AZERBAIJANI BACKLASH AGAINST US WORDING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000504 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2027 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS PHUM PINR MARR MOPS AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI BACKLASH AGAINST US WORDING ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT UNABATING REF: BAKU 00494 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 12-14. ¶2. (C) Summary: Post-publication revisions to Nagorno-Karabakh language in the 2006 Armenia Human Rights Report continue to ignite strong, negative reaction from the Azerbaijani Government and public. We are beginning to see a broader-based reaction from Azerbaijani society and media focusing on two questions: "Why did the USG make the language change?" and "Is the US a trustworthy partner for Azerbaijan?" In spite of EUR DAS Bryza's April 23 media appearances, the level of criticism from the government and society shows no signs of abating. We continue to believe that we need to take additional, urgent steps to address the situation, which if not rectified soon, could significantly erode our ability to advance our security, energy and reform goals in Azerbaijan. Given the personal nature of President Aliyev's expressed sense of betrayal on this issue, as well as the personal nature of politics in Azerbaijan, our approach must include both public and private measures. In addition to issuing a definitive public statement of our policy (reftel),a senior-level phone call to Aliyev, followed by a senior-level visit to Baku, would help to address a damaging setback in the bilateral relationship. End summary. GOAJ Officials' Concerns not Abating -------------- ¶3. (C) The government's public criticism of the USG decision is not fading. Ali Hasanov, chief of the Presidential Administration's Political Affairs Department, criticized the US on ANS television's widely viewed Point of View program. Hasanov questioned the very foundation of our bilateral relationship, stating, "If a group of Armenians manage the foreign policy of the USA, we cannot have strategic cooperation with this country." ¶4. (C) As reported septel, Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov reiterated Azerbaijani Ambassador Yashar Aliyev's request to EUR DAS Bryza that the USG issue a public statement with a "very clear indication that the US recognizes NK as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan." Azimov underscored that this has "always been understood between the US and Azerbaijan, and is not a subject for compromise language." He emphasized that in so stating, the USG is not undertaking any new obligations, but simply clearly reaffirming long-standing US policy. Azimov made similar comments in a television appearance. ¶5. (C) On April 23, Presidential Foreign Policy Department officer Hasan Mammadzada shared his thoughts regarding the incident with us. (Note: Mammadzada works directly for Novruz Mammadov, who is President Aliyev's Foreign Policy Advisor.) Mammadzada said this "unfortunate incident" leaves the Azerbaijani Government wondering and "we are trying to understand why the change was made." Mammadzada underscored that the incident has the potential to undercut our strong bilateral cooperation in many areas. Mammadzada also repeated Ambassador Yashar Aliyev's April 23 request to EUR DAS Bryza for an official USG statement that the U.S. recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan and expressing US concern over the continuing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory. Media Attention Focused on the HRR -------------- ¶6. (C) The crisis continues to reverberate in the Azerbaijani media. Nearly all newspapers led with headlines on April 24 detailing the continuing GOAJ protests and potential negative impact on bilateral relations. One newspaper ran the headline that "a Cold War has begun" between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Senior GOAJ officials also continue to speak out against the USG's "pro-Armenian bias." As noted above, appearing on ANS's popular "Point of View" program on April 23, Presidential advisor Ali Hasanov said that Azerbaijan could not have strategic cooperation with a country whose foreign policy is being managed by Armenians. DAS Bryza's BBC, VOA, and Lider TV interviews received light BAKU 00000504 002 OF 003 coverage and do not appear to have calmed public opinion. (Note: We expect these interviews to receive broader coverage tonight, and we will report reaction futher tomorrow. However, the language change in the HRR has reinforced the perception by some Azerbaijanis that the US favors Armenia and is not an honest broker in the OSCE Minsk Group process. The interviews do not appear to have definitively addressed Azerbaijani concerns.) DFM Araz Azimov has also been widely quoted on television today saying that Washington need not apologize, it should simply correct a position which runs counter to its own stated policies. Local Contacts Asking, "Is the US Trustworthy?" -------------- -- ¶7. (C) A range of non-government contacts from a spectrum of political views have expressed their frustration over the language change. Contacts' concerns have repeatedly focused on two central questions: "Why did the USG make the language change?" and "Is the US a trustworthy partner for Azerbaijan?" ¶8. (C) Ramin Isayev, a young, progressive, US-educated leader ofthe Euro-Atlantic Center, which lobbies for Azerbaijan's increased integration into NATO, told us the language change was "absolutely unexpected" and had the potential for short- and long-term consequences to the relationship. When asked how Azerbaijanis are responding to the news, Isayev said 80 percent of his contacts are focusing on the issue of "whether the US is trustworthy." Isayev said the story will fade from the headlines, but he advised that the USG should focus on the long-term bilateral consequences of key Azerbaijani government contacts questioning the United States' ability to be a reliable partner for Azerbaijan. ¶9. (C) Other regular Embassy interlocutors, who are academics and political commentators, Leyla Aliyeva, Dadash Aliyev, Elhan Mehtiyev, and Shahin Rzayev -- also highlighted the potential long-term impact to the relationship. Dadash Aliyev noted that this incident will play into the hands of those within the GOAJ and those normal citizens who do not support Azerbaijan's close relations with the US. Leyla Aliyeva -- an independent Western-educated academic -- told us that the issue undercuts the very idea of Azerbaijan and the USG sharing a "strategic" partnership. What's at stake -------------- ¶10. (C) As reftel noted, the GOAJ's continuing, visceral reaction to the post-publication changes in the NK language is driven in large part by President Aliyev's strong sense of personal betrayal. In this highly centralized political system, good relations with Aliyev are key to everything. We have made steady progress on our key interests -- security, energy, and reform -- because of a strong personal relationship with President Aliyev, and his growing confidence in the US as a strategic partner which he can trust. This is particularly important on NK, the top issue for Aliyev. Trust of the US as a reliable parnter is, we believe, the foundation we need to press Aliyev to take difficult economic and political reforms and closer security cooperation. Continued progress in all of these areas -- and particularly the sensitive security and reform issues -- depends on President Aliyev's continued trust of the United States. ¶11. (C) Those within the GOAJ who do not favor close ties with the United States are using this episode to sow doubt in President Aliyev's mind as to the reliability of the United States as a strategic partner and honest broker in the NK peace process. Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov has underscored to the Ambassador that the USG's apparent double standard on NK opens the door to pressure from both south and north for Aliyev to distance Baku from Washington. Mehman Aliyev, the director Turan news agency, raised this point with us on April 23, noting that many GOAJ officials' personal interests (particularly those with strong business and personal ties to Russia) are not advanced by Azerbaijan maintaining close ties with the US. At a time when Azerbaijan could play a key role in countering Russia's energy supply monopolies and helping the international community build pressure on Iran, we can ill afford to allow BAKU 00000504 003 OF 003 the anti-US elements within the Azerbaijani Government to gain the upper hand. Action Request -------------- ¶12. (C) Considering the escalating drumbeat in the press and society, which is eroding our image as a reliable partner, we maintain that time is of the essence in taking additional steps to address this issue. As reported reftel, we believe we need immediate, decisive steps to stem the damage this incident is causing to the bilateral relationship. Given the highly personal nature of President Aliyev's views on this subject, our strategy needs to include both public and private measures. We appreciate DAS Bryza's extraordinary effort on media outreach, but his April 23 interviews do not appear to have stemmed the public outcry. We also appreciate DAS Bryza's work with the two Foreign Ministers to devise appropriate language that could be used in a statement from the podium to clarify the USG position on NK. Such a statement is essential. In the meantime, the Embassy and the Ambassador face continued intense media questioning. We have used the limited points provided to date; unless instructed otherwise by the Department, we will add the following points going forward: - We apologize for the confusion created by the recent changes made to the Human Rights Report. - There has been absolutely no change in US policy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. - The United States has reaffirmed its support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty on numerous occasions, including in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884 during the active phase of the conflict. You can find each of these resolutions in their entirety on the U.S. Department of State website. - We continue to fully recognize and support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, including Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories. - As we said in the Azerbaijani section of our 2006 Human Rights Report, "Armenia continues to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories." - As one of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, the United States remains an honest, objective broker in the ongoing efforts to find a peaceful settlement to this conflict. ¶13. (C) As recommended reftel, we also urge a senior USG official call President Aliyev as soon as possible to convey our understanding of the sensitivity of this issue, our recognition of Azerbaijan's position on NK, explain what happened and why, and assure him that we are working on an appropriate solution. The call should also reaffirm our support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, including NK and the Occupied Territories, and our continuing commitment to finding a solution acceptable to both sides through the Minsk Group peace process. We believe that as a next step, we should also consider a senior-level visit to Baku as soon as feasible, in order to assure Aliyev of the importance we attach to our partnership with Azerbaijan. ¶14. (C) The second key question being asked is "why the change?" We would appreciate Washington's guidance on what to say publicly and privately in response. DERSE