PRESIDENT ALIYEV,S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR REIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000584 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG MARR AMGT ABLD CASC AJ SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV,S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR REIEWS REGIONAL ISSUES, DEMOCRATIC REFORM REF: BAKU 00545 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov flagged President Aliyev's planned attendance at the upcoming energy summit in Poland as a "very important" step to reassure Europe. The GOAJ hopes for progress in bilateral relations with Turkmenistan in 2007, although Baku is pursuing a "step-by-step strategy" with Ashgabat. On Iran, Mammadov said Tehran has been pressuring Baku every month for the past several months to agree to an official visit to Baku, and that Baku may have to agree to a September visit. Mammadov acknowledged that Presidential Chief of State Ramiz Mehdiyev played a role in organizing the March opening of a CIS democracy organization and that the organization would have a hand in monitoring the 2008 presidential election. On the June 18-19 GUAM summit, Mammadov said the GOAJ seeks to strengthen the organization, but he also acknowledged the organization's lack of coherence. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: On domestic dynamics, Mammadov proposed that the Ambassador and other Western Ambassadors engage Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev on democracy, human rights, and processes related to the presidential election. Mammadov emphasized that it is very important "to explain all processes" to Mehdiyev, and that western countries need to start talking about election cooperation now. Mammadov said it is "my personal interest" to further the process of Azerbaijan's pro-western orientation, but "I cannot influence all of the negative processes that I see." Mammadov said some GOAJ officials do not believe it is in Azerbaijan's interest to join the WTO, but acknowledged the serious nature of Azerbaijan's corruption problems, suggesting there could be an eventual "collapse" if corruption is left unattended. End Summary. Advancing the Bilateral Security Dialogue -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador began her May 4 meeting with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov by stating that since the problem regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh language in the Armenia section of the Human Rights Report has been resolved, the USG looks forward to rescheduling the bilateral security dialogue in the near future. Mammadov said that there is "no problem" now, but "we did not understand the reason for the (original) change." Regional and Energy Developments -------------- ¶4. (C) Mammadov noted that President Aliyev's attendance at the upcoming energy summit in Poland is "very important" because the other three attending Presidents -- from Poland, Georgia, and Ukraine -- all need Azerbaijani oil and gas. Mammadov said Putin will "not be happy" that President Aliyev is going because the GOAJ is sending an important signal to Europe by attending the meeting. Mammadov observed that Kazakh President Nazarbayev was invited, but he made his attendance conditional on whether Putin would attend. ¶5. (C) Regarding Turkmenistan, Mammadov was optimistic that the GOAJ could "achieve some results" in 2007. Caspian delimitation talks are going "normally," according to Mammadov; the GOAJ is still trying to arrange a visit by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov to Ashgabat. Mammadov noted, however, that the GOAJ is not following a strategy of pressuring Ashgabat on a trans-Caspian pipeline. Instead, the GOAJ is pursuing a "step-by-step strategy" on this issue. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the status of a gas transit agreement with Turkey. Mammadov said "I cannot respond concretely," but in general, believes there is no problem in moving toward an accord. ¶7. (C) On Iran, the Ambassador raised Minister of Economic Development Heydar Babayev's recent statements on expanding economic relations with Iran. The Ambassador noted that it was very important for Azerbaijan to comply with UN attempts to limit Iran's nuclear program. Mammadov acknowledged the Ambassador's point, but said that Tehran has been pressuring Baku for months to schedule an official visit to Azerbaijan. Mammadov explained that the Azerbaijani Ambassador in Tehran has received Iranian proposals for a visit by Ahmadinejad to Baku every month. The GOAJ has found pretexts to refuse these requests, but "it is very difficult" to continue denying these requests and there may be a visit in September. BAKU 00000584 002 OF 004 ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked Mammadov for background about recent reports of several new Russian institutions in Azerbaijan, especially the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) International Institute for the Monitoring of the Development of Democracy and Observance of Electoral Rights. (Note: Per reftel, this CIS institution was opened in March by visiting Russian Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov. We have been anticipating that this CIS institutions will play an election monitoring role in the September 2008 Presiential election.) Mammadov was remarkably candi on this issue, stating that Mehdiyev was instruental in organizing this structure, which Mehdiyev believes "could be helpful" for the presidential election. Regarding Russia, the Ambassador confirmed to Mammadov that press reports alleging US-Russian discussions about the Gabala radar station's incorporation into a missile defense architecture were entirely false. ¶9. (C) Regarding Belarusian President Lukashenko's May 1-3 visit to Baku, the Ambassador observed that this visit is raising concern in Washington and detracts from Azerbaijan's reformist image. Mammadov indicated the visit was partly reciprocal and personal in nature as President Aliyev visited Belarus in October 2006. Mammadov said that during President Aliyev's October 2006 visit to Minsk, Lukashenko pledged to assist Azerbaijan in "some areas" for an "inexpensive price." (Note: In October 2006, Belarus promised to create a tractor factory in Azerbaijan, as well as supply farm equipment to Baku.) GUAM Summit Preview -------------- ¶10. (C) Mammadov said the GOAJ wants to strengthen GUAM during the June 18-19 GUAM summit in Baku. Mammadov highlighted Ukraine's domestic political situation as a key constraint on the organization's coherence. Mammadov noted three problems regarding the upcoming summit: the Ukrainian Duma has not ratified several key GUAM documents, Ukrainian President Yushchenko's political future is unclear, and Moldovan President Voronin probably will not come. Mammadov confirmed that Yushchenko and Saakashvili will attend. Mammadov said a key GOAJ priority within GUAM is gaining support for an UNGA resolution on the protracted conflicts. Mammadov observed that we are "seeing if the four member countries are together on this and other issues," and that the organization can serve as a hedge against Russia's regional influence. ¶11. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the GOAJ's vision for GUAM, Mammadov highlighted several areas. First, Azerbaijan wants good political coordination and dialogue among GUAM members. Second, the GOAJ wants to bolster economic cooperation among members. Mammadov argued that the Soviet-era trend of ineffective multilateral organizations -- as seen in the CIS -- has "persisted" in GUAM. Finally, the GOAJ wants to enhance cooperation within GUAM on military and other unspecified areas. Mammadov noted that previous projects suggested and funded by the USG have not succeeded. Mammadov stated, however, that all GUAM members are still young countries and the GOAJ still wants to keep trying to bolster the GUAM framework. Nagorno-Karabakh Tidbits -------------- ¶12. (C) Regarding a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict, Mammadov said it is important to have yearly "new elements or initiatives" to keep the process alive. Mammadov said that Russia and France perceive a lack of progress toward a settlement as being in their interests. Without clear context, Mammadov also said it is "not possible" for there to be an agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. (Note: It is unclear if Mammadov's skepticism was in reference to a particular sticking point or the entire process.) Mehdiyev's Democracy Conference -------------- ¶13. (C) Mammadov said the GOAJ would be grateful for Embassy assistance in finding a USG speaker for Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev's May 23 Democracy Conference in light of the Ambassador's inability to attend. Mammadov shared a draft copy of the conference agenda with the Ambassador, noting that the GOAJ had invited the British, Russian, and U.S. Ambassadors to deliver speeches during the conference. Mammadov observed that several Azerbaijani MP's and regional BAKU 00000584 003 OF 004 academics have also been invited, including locally-respected political commentator Rasim Musabayov. Mammadov noted that the conference would be a good forum for discussing a variety of democratic dynamics within the region. New Forum with Mehdiyev -------------- ¶14. (C) Mammadov observed that there is a need "to organize some counterbalance" in light of President Aliyev's recent meetings with Presidents Lukashenko and Putin. Mammadov emphasized that it is very important "to explain all processes" to Mehdiyev, specifically to show the attitude of the West toward a variety of domestic political issues for which Mehdiyev is responsible. Mammadov suggested the Ambassador, other Western ambassadors, and OSCE representatives arrange a meeting with Mehdiyev "to conserve the state of relations" between Azerbaijan and the West and to prepare for the October 2008 election . Mammadov proposed that the discussion focus on democracy, human rights, and processes related to the presidential election, and he suggested May 14-17 as potential dates. Mammadov underscored that western countries need to start talking about election cooperation now, not immediately before the election. ¶15. (C) The Ambassador welcomed Mammadov's suggestion and pledged to follow up with her colleagues to arrange a meeting with Mehdiyev. The Ambassador observed that it was particularly important to focus on press freedom at this time, as increasing problems here can easily undercut Azerbaijan's image internationally. The Ambassador passed Mammadov a copy of her May 3 World Press Freedom Day speech, while noting the recent decision to grant ANS a broadcasting license for six years was a positive step. Mammadov underscored the importance of being able to deliver tough messages "as a friend." (NOTE: The Ambassador conveyed Mammadov,s comments to Ambassadors from the OSCE, Council of Europe, UK, Norway and Germany (EU Presidency). All agreed that a joint approach to Mehdiyev urging concrete steps to improve Azerbaijan,s media climate could be effective. We hope to make this joint approach this week.) ¶16. (C) Mammadov stated that the main direction of our policy must be clear, implying the importance of Azerbaijan's pro-western foreign policy. Doing his best to not directly criticize Mehdiyev, Mammadov said it is "my personal interest" to further the process of Azerbaijan's pro-western orientation, but "I cannot influence all of the negative processes that I see." Mammadov explained that his portfolio only covers Azerbaijan's foreign relations and not its domestic policies. Mammadov counseled that a meeting of the western Ambassadors and Mehdiyev would be valuable because Mehdiyev would have to report the results to President Aliyev. Mammadov also acknowledged that perceptions matter and it can be bad for President Aliyev to be meeting with illiberal statesmen. The Ambassador affirmed this point, commenting that because Azerbaijan is an increasingly important country, many western officials are watching Azerbaijan's internal developments closely. WTO Accession -------------- ¶17. (C) The Ambassador raised the disturbing trend of rising corruption within Azerbaijan's business climate. The Ambassador noted that Azerbaijan's business climate has worsened over the last year because of increasing corruption. Many American companies are considering leaving Azerbaijan, and this trend is hurting Azerbaijan's international image. The Ambassador suggested that WTO accession could help reverse this image problem. ¶18. (C) Mammadov noted that he does not work on WTO-related issues, but he indicated that GOAJ officials do not agree on the need to join the WTO. Mammadov said "some circles" in the GOAJ are angry about the USG's public message on Azerbaijan joining the WTO. Mammadov underscored the need to address these issues in a "friendly, private" setting. Mammadov observed that some GOAJ officials argue that joining the WTO will undercut Azerbaijan's domestic productivity. The Ambassador countered that this argument does not hold water and is intended to protect some elites' monopolies. The Ambassador said she wants to ensure that President Aliyev gets the message that rising corruption is tarnishing Azerbaijan's image. ¶19. (C) Mammadov said he did not know if all GOAJ ministers understand how bad corruption is for Azerbaijan's image abroad. Mammadov cryptically remarked that I know this is BAKU 00000584 004 OF 004 "not the eternal way" and that this situation cannot continue for ever. He suggested there could be an eventual "collapse" if Azerbaijan does not address its corruption problem. NEC --- ¶20. (C) The Ambassador said the USG is grateful for the GOAJ's assistance in finding a suitable site for a New Embassy Compound and that Presidential Aide Ali Asadov has assisted the USG in this effort. Mammadov commented that he was happy to hear this report and hoped that all issues would be resolved in the near future. Pending Adoptions -------------- ¶21. (U) The Ambassador raised the issue of pending adoption cases. As noted in previous meetings, the Ambassador reiterated that the USG needs the GOAJ's assistance in moving these cases forward. Comment -------------- ¶22. (C) Mammadov's has been a strong advocate of greater engagement with the West -- and particularly the United States -- and is one of the few officials in the Presidential Apparat who has consistently offered this sort of candid, behind-the-scenes advice on how best to promote further reform. We will follow up on his suggested approach to engage Mehdiyev with Western colleagues, as well as bilaterally, on democracy, human rights and anti-corruption issues. DERSE