MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUNDER ON THE GABALA RADAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000722 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA/IR E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AJ RU IR SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUNDER ON THE GABALA RADAR STATION REF: A. BAKU 00219 ¶B. BAKU 00154 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b, d). Background on the Radar -------------- ¶1. (C) The Gabala radar station (also known as the Lyaki large phased-array radar) was originally part of the USSR's broader ballistic missile defense architecture; specifically, it was one of nine major radar stations erected on Soviet territory to detect and track the launch of ballistic missiles. Construction of the 87-meter tall facility began in 1978 and was finished in 1984. According to open sources, the site was designed to track missiles emanating from the southern hemisphere, including the Middle East and Indian Ocean. The site was designed to relay acquired information to two more sophisticated radars positioned outside Moscow, where ballistic information was processed. According to open source literature, there are currently 923 Russia military service members and 234 Russian civilian personnel working at the radar site. ¶2. (S) A U.S. military assessment confirms that the radar's primary mission is to detect ballistic missiles from the Middle East and Indian Ocean region, as well as conducting space surveillance. The same study argues that Russia's ballistic missile early warning system would have a significant coverage gap without the radar. However, Moscow is currently constructing a new Voronezh radar in southern Russia, which may be completed in 2008 or 2009. According to this assessment, Russia's need for the Gabala radar will significantly decrease after this new radar becomes operational, and Moscow will be unlikely to renew its lease agreement with Baku. This assessment also notes that Moscow provides $22 million annually for radar data and operations and maintenance expenses, including $7 million for leasing the site, $5 million for power, and $10 million for communications, water, and other costs. (Note: The assessment can be found on siprnet at http://www.dia.smil.mil/intel/ europe/russia/dar/S-47-158-07-RAO3.html) Azerbaijani-Russian Negotiations over Gabala -------------- ¶3. (C) The existence of the Gabala facility on Azerbaijani territory has been a long-standing point of contention between Azerbaijan and Russia. Whereas the former sought to �A;limit Russian military facilities on Azerbaijani soil after independence in 1991, Moscow fought to preserve the components of its Soviet-era missile defense architecture. The failure of Azerbaijan and Russia to come to terms over the status of the facility was exacerbated by the political chaos in Azerbaijan surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the personal animosity between former Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Boris Yeltsin. ¶4. (C) The two sides began negotiations over the status of the Gabala radar station in 1997. The negotiations appeared to have been significantly boosted by warmer personal relations between former President Heydar Aliyev and President Putin. In January 2002, during President Heydar Aliyev's visit to Russia, Heydar Aliyev and Putin reached an agreement on the status of the Gabala facility. Later in 2002, both countries' parliaments ratified an agreement for Russia to lease the facility for 10 years, paying Azerbaijan the $7 million leasing fee. ¶5. (C) Periodically, Azerbaijani government officials publicly question whether the terms of the lease should be reexamined. GOAJ officials appear to cite environmental or other red-herrings to remind Moscow that the lease terms could be reconsidered. Local contacts widely report that the GOAJ sees the terms of the lease as a point of leverage with Russia. This tactic also plays well with the Azerbaijani public, which enjoys seeing Azerbaijan in a position of strength vis-a-vis Russia. January Dispute over the Lease Terms -------------- ¶6. (C) The most recent example of Azerbaijan questioning the terms of the Gabala radar station lease was in the winter of 2006-2007. The immediate context of this incident was Azerbaijan's refusal to accede to Russia's increased price BAKU 00000722 002 OF 002 for gas exports to Azerbaijan. (Note: The GOAJ took several unusually public swipes at Russia in this time period, including Presidential Administration political chief Ali Hasanov's public statement that Russia "did not act like a gentleman" in gas negotiations. Reftel A.) In early January, local press carried several stories that the GOAJ was considering increasing the rent, triggering the local political rumor mill into high gear that Azerbaijan was flexing its muscles against Russia because of Moscow's gas negotiating behavior. In a public episode of the GOAJ's tactic, pro-government Parliamentary MP Zahid Oruc in January warned that the terms of the lease would be reviewed in the spring. Oruc stated that while the reasons for reviewing the lease were purely economic, "Russia's energy policy makes it necessary to reconsider the agreement." ¶7. (C) The GOAJ eventually sought to turn down the pressure. Presidential Administration military aide Vahid Aliyev in late January publicly pledged that the GOAJ would stick to the terms of the lease through 2012 because "Azerbaijan always honors its agreements." Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov subsequently confirmed in a private conversation with the DCM that the GOAJ would not raise the lease on the Gabala station in the immediate future, but Baku might consider the lease's terms "in a year or so." (Reftel B) ¶8. (C) Since January, there has only been limited public focus on Russia's leasing of the facility. Despite MP Oruc's threat, the Parliament has not yet examined the terms of the lease. ¶9. (C) Azerbaijan and Russia appear to have settled into a position of claiming that neither side is advocating changes to the lease. In early May, Russian Ambassador Vasiliy Istratov stated that Russia has not received any new proposals from Azerbaijan regarding the status of the facility, while suggesting that Russia in the future may give up the facility and build a comparable radar on Russian territory. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov in late May said Russia has not sent any requested changes to the lease to the GOAJ. Mammadyarov acknowledged, however, that he discussed the facility with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov during Lavrov's May 21-22 visit to Baku. Mammadyarov did not mention specific points of his discussion, only that Lavrov and himself discussed Gabala. (Note: While in Baku, Lavrov gave a speech at Baku State University in which he referred to the destabilizing effects of U.S. missile defense plans.) LU