PRESIDENT ALIYEV'S VIEWS AND SUGGESTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000465

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PASS TO DASD FATA, TONY ALDWELL, AND JON CHICKY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV'S VIEWS AND SUGGESTED
DELIVERABLES FOR THE APRIL 23 USG-GOAJ BILATERAL SECURITY
DIALOGUE

REF: A. BAKU 00280

B. BAKU 00422

C. BAKU 01837

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. In recent meetings with the Ambassador,
President Aliyev, Presidential Apparat Chief Ramiz
Mehdiyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Araz Azimov have reiterated the importance of the
bilateral security dialogue as a key forum for reflecting our
security cooperation. The GOAJ also seeks the establishment
of a follow-up implementation mechanism to ensure the
dialogue produces results. President Aliyev
raised the importance of our border security cooperation and
was open to discussing a US Customs and Border
Protection proposal for technical assistance. He welcomed
the agenda items on energy infrastructure protection, NATO,
and defense sector reform. He noted his interest in a
potential TEP program as a sign of USG partnership, and said
it is "not excluded, not at all," that TEP-trained troops
would serve in Iraq or Afghanistan, but said that as in
Georgia's case, there should be "no direct link." Embassy
suggests the Department consider establishing regular DVCs by
the co-Chairs to monitor progress on agreed next steps as an
implementation mechanism. We also strongly recommend that
the US and Azerbaijan issue a joint statement at the
conclusion of the dialogue on April 23, as a "visible sign"
of US interest in Azerbaijan's security, as requested by
President Aliyev to former DOD A/S Rodman (Reftel A). Embassy
also proposes several specific objectives and deliverables
for the Department's consideration. End Summary.


2. (C) On the eve of the tenth annual April 23 bilatral
security dialogue, senior GOAJ officials haveexpressed
their strong interest in the forum, relecting our growing
level of cooperation. President Aliyev met with the
Ambassador on April 16 to discuss the dialogue and underscore
his attention to the forum (septel). Presidential Apparat
Chief Ramiz Mehdiyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and
Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov separately have
emphasized the importance of this year's dialogue. Azimov
points out that the GOAJ is sending the highest-level and
most representative delegation it has ever sent, with all the
power ministries, including MOD, represented, most at the
deputy minister level. Against the backdrop of broader USG
efforts to invigorate and elevate our bilateral relationship,
we believe this year's security dialogue is the opportunity
to engage more deeply with the GOAJ on our
mutual security interests.

President Aliyev Keenly Interested in Talks
--------------


3. (C) On April 16, the Ambassador met with President Aliyev
at Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev's suggestion to
discuss the Security Dialogue. The President reviewed the
agenda for the talks with approval, leading with his deep
concern about both of Azerbaijan's borders -- "we need to do
a lot both north and south." The GOAJ has designated
significant funding to make major investments in border
security and is interested in "buying more equipment for
border infrastructure" from the US. The State Border Service
would be prepared to outline needs at the talks.
Aliyev said that the funding increase was motivated in part
by the fact that "more and more Iranians are crossing the
border and moving in" to Azerbaijan and this is expected to
continue.


4. (C) The Ambassador told the President that the US Customs
and Border Protection service had visited Azerbaijan in
January and followed up with a proposal for technical
assistance on a reimbursable basis to strengthen Azerbaijan's
customs service, including in its security function, which
she had sent to him recently and which she hoped would be
discussed at the Security Dialogue. Aliyev said he had not
seen the letter yet, but agreed that Customs indeed plays a
key role in border security and that discussion of the
proposal at the security dialogue would be of interest. In a
separate conversation, the Ambassador alerted Deputy Foreign
Minister Azimov to the proposal and he also expressed
interest. (COMMENT: We hope that CBP will be able to
discuss its proposal with specific focus on how it will help
strengthen customs role in border security at the April 23

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talks. END COMMENT)


5. (C) Similarly, Aliyev said, the GOAJ is interested in
bolstering its abilities to protect critical energy
infrastructure. The Presidential Security Service is
responsible for protecting the pipelines, BTC and BTE, Aliyev
said. He seemed uncertain, however, who was in the lead with
respect to the security of Azerbaijan's oil platforms and
Sangachal terminal. MOD, the Border Guards and the Navy,
each play some role, he noted. He also noted with
appreciation USG assistance in training naval commandos.
(COMMENT: BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader has told
Embassy interlocutors that Azerbaijan's platforms and the
Sangachal terminal are enormously vulnerable. Two hand
grenades thrown into the Sangachal terminal could put it out
of business, and a small motorboat could bring down an oil
platform, in Schrader's view. Septel reports further
observations on energy infrastructure security. END COMMENT)


6. (C) Noting the agenda item on a train and equip program,
Aliyev commented "Ah! This is new." The Ambassador explained
that it was on the agenda because he had raised TEP with
former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld last year and the USG
had been considering if/how we can respond, given
acknowledged constraints. He recalled that he had raised it
with Secretary Rumsfeld because Georgian President
Saakashvili had told him it was a very useful program,
especially for facilitating defense reform, that has been
ongoing in Georgia for 7-8 years. The Ambassador noted the
USG was not yet in a position to offer a TEP, but that it
appears that if we will be, it would be on the basis that
those trained would be deployed to Afghanistan. Aliyev
replied that that would be "something different than what was
offered to Georgia...in the case of Georgia there was no link
to Afghanistan, to outside projects...it can be discussed, I
don,t mind, but there should not be a direct link. They
(troops trained) can go to global hot spots, like Iraq and
Aghanistan, it is not excluded, not at all, but should not be
directly linked. We want it (a TEP) for general purposes, as
a sign of our partnership." The Ambassador asked whether
given his view we should discuss it at the Security Dialogue.
Aliyev said yes.


7. (C) The President welcomed the agenda item on NATO and
noted the importance of defense sector reform. The
Ambassador commented that our ability to assist Azerbaijan in
this regard is hampered by restricted access to the
Ministry of Defense, funneled through one senior officer, and
that underfunding of the Navy also impacts maritime
security efforts. She told Aliyev that no Ministry of
Defense representative planned to attend the talks from
Baku. The President laughed and commented that Defense
Minister Abiyev and Deputy Foreign Minster Azimov do not
like each other, and that is why MOD was reticent. He said
it is important that MOD attend and that he would instruct
them to do so. (COMMENT: MOD's General Najafov is now
included in the GOAJ delegation. END COMMENT)

Overarching Suggestions
--------------


8. (C) Given Aliyev,s keen interest in the talks and desire
that they produce results that reflect the growing,
changing nature of our bilateral relationship, and USG
support for Azerbaijan's independence and security in the
face of regional pressures, we believe it is vital that the
April 23 talks result in practical deliverables, the
establishment of an appropriate follow-up mechanism, and
receive appropriate public profile. Embassy provides the
following suggestions for the Department's consideration.


A. Establish regular DVCs for the co-Chairs as a Follow-Up
Mechanism: The USG and the GOAJ agree that a missing aspect
of previous consultations was the lack of a clear follow-up
and implementation mechanism. Both sides have
expressed their interest in making the security dialogue a
productive results-oriented forum. Azimov told the
Ambassador on April 12 that the GOAJ strongly supports
establishing some form of an implementation mechanism (Reftel
B). Embassy proposes that a key result of the April 23
dialogue should be creating a follow-up mechanism.
Specifically, Embassy proposes establishing quarterly DVCs
for the bilateral security dialogue chairs to discuss the
status of agreed upon action items. Working level officials

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would take forward agreed action items with the aim of
reporting to the regular DVC's of the co-chairs.


B. Issue a Joint Press Statement: MFA and we agree that we
should issue a joint press statement at the conclusion of the
April 23 dialogue, marking the tenth anniversary of our
annual consultations on security and its strengthening this
year. Such a statement would address President Aliyev's
February request to former Department of Defense A/S Peter
Rodman for, and A/S Rodman's offer to provide, "more public
signs" from the USG of our support for Azerbaijan's
independence and security in the face of regional pressures
(Reftel A). (Note: Embassy emailed Azimov's specific
suggested themes to Department on April 17. We agree with
these suggested themes.)

Suggested Objectives andDeliverables
--------------


9. (C) Embassy provides the following agenda-specific
suggestions for concrete outcomes of the dialogue. As noted
above, we propose that the quarterly DVCs address progress on
the proposed action items:


A. Maritime Security: Our bilateral assistance cooperation in
this area is solid. Importantly, Azimov has now requested USG
advice on crafting a comprehensive "Maritime Security
Concept" for Azerbaijan, to "harmonize and synergize" the
GOAJ's currently divided efforts. Since one of our major
problems in advancing Caspian maritime security here is lack
of cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard, this
effort will advance our interests as well. We suggest
agreeing to Azimov's April 17 request for USG assistance in
developing a Maritime Security Concept. Azimov noted that
this paper would lay out the risks and threats to Azerbaijan,
identify the major players and how to harmonize and synergize
their efforts. The effort will help identify gaps in
Azerbaijan's current maritime security posture. Both sides
could agree to draft this document by next year's dialogue,
with regular consultations in a DVC forum.


B. Border Security: In line with President's Aliyev's push
to strengthen border security and interest in "buying
equipment" from the US for this purpose, Azimov has told us
that the State Border Service will outline specific needs. A
second objective for this agenda item would be to secure GOAJ
commitment to further consider the February 2007 US Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) proposal for technical assistance
(advisors) to the State Customs Committee on a fully
reimbursable basis to help strengthen Customs role in border
security. We believe we need, as a next step, agreement to
further consultations between CBP and the State Committee to
see how the proposal can be made compatible with GOAJ
legislation, including the new Customs Code. The GOAJ could
report back on its decision during the first DVC.


C. Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection: The GOAJ seeks
to strengthen its capabilities to protect Azerbaijan's
critical energy infrastructure. It is in our interest that
Azerbaijan remain a reliable supplier to Europe and global
markets and that it protect effectively, for purposes of
domestic stability and development, its chief revenue earner.
The objective of this session would be agreement that a
group of USG experts visit Azerbaijan to assist the GOAJ to
conduct an assessment of vulnerabilities, current
capabilities and needs, similar to the assistance we provide
the Gulf countries under the Gulf Security Dialogue on this
issue.


D. OSCE, UN, GUAM, EU: While the GOAJ has not clearly
articulated its objective for this agenda item, the
Azerbaijani delegation will likely focus on gaining USG
support in these multilateral forums to bolster its position
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We have been clear that the
OSCE Minsk Group is the key forum for resolving the conflict.
We could use this agenda item to underscore to the GOAJ that
we will only support a UNGA resolution on the conflicts if it
will contribute to a peaceful solution. Concerning GUAM and
the EU, we propose soliciting the GOAJ's goals for their
participation with these two organizations.


E. Security Outside the Caspian and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference: The proposed objective is to solicit the
GOAJ's specific plans for playing an increased role in

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enhancing security outside of the immediate Caspian region.
It would be useful to see what non-military contributions the
GOAJ could bring to the table. Azimov told the Ambassador he
plans to brief the USG delegation on important new
non-military contributions in Afghanistan that GOAJ will
propose in May to NATO, including the construction of a
girl's school, participation in a provincial reconstruction
team, and demining and police training for Afghani police.
The FonMin has also discussed GOAJ encouraging a broader OIC
role there and in Iraq. We suggest encouraging the GOAJ to
consider joining the International Compact for Iraq. The
co-Chairs could discuss the status of GOAJ proposals during
future DVCs. As the GOAJ budget grows with energy revenues,
we should encourage the GOAJ to match its resources to its
declaratory statements. The GOAJ repeatedly has focused on
its role as a model Muslim country that can spread the value
of religious tolerance. The GOAJ has used its role as the
Chair of the OIC's Foreign Ministers' Conference (a term that
ends this summer) to showcase this role. The GOAJ's interest
in playing a broader role in promoting security outside the
Caspian is not limited to Azerbaijan's OIC membership,
however. For example, the GOAJ sees its military
contributions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo as part of its
effort o promote stability. Foreign Minister Mammadyarov
has also indicated the GOAJ's interest in helpingstabilize
Lebanon.


F. Nonproliferation: The suggested objective of this session
would be to clarify definitively the GOAJ's position on PSI
and decide on any new areas of non-proliferation cooperation.
Working together with the GOAJ on its proposed "Maritime
Security Concept" also could serve as a forum for examining
ways to augment our existing cooperation.


G. Lunch session on Regional Relations: Azimov said that from
his personal perspective, this is one of the two most
important agenda items (the second key agenda item for Azimov
is the Security Sector Reform and NATO IPAP session.) The
suggested objective of this session would be to solicit
Azimov's perceptions on recent Iranian and Russian behavior.
Following up on A/S Rodman's visit (Reftel A),we suggest
this exchange of views be cast under the broader umbrella of
our interest in a sustained dialogue -- similar to the Gulf
Security Dialogue -- to consult with the GOAJ concerning its
threat perceptions vis-a-vis Iran.


H. Security Sector Reforms and NATO IPAP: As noted above,
Azimov identified this as one of the two most important
agenda items. He has been notably successful, in
Azerbaijan's weak bureaucratic climate, in establishing a
functional interagency process with the GOAJ's power
ministries and putting together the country's National
Security Concept (Reftel C). He hopes to keep this process
going in the second stage of IPAP -- which the GOAJ will
develop with NATO this spring -- to effect greater "security
sector reform." It is in our interest to support this
effort. The suggested objectives of this agenda item are: (a)
to ask for a preview of the key issues under discussion
between the GOAJ and NATO regarding Azerbaijan's new IPAP and
encouraging that the new IPAP be made public; (b) to clarify
the GOAJ's specific security sector reforms; and (c) to
secure concrete commitments from the GOAJ on Nasosnaya air
base. We understand that Washington has identified an
excellent candidate in response to the GOAJ's request for a
USG advisor in government-to-government consultation on the
IPAP process (along with the UK, German and Turkish advisors
who with the US compose the "quartet" advising the GOAJ on
its NATO process). The GOAJ's efforts to draft and review
national security-related documents and create a genuine
interagency process on national security issues are part of
Azerbaijan's NATO IPAP commitments. Engaging with the GOAJ
on this issue also would give us unprecedented access to and
ability to influence the GOAJ's internal deliberations on key
national security documents with implications for the US.


I. Coalition Contributions: The suggested objectives would be
to secure new non-military contributions from the GOAJ and
for the USG to brief the Azerbaijani delegation on the status
of coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Per Reftel B,
Azimov told the Ambassador on April 12 that he will brief
participants on several new non-military contributions to
Afghanistan that the GOAJ seeks to announce in May at the NAC
-- specifically, contributions
to a Provincial Reconstruction team, funding the

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constructions of a girls school, and security and demining
training in Baku for Afghanistan security units. In our
view, these are significant contributions that we should
continue to encourage from the GOAJ. We should urge the GOAJ
to join the International Compact for Iraq.


J. Azerbaijan Train and Equip (TEP): The suggested objective
would be to further explore possible conditions for
a TEP and GOAJ interest. We need to clarify both sides'
positions. President Aliyev told the Ambassador on April 16
that he welcomed a discussion on TEP during the dialogue, but
he said that any TEP mission could not be specifically linked
to a deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan, as it was not in the
case of Georgia. President Aliyev did not exclude a trained
unit deploying to Afghanistan or Iraq, but he objected to the
direct linkage. We understand that there were conditions
attached to Georgia peacekeeping TEP programs (SSOP) and if
we think the Georgian example can be instructive, we should
explain it more fully. A peacekeeping TEP would provide a
invaluable tool for pushing forward defense -- and democratic
-- reform in Azerbaijan.


K. Counterterrorism Cooperation: The suggested objective is
to identify specific new areas for CT cooperation, to be
followed up in quarterly DVCs. The Minister of National
Security has expressed interest in more training and
engagement on the non-intelligence aspects of our CT
cooperation, including from the FBI. Azimov has suggested
that
both sides can do more to address the ideological roots of
terrorism. Azimov also said the Ministry of National
Security will propose increased operational measures and
intelligence exchanges. We suggest both sides agree to
prepare a list of non-intel proposals for enhancing CT
cooperation, to be reviewed during the first DVC, and then
specific proposals can be crafted.


10. (U) Embassy thanks PM and EUR for their leadership,
interest, and support in preparing this year's security
dialogue. The launch of an intensified security dialogue is
a key step in implementing Secretary Rice's vision, outlined
in her February 2007 letter to President Aliyev, to elevate,
expand, and strengthen our relationship with Azerbaijan.
DERSE