Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU722
2007-06-08 12:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUNDER ON THE GABALA RADAR

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR AJ RU IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9799
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0722/01 1591220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081220Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3212
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0681
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000722 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AJ RU IR
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUNDER ON THE GABALA RADAR
STATION

REF: A. BAKU 00219


B. BAKU 00154

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b, d).

Background on the Radar
------------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000722

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AJ RU IR
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUNDER ON THE GABALA RADAR
STATION

REF: A. BAKU 00219


B. BAKU 00154

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b, d).

Background on the Radar
--------------


1. (C) The Gabala radar station (also known as the Lyaki
large phased-array radar) was originally part of the USSR's
broader ballistic missile defense architecture; specifically,
it was one of nine major radar stations erected on Soviet
territory to detect and track the launch of ballistic
missiles. Construction of the 87-meter tall facility began
in 1978 and was finished in 1984. According to open sources,
the site was designed to track missiles emanating from the
southern hemisphere, including the Middle East and Indian
Ocean. The site was designed to relay acquired information
to two more sophisticated radars positioned outside Moscow,
where ballistic information was processed. According to open
source literature, there are currently 923 Russia military
service members and 234 Russian civilian personnel working at
the radar site.


2. (S) A U.S. military assessment confirms that the radar's
primary mission is to detect ballistic missiles from the
Middle East and Indian Ocean region, as well as conducting
space surveillance. The same study argues that Russia's
ballistic missile early warning system would have a
significant coverage gap without the radar. However, Moscow
is currently constructing a new Voronezh radar in southern
Russia, which may be completed in 2008 or 2009. According to
this assessment, Russia's need for the Gabala radar will
significantly decrease after this new radar becomes
operational, and Moscow will be unlikely to renew its lease
agreement with Baku. This assessment also notes
that Moscow provides $22 million annually for radar data and
operations and maintenance expenses, including $7
million for leasing the site, $5 million for power, and $10
million for communications, water, and other costs. (Note:
The assessment can be found on siprnet at
http://www.dia.smil.mil/intel/

europe/russia/dar/S-47-158-07-RAO3.html)

Azerbaijani-Russian Negotiations over Gabala
--------------


3. (C) The existence of the Gabala facility on Azerbaijani
territory has been a long-standing point of contention
between Azerbaijan and Russia. Whereas the former sought to
limit Russian military facilities on Azerbaijani soil after
independence in 1991, Moscow fought to preserve the
components of its Soviet-era missile defense architecture.
The failure of Azerbaijan and Russia to come to terms over
the status of the facility was exacerbated by the political
chaos in Azerbaijan surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh war and
the personal animosity between former Presidents Heydar
Aliyev and Boris Yeltsin.


4. (C) The two sides began negotiations over the status of
the Gabala radar station in 1997. The negotiations appeared
to have been significantly boosted by warmer personal
relations between former President Heydar Aliyev and
President Putin. In January 2002, during President Heydar
Aliyev's visit to Russia, Heydar Aliyev and Putin reached an
agreement on the status of the Gabala facility. Later in
2002, both countries' parliaments ratified an agreement for
Russia to lease the facility for 10 years, paying Azerbaijan
the $7 million leasing fee.


5. (C) Periodically, Azerbaijani government officials
publicly question whether the terms of the lease should be
reexamined. GOAJ officials appear to cite environmental or
other red-herrings to remind Moscow that the lease terms
could be reconsidered. Local contacts widely report that the
GOAJ sees the terms of the lease as a point of leverage with
Russia. This tactic also plays well with the Azerbaijani
public, which enjoys seeing Azerbaijan in a position of
strength vis-a-vis Russia.

January Dispute over the Lease Terms
--------------


6. (C) The most recent example of Azerbaijan questioning the
terms of the Gabala radar station lease was in the winter of
2006-2007. The immediate context of this incident was
Azerbaijan's refusal to accede to Russia's increased price

BAKU 00000722 002 OF 002


for gas exports to Azerbaijan. (Note: The GOAJ took several
unusually public swipes at Russia in this time period,
including Presidential Administration political chief Ali
Hasanov's public statement that Russia "did not act like a
gentleman" in gas negotiations. Reftel A.) In early
January, local press carried several stories that the GOAJ
was considering increasing the rent, triggering the local
political rumor mill into high gear that Azerbaijan was
flexing its muscles against Russia because of Moscow's gas
negotiating behavior. In a public episode of the GOAJ's
tactic, pro-government Parliamentary MP Zahid Oruc in January
warned that the terms of the lease would be reviewed in the
spring. Oruc stated that while the reasons for reviewing the
lease were purely economic, "Russia's energy policy makes it
necessary to reconsider the agreement."


7. (C) The GOAJ eventually sought to turn down the pressure.
Presidential Administration military aide Vahid Aliyev in
late January publicly pledged that the GOAJ would stick to
the terms of the lease through 2012 because "Azerbaijan
always honors its agreements." Presidential Foreign Policy
Advisor Novruz Mammadov subsequently confirmed in a private
conversation with the DCM that the GOAJ would not raise the
lease on the Gabala station in the immediate future, but Baku
might consider the lease's terms "in a year or so." (Reftel B)


8. (C) Since January, there has only been limited public
focus on Russia's leasing of the facility. Despite MP Oruc's
threat, the Parliament has not yet examined the terms of the
lease.


9. (C) Azerbaijan and Russia appear to have settled into a
position of claiming that neither side is advocating changes
to the lease. In early May, Russian Ambassador Vasiliy
Istratov stated that Russia has not received any new
proposals from Azerbaijan regarding the status of the
facility, while suggesting that Russia in the future may give
up the facility and build a comparable radar on Russian
territory. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov in late
May said Russia has not sent any requested changes to the
lease to the GOAJ. Mammadyarov acknowledged, however, that
he discussed the facility with Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov during Lavrov's May 21-22 visit to Baku. Mammadyarov
did not mention specific points of his discussion, only that
Lavrov and himself discussed Gabala. (Note: While in Baku,
Lavrov gave a speech at Baku State University in which he
referred to the destabilizing effects of U.S. missile defense
plans.)
LU