draft Azerbaijan's Foreign
Policy Strategy, Military Doctrine, and the other documents
to support the NSC.


B. COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS

(C) Although the GOAJ recently announced plans to double its
NATO contingent in Afghanistan, we believe it currently is
reluctant to take on additional coalition contributions that
are of a military nature (a reluctance we recognize could
complicate Train-and-Equip Program discussions, see below).
The GOAJ probably perceives it has adequately demonstrated
support in a number of key coalition missions -- Afghanistan,
Kosovo, and Iraq -- and seeks to showcase these
contributions. The GOAJ, however, aspires to be seen as a
regional power and support for coalition operations advances
this goal. The GOAJ is pursuing new civilian contributions
in Afghanistan.

(C) The suggested U.S. objectives are to secure new
non-military and military contributions from the GOAJ and for
the USG to brief the Azerbaijani delegation on the status of
coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Per ref C, Azimov
told the Ambassador on April 12 that he will brief
participants on several new non-military contributions to
Afghanistan -- specifically, contributions to a Provincial
Reconstruction team, funding the constructions of a girls
school, and security and demining training in Baku for
Afghanistan security units. In our view, these are
significant non-military contributions that we should
encourage the GOAJ to continue making, given its growing
energy wealth and stated desire to play a larger regional
security role. We should also use this opportunity to urge
the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq.


C. CASPIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES

(C) The Azerbaijani Navy and the Coast Guard are the key GOAJ
interlocutors regarding our maritime cooperation. DFM Azimov
perceives the goal of our bilateral cooperation in this area
as "capacity-building" to address transnational threats. The
Navy and the Coast Guard, however, do not cooperate
extensively.

(C) Our bilateral assistance cooperation in this area is
outstanding. Azimov has even requested U.S. advice on
crafting a comprehensive "Maritime Security Concept" for
Azerbaijan, to "harmonize and synergize" the GOAJ's currently
divided efforts. We suggest the DoD elements at the Embassy
be the relevant POC to address Azimov's request, and this
item be noted in the dialogue's list of action-items. We
suggest that Washington use this agenda item to: (1) solicit
the GOAJ's thoughts on next steps in advancing our maritime
cooperation, including developing synergies among our
existing programs to address transnational threats; (2)
encourage enhanced inter-governmental cooperation; and (3)
urge the maritime State Border Service to develop operational
plans that include the Navy to advance our
counterproliferation interests. Another suggested action
item is for both sides to come up with a clear list of
possible synergies in our existing maritime and border
security programs.


D. MISSILE DEFENSE

(C) The GOAJ seeks reassurances that the U.S. intends to
consult closely regarding our discussions with Russia on the
possible utility of using the Gabala radar facility in the
U.S. missile defense architecture. President Aliyev and
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have requested that the GOAJ be
included -- in a bilateral or trilateral forum -- in
developing any potential U.S.-Russian proposals for joint
access to the Gabala radar station. Aside from background on
the U.S. missile defense architecture, the GOAJ would be
grateful for any specific updates -- as available -- on our
discussions with Russia.

(C) We welcome Washington's suggestion to provide a

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background brief on the U.S. missile defense system. As
possible, we suggest the U.S. side be as transparent as
possible about the status of our consultations with Moscow.


E. TRAIN AND EQUIP (TEP)

(C) The security talks present a key opportunity to clarify
both sides' positions regarding interest in a possible TEP.
President Aliyev told the Ambassador on April 16 that he
welcomed a discussion on TEP during the security dialogue,
but said that any TEP mission could not be specifically
linked to a deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan, as it was not
in the case of Georgia (ref A). This misimpression appears
to have been corrected by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, who
later told the Ambassador that President Aliyev is prepared
to commit in a TEP to deploy a trained unit to "peacekeeping
operations" to Afghanistan or Iraq, but he does not want to
mention specific countries in the TEP document due to the
"Muslim factor." We suggest that Washington clarify to the
Azerbaijani delegation the necessary linkage in our view
between TEP and a coalition contribution.


F. CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

(C) The GOAJ seeks to strengthen its capabilities to protect
Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure. According to
Azimov, the Azerbaijani delegation plans a presentation on
this topic, and seeks greater engagement with the U.S.
Senior Azerbaijani officials were very pleased by the NATO
Riga Summit statement supporting "a coordinated international
effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to
promote energy infrastructure security." Azimov told us the
GOAJ would welcome an international (U.S. or NATO) assessment
to identify gaps in Azerbaijan's current security posture.

(C) We believe the GOAJ lacks a comprehensive approach to
protecting its energy infrastructure (septel). The U.S. has
an inherent interest in helping the GOAJ develop such an
approach, given Azerbaijan's central role in the BTC and the
South Caucasus Gas pipelines and indications of Iranian
threats. We recommend we discuss the feasibility of a U.S.
team of experts performing a needs assessment of Azerbaijan's
energy infrastructure. The GOAJ would then be responsible
for implementing and funding necessary security upgrades.
This session could also seek to clarify the precise roles of
individual GOAJ security agencies in protecting Azerbaijan's
energy infrastructure, as the roles and responsibilities have
been complicated by the introduction of the Ministry of
Emergency Situations.


G. AZERBAIJAN'S WIDER ROLE

(C) We suggest this agenda item be used to solicit the GOAJ's
specific plans for playing an increased role in enhancing
security outside of the immediate Caspian region. We believe
the U.S. should largely be in listening mode to gauge how
serious the GOAJ is about this issue. The GOAJ repeatedly
has focused on its role as a model Muslim country that can
foster the value of religious tolerance, highlighting its
contributions to coalition operations and its role in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. (NOTE: Azerbaijan's
year-long chairmanship of the OIC's Foreign Ministers'
Conference ended in May, but Azerbaijan continues to play a
key role as a member of the OIC troika. END NOTE.) For
example, the GOAJ sees its military contributions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo as part of its effort to
promote stability.

(C) We suggest Washington encourage the GOAJ to use its
growing energy revenues to match its declaratory commitments
to spread the value of tolerance and play a larger regional
role. It would be useful to see what non-military
contributions the GOAJ could bring to the table. Azimov told
the Ambassador he plans to brief the USG delegation on
important new non-military contributions in Afghanistan that
the GOAJ proposed in May to NATO, including the construction
of a girl's school, participation in a provincial
reconstruction team, and demining and police training for
Afghani police (ref C). The Department should also encourage
the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq as a
clear demonstration of its declaratory commitments to play a
larger regional role.


H. BORDER SECURITY


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(C) Our border security cooperation is robust and a bilateral
success story. In line with President's Aliyev's push to
strengthen border security and interest in "buying equipment"
from the U.S. for this purpose, Azimov told us the State
Border Service will outline specific needs (ref C). A second
objective for this agenda item would be to highlight for the
GOAJ the critical national security aspects of a transparent
effective customs service, and to secure GOAJ commitment to
further consider the February 2007 US Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) proposal for technical assistance (advisors)
to the State Customs Committee on a fully reimbursable basis
to help strengthen Customs role in border security. We
suggest encouraging the GOAJ to agree during the security
dialogue to engage in consultations between CBP and the State
Committee to see how the proposal can be made compatible with
GOAJ legislation, including the new Customs Code. The GOAJ
could agree to report back on its decision within six months
of the security dialogue.


I. NONPROLIFERATION

(C) The suggested objective of this session is to clarify the
GOAJ's position on PSI and solicit the GOAJ's perspectives on
how to deepen our non-proliferation cooperation. The GOAJ
has not yet commented substantively on our response to its
detailed PSI questions (ref D),and promised that it would
respond at the security talks.


J. OSCE, UN, GUAM, EU

(C) While the GOAJ has not clearly articulated its objective
for this agenda item, the Azerbaijani delegation likely will
focus on gaining USG support in these multilateral forums to
bolster its position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We
have been clear that the OSCE Minsk Group is the key forum
for resolving the conflict. We could use this agenda item to
underscore to the GOAJ that we will only support a UNGA
resolution on the conflicts if it will contribute to a
peaceful solution. Concerning GUAM and the EU, we propose
soliciting the GOAJ's goals for its participation in these
two organizations.


K. CT COOPERATION

The suggested objective is to identify specific new areas for
CT cooperation, to be followed up by Ambassador Derse and
Ambassador Yashar Aliyev. The Minister of National Security
has expressed interest in more training and engagement on the
non-intelligence aspects of our CT cooperation, including
from the FBI. There is already extensive CT-related
information sharing between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Azimov
has suggested that both sides can do more to address the
ideological roots of terrorism (ref C). Azimov also said the
Ministry of National Security will propose increased
operational measures and intelligence exchanges. In line
with the Department's talking points sent via email from PM,
we agree that it is important to encourage the GOAJ to pass
an effective terrorist finance legislation and to create a
financial intelligence unit. We suggest both sides agree to
prepare a list of proposals and timeframes for enhancing CT
cooperation in the security dialogue's minutes.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Embassy thanks PM and EUR for their leadership,
interest, and support in preparing this year's security
dialogue. While our security cooperation is robust, this
year's consultations are the perfect forum for providing
strategic-level direction to and identifying new areas for
cooperation. The launch of an intensified security dialogue
is a key step in implementing Secretary Rice's vision,
outlined in her February 2007 letter to President Aliyev, to
elevate, expand, and strengthen our strategic partnership
with Azerbaijan, and will contribute directly to achieving
critical U.S. national security goals with this key Eurasian
security partner.
DERSE