OVP DEPUTY ASSISTANT MEETING WITH AZERI FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000696 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG AJ TU SUBJECT: OVP DEPUTY ASSISTANT MEETING WITH AZERI FM MAMMADYAROV Classified By: AMBASSADOR DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Advisor Joseph Wood and Ambassador Derse met with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on May 30. Mammadyarov was relaxed and expansive about his recent discussions with new Turkmenistani President Gurbanguly Berdymukhmammedov, which he described as "amazingly good" and was very positive about the steps that Azerbaijan planned to take to implement improved Azerbaijani-Turkmenistani bilateral relations. He also covered Russia and Iran and touched on his views for Azerbaijan's future membership in NATO and the European Union, and media freedom issues. END SUMMARY. -------------- AZERBAIJAN-TURKMENISTAN BILATERAL RELATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) In a May 30 meeting with VPOTUS Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor Joseph Wood and Ambassador Derse, Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov said that Azerbaijan's ultimate goal of improving relations with Turkmenistan would be to solve the Caspian demarcation issue, and lay the foundation for a possible trans-Caspian pipeline. Mammadyarov said that Azerbaijan was taking a longer-term approach to relations with Turkmenistan and views finalization of the Caspian demarcation issue with Turkmenistan as being the only impediment to development of the Caspian as an energy transit corridor. He said that once demarcation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan can be finalized, then "everything can be done." He noted that Iran,s stance vis-a-vis the Caspian was unique, but that it would not affect trans-Caspian issues. On another matter, Mammadyarov said that he did not/not believe that exploitation of the Petronas field would be subject to a finalized a demarcation agreement with Turkmenistan. ¶3. (C) Mammadyarov said that the key to dealing with Berdymukhmammedov on energy issues would be to stress the importance of diversification to Turkmenistan,s independence and that when Mammadyarov himself presented the energy issue to Berdymukhmammedov in this way, he seemed receptive. Mammadyarov said that there was also excess natural gas storage area in Azerbaijan which could be used to hold Turkmen natural gas, something that Berdymukhmammedov was ;also aware of and seemed to possibly be interested in. Mammadyarov said that Berdymukhmammedov seemed to view Azerbaijan positively as a transit corridor, since in addition to pipeline capacity; Berdymukhmammedov also viewed the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as an additional source of transit. Mammadyarov seemed to be pleasantly surprised that Berdymukhmammedov's thinking on the energy transit issue had developed to this point. Mammadyarov said that he also believed that Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev was supportive of a trans-Caspian pipeline but that he would not "run in front of the issue." Mammadyarov believed that it would be easier to bring Turkmenistan along first and then it would be easier for Kazakhstan to follow. -------------- AZERBAIJAN'S STRATEGY -------------- ¶4. (C) Mammadyarov said that he expected a presidential decree would be signed very soon to create an Azerbaijan Turkmenistan intergovernmental commission. While the demarcation issue remained the biggest sticking point, Azerbaijan is content to leave this issue off the table for now in order to let relations develop, namely non-energy economic and trade ties, and educational and cultural programming. After these ties and a level of trust are established, the demarcation issue could then be addressed. Responding to a question from Wood, Mammadyarov urged the USG to take a low-key approach to Turkmenistan especially vis--vis the energy issue, placing an emphasis on diversification as a vision for the future. He recommended BAKU 00000696 002 OF 004 that the U.S. initially focus on educational and cultural issues first, before moving to major substantive issues. He noted that Berdymukhmammedov is a doctor by training, making issues of education, health and culture of interest to him. -------------- BERDYMUKHMAMMEDOV'S STYLE -------------- ¶5. (C) Wood then asked if Turkmenistan was viewing the bevy of foreign policy and regional issues before it from a geopolitical or economical viewpoint. Mammadyarov said that Berdymukhmammedov was definitely "using the oriental style" in his relationships with interlocutors, which he defined as requiring the person across the table to "read between the lines." He said that Berdymukhmammedov's first year would be focused on showing that he is "out of the shadow of Turkmenbashi." -------------- COGS 2007 -------------- ¶6. (C) In regard to the upcoming Caspian Oil and Gas Show (COGS) to be held in Baku on June 5-8, Mammadyarov said that there were a number of central and southeastern European countries (and companies) that would be sending important delegations, both for the show itself and to undertake negotiations with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). He noted that Greece, Italy, Hungary and Austria would have important delegations, with Greece sending the largest one, and that they would engage in negotiations with SOCAR after COGS regarding the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector (TGI). -------------- TURKEY AND TRANSIT -------------- ¶7. (C) Mammadyarov said Azerbaijan and Turkey had agreed to open discussions on a gas transit agreement at COGS, and that a letter had already been sent from Prime Minister Rasizade,s office to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Mammadyarov somewhat sheepishly admitted that the Azerbaijani side had not yet decided who would be the chief negotiator but that a decision would be made by the time of COGS. He said that based on his recent discussions with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul during the week of May 21, that Gul was not the main driver of Turkey,s policy on gas transit. He noted that Turkish Energy Minister Helmi Guler was trying to "play with the case" and that he "wanted to create another Gazprom" in which Turkey could buy Azerbaijani gas (or anyone's gas) and resell for multiple times higher. Unrelated to energy, Mammadyarov said that Gul was very concerned about the political situation in Turkey and that Gul said that the situation was "very shaky." Mammadyarov was somewhat amused that Turkey's political future was hinging on one woman's wearing of a scarf, though he clearly understood the deeper importance. -------------- RUSSIA, IRAN, AND MORE SANCTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Mammadyarov said that during his May 21-22 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Baku, Lavrov told him that Russia was not yet ready for another (third) round of sanctions on Iran. However, it was noted that this discussion took place before the most recent IAEA report which contained information that the Iran nuclear program continues apace. Mammadyarov noted that Russia is putting "a broad agenda on the table" and that its support for or against UNSC sanctions on Iran was not necessarily related to if they think that more sanctions were warranted or not. Briefly touching on Russia energy issues, he said that the Russians wanted to "be part of Nabucco" though he did not elaborate on this point. BAKU 00000696 003 OF 004 ¶9. (C) In regard to missile defense, the Ambassador made the point that a recent press report that the U.S. and Russia had, or would, enter into some kind of joint agreement over the Qabala radar station was not correct. Mammadyarov said that Lavrov himself had told him that the U.S. had not rained Qalaba with Russia and that, since Qabala was on Azerbaijani territory that the Russians would not be able to make any agreements without involving Azerbaijan anyway. Mammadyarov seemed to accept both Lavrov's and the Ambassador's explanations. ¶10. (C) Mammadyarov indicated that Russia's position on the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty was unclear. Mammadyarov said that the upcoming visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Vienna would be very important, but he noted that Russia's statement about possibly withdrawing from the CFE treaty was likely a case of Russia "putting out public feelers". Mammadyarov expressed his skepticism about CFE saying that in many cases it is a matter of "who suffered more vs. who achieved something." ¶11. (C) In regard to Iran, Mammadyarov said that Iran's unwillingness to change or adapt to international pressure is the result of stubbornness on the part of Iranian President Makhmud Ahmedi-Nejad. Mammadyarov believes that Ahmedi-Nejad is "comfortable in his position" and that "external threats only strengthen his position." He said that Azerbaijan "does not want to be sandwiched between two nuclear powers." Mammadyarov gave his personal assessment that Libya's decision to give up its WMD program was likely the result of Muhmar Qadaffi's son persuading his father that it would be in Libya's best interest. Mammadyarov said that based on his time spent as Azerbaijani Ambassador to Italy, where Qadaffi's son was also living at the time, that the son was fairly westernized and wanted to be able to travel and live more freely. -------------- POST-PUTIN RUSSIA -------------- ¶12. (C) Mammadyarov said that he fully expected Russian President Putin to leave office in 2008, but he also expected that Putin would continue to wield significant influence. He said that Putin had unequivocally said that he would not seek a third term and that it was not in his character to back off from such a statement. He speculated that Putin would create some kind of "advisory council" or similar structure in which he would be able to sway public opinion on issues of importance, and he noted that he thought that Putin would still "run the country as he saw fit." -------------- NATO AND THE EU -------------- ¶13. (C) Wood asked Mammadyarov where he wanted Azerbaijan to be in five years regarding NATO and the EU. Mammadyarov replied that he hoped that Azerbaijan would be "a member of NATO and the EU". Mammadyarov said that currently, Azerbaijan was in the "grey zone" in terms of NATO. While it would ultimately be Azerbaijan's goal to be "part of NATO" (he noted that it is official Azerbaijani government policy in general to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures); Mammadyarov said that should Azerbaijan ever "openly state their strong desire to be a NATO member," Russia would "never allow Nagorno-Karabakh to be returned to Azerbaijan." The "full force of the Russian government would work against this," Mammadyarov said. ¶14. (C) Mammadyarov also expressed his concern that the U.S. Congress "would never vote to let Azerbaijan into NATO." Mammadyarov said that it remains important for Azerbaijan to take a gradual approach, adding that he envisioned Azerbaijan in NATO only after the return of NK and some level of integration had taken place. He also said that it would be BAKU 00000696 004 OF 004 important for Armenia to "participate" as well and perhaps both should move together on NATO. He said that these approaches would be more important than making bold statements in the media now about joining NATO and that this would do little more than provoke Russia and Iran. Mammadyarov also noted there remain many internal structural reforms that need to take place within Azerbaijan, notably in the Ministry of Defense. -------------- JOURNALISTS AND DOMESTIC REFORM ISSUES -------------- ¶15. (C) The Ambassador engaged Mammadyarov on the issue of media freedom and democratic reform, given his position as co-chair of the bilateral "democracy dialogue". The Ambassador gave a brief readout of her meeting earlier in the day with Ramiz Mekhtiyev. She noted that she had requested a meeting with Mehtiyev on behalf of several concerned diplomatic colleagues and asked Mammadyarov to urge Mekhtiyev to agree. Mammadyarov said that he would. When the Ambassador raised the issue of possibly declaring a "moratorium" on prosecution of journalists, Mammadyarov said that he did not believe that this was possible, though it may be possible to reduce the sentence time. He then said that even he and Finance Minister Samir Sharifov had been written about, apparently in derogatory terms, in a newspaper recently, and Mammadyarov seems to take offense to this. DERSE