IRANIAN ACADEMIC CALLS FOR U.S. TO FUND AZERI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000698 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017 TAGS: ECPS KDEM PGOV PREL PROP IR AJ SUBJECT: IRANIAN ACADEMIC CALLS FOR U.S. TO FUND AZERI NATIONAL MOVEMENT REF: BAKU 608 BAKU 00000698 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Speaking with Iran Watcher on May 30, Professor Gholam-Reza Sabri-Tabrizi reiterated his interest in establishing an Azeri-language satellite television station in support of efforts to bring about peaceful political change within the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) (reftel). Arguing that lasting change would only be possible by supporting efforts to change the IRI from within, Tabrizi said that he was opposed to a possible U.S. military attack on Iran. Instead, Tabrizi suggested that the U.S. provide financial support for the creation of an "Azeri National Movement" and accompanying new satellite television station. Tabrizi said that existing Azeri diaspora groups such as the World Azerbaijanis Congress (WAC) and South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM) were plagued by "personal animosities" and the negative influence of the Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ),which he alleged has better ties with the IRI than openly acknowledged. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Speaking with Iran Watcher on May 30, Professor Gholam-Reza Sabri-Tabrizi reiterated his interest in establishing an Azeri-language satellite television station in support of efforts to bring about peaceful political change within Iran (reftel). Pointing to recent protests by ethnic Azeris in Iran to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the 22 May 2006 ethnic Azeri demonstrations, Tabrizi said that the time was right for the U.S. to support efforts to bring about change in Iran from within. Saying that any military attack on Iran by the U.S. would be counter-productive as it would serve to unify and rally Iranians around the current regime, Tabrizi suggested that the U.S. provide financial support to the creation of an "Azeri National Movement," a key component of which would be a new satellite television station. ¶3. (C) In addition to funding the new station, Tabrizi also suggested that the U.S. provide assistance to Ahmad Obali's GunAz Television. Reportedly in regular contact with Obali, Tabrizi has appeared as a guest on Obali's station, most recently on May 20 when he reportedly made a 45 minute appeal to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Iranian nation to allow Azeris to use their mother tongue. According to Tabrizi, Obali had recently been at the White House for discussions about his station the week of 21-25 May. (Note - it was not clear with whom Obali had reportedly met.) To support efforts within Iran, Tabrizi suggested that the U.S. needed to finance trusted members of his organization to support the families of imprisoned Azeri activists such as Abbas Lisani. According to Tabrizi, his organization already provided such families with approximately USD 200 per month. Tabrizi said that this financial support was critical because it "lessened the leverage" Iran had on family members with which to try to coerce the behavior of the imprisoned. ¶4. (C) Concerning existing Azeri diaspora groups such as the World Azerbaijanis Congress (WAC) and South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM),Tabrizi said that they were plagued by "personal animosities" and the negative influence of the GOAJ. Suggesting that he might be "taking over" the WAC in the near future, Tabrizi said that the WAC was ineffective because it was "manipulated by Russians and the Azeri Government." Saying that the GOAJ had far better ties with Iran than openly acknowledged, Tabrizi also reported that the GOAJ was increasingly uncomfortable with his views, saying that he had been threatened by Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev after appearing on GunAz Television. As a result of this pressure, Tabrizi claimed that he had almost lost his office space for the Coordinating Committee of World Azerbaijanis, rescued only after the personal intervention of First Lady and Member of Parliament Mehriban Aliyeva (whose grandfather, according to Tabrizi, was an Iranian Azeri). ¶5. (C) Concerning Azerbaijan's foreign policy, Tabrizi characterized it as "going a zig-zag way" in order to keep both Iran and Russia happy. Saying that the GOAJ was steadily "maneuvering toward Russia," Tabrizi characterized Mehdiyev as "a Russian agent." Tabrizi said that he had no idea as to what the GOAJ expected from the U.S. ¶6. (C) Tabrizi said that while he had previously been critical of United States' Iran policy during the Shah era, he said that he was now convinced that the U.S. was the best BAKU 00000698 002.2 OF 002 hope for stability in the region. Continuing that he did not want to see the U.S. pushed out of the region by either Russia or the U.K., Tabrizi again made a case for U.S. support of efforts to bring about democratic change from within the IRI. Tabrizi noted that he had recently been approached by Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijani Arthur Lenk concerning the situation of ethnic Azeris in Iran, with a "representative from Tel Aviv" accompanying him on that visit. ¶7. (C) Comment: While Tabrizi is undoubtedly well connected within Azeri diaspora circles, it is unclear whether he has adequate support within these circles either to assume the helm of the WAC or persuade other groups to overcome their differences and join him in establishing an "Azeri National Movement." The efforts of Azeri diaspora groups to support change within Iran continue to be hampered by their inability to cooperate with each other, as well as financial constraints. Over the past six months, we have observed considerable interest on the part of Azeri diaspora groups in securing financial support from the U.S., including for new broadcasting initiatives. While contacts report that there is a great hunger within Iran for information from outside sources, it is not clear whether the messages Azeri diaspora groups might send (with some groups seeking greater cultural autonomy and others with an openly separatist agenda) would resonate with ethnic Azeris in Iran, as the overwhelming majority of ethnic Azeris seem to consider themselves to be Iranians first, ethnic Azeris second. As the Department weighs diaspora group's funding requests, we think it is important to also consider this question, as well as the potential for fallout within both Iran and Azerbaijan of U.S. funding for diaspora broadcasters, particularly those with separatist agendas. End Comment. DERSE