US AZERBAIJANI SECURITY POLICY DIALOGUE -- NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000282

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR PM; EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: US AZERBAIJANI SECURITY POLICY DIALOGUE -- NEXT
STEPS

REF: A. BAKU 01837

B. BAKU 01836

C. BAKU 0158

D. BAKU 001837

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (U) This is an action request, see para 13.

Background
--------------


2. (C) Since President Ilham Aliyev's April 2006 visit to
Washington and the Secretary's February letter to President
Aliyev outlining our three main areas of shared interests,
the USG has sought to raise the strategic level of our
relationship with Azerbaijan. We are working to create or
revitalize existing forums that will allow us to deepen our
engagement with the GOAJ on our three primary interests --
advancing democracy through political and economic reform,
promoting energy diversification, and enhancing regional
security. The Department has energized new forums that
correspond to our political and economic reform and energy
interests. In light of global and regional security
developments, we now need to broaden and intensify our
security policy dialogue with the GOAJ as outlined in the
Secretary's letter. The USG needs a forum to build upon our

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existing, strong security partnership to advance US
interests, while addressing the GOAJ's legitimate security
concerns -- including Russian and Iranian desires to undercut
Azerbaijan's sovereignty and restrict the US presence in
Eurasia.


3. (C) A/S Lowenkron's December 2006 visit laid the basis
for an elevated dialogue on our democracy agenda. The next
step on this democracy dialogue will occur with Foreign
Minister Mammadyarov's March visit to Washington and meeting
with the Secretary. Our economic and energy interests were
advanced by the Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) and the
following Energy Diplomacy Dialogue, which were co-chaired by
A/S Sullivan and Minister of Finance Samir Sharifov. The EPC
concluded on February 7 with an agreement by the Co-Chairs to
speak on a quarterly basis to review progress and to have the
next EPC meeting in Washington in February 2008.


4. (C) The USG and the GOAJ participate in regular Bilateral
Defense Consultations (BDC) that are rapidly developing as a
valuable forum for direct mil-to-mil relations. We believe
that a broadened and intensified security policy diaogue
will help provide policy context for the BD's, and by
addressing security issues of concernto Azerbaijan, will
help provide the context to dvance US interests in our
relationship across the board.

Why the Security Agenda Matters
--------------


5. (C) Strengtheningour bilateral security policy agenda is
critical to advancing US interests in expanding the frontier
of freedom in a moderate Shia-majority state and diversifying
world energy sources. Several geopolitical factors
underscore the importance of our ties with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan is located in the greater Caspian basin, which
could serve as a corridor for advancing freedom and tolerance
in Eurasia -- particularly as Azerbaijan strengthens its
relations with and support for Georgia -- and a mechanism for
diversifying Europe's energy sources. Azerbaijan's shared
borders and delicate relations with Iran and Russia touch
upon our interests in positively influencing Iranian and
Russian behavior. Azerbaijan's proximity to the Middle East,
active engagement with the Muslim world, and its desire to
partner with the US not only in, but also beyond, the
immediate Caspian basin -- in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and
Lebanon -- further reinforce Azerbaijan's potential
significance for the USG as a security partner.


6. (C) There are a number of key issues on our bilateral
security agenda: defeating global and regional terrorist and
proliferation threats, supporting Azerbaijan's movement
toward NATO, enhancing Azerbaijan's role as a supplier and
transit country for energy supplies to European markets,
strengthening security of critical energy infrastructure,
bolstering Azerbaijan's sovereignty and supporting its
independence in its relations with Russia and Iran, ensuring
peace and stability in the Caspian region, and peacefully
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The GOAJ's desire
to cooperate with the USG outside the immediate Caspian basin
also could broaden the scope of our security dialogue. For
example, the GOAJ has expressed an interest in working with

the USG to promote stability in Lebanon and increasing its
contribution to efforts in Afghanistan on the civilian as
well as the military side.


7. (C) Azerbaijan is a key security partner in Eurasia. The
USG maintains a robust "Caspian maritime security" program in
the Caspian Sea with the GOAJ that seeks to address regional
counterterrorist and counterproliferation threats.
Azerbaijan is a troop-contributing Coalition member in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and provides unlimited overflight
and landing rights for Coalition aircraft bound for
Afghanistan and Iraq. The GOAJ is taking steps to move
closer toward NATO, and its foreign policy is focused on
closer interaction with Euro-Atlantic structures. The
relationship with NATO and Azerbaijan's IPAP commitments on
political and economic reform also support our democracy
agenda.


8. (C) The GOAJ has signaled its desire to deepen the level
of cooperation on strategic security issues and to better
coordinate our diverse security-related activities.
Specifically, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov told the
Ambassador on January 18 that he hopes our security dialogue
can be "more useful and more fruitful." Deputy Foreign
Minister Azimov also requested that the USG engage in
government-to-government consultations with the GOAJ on
drafting Azerbaijan's Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy
Strategy (reftel A). On the issue of our
counterproliferation cooperation, Azimov has raised the need
for "better coordination and synergy" between the various
bilateral programs related to proliferation threats (reftel
B).

Creating A Robust Bilateral Security Dialogue
--------------


9. (C) We believe that the time is right to intensify the
security policy aspect of our bilateral relationship, given
President Aliyev's April 2006 visit to Washington and the
Secretary's February letter to President Aliyev. Consistent

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with the Secretary's letter to President Aliyev, we have
taken steps to strengthen our dialogue in the areas of reform
and energy. The GOAJ's deep concerns with respect to recent
developments with Russia and Iran further highlight the need
to intensify our bilateral security cooperation Reftel C).
As recently as February, President Aliyev expressed concern
at Iran and Russia's increasingly aggressive regional efforts
with visiting A/S Defense Peter Rodman (Septel). We believe
we need a forum at the policy level to address our bilateral
security interests to parallel the BDC's valuable format for
conducting our mil-to-mil contacts.


10. (C) We have consulted informally with State colleagues
to plan for the upcoming political-military consultations
with the GOAJ, and how to expand that forum into a broader
"security policy" dialogue. We have also consulted with the
GOAJ to determine their priorities for the consultations.
Embassy has confirmed that Deputy Foreign Minister Araz
Azimov has agreed to come to Washington for the pol-mil
consultations on April 19. Per our exchanges with the
Department and the GOAJ about ways to invigorate the quality
and substance of the consultations, Embassy provides the
following suggestions for the Department's consideration.

Specific Suggestions
--------------


11. (C) The agenda for an intensified security policy
discussion with the GOAJ should include:

--Increased focus on Azerbaijan's NATO IPAP process. Deeper
engagement with the GOAJ regarding its relations with NATO is
a critical tool for substantively moving the GOAJ toward
increased interaction with Euro-Atlantic structures and
meeting its political, economic, and security IPAP
commitments, expanding the frontier of freedom, and providing
us with deeper insight into the GOAJ's national security
goals. The USG should use the consultations to encourage the
GOAJ to continue moving toward NATO, including on political
and economic reform commitments in the IPAP that support our
democratic goals, with the objective of the GOAJ agreeing to
concrete benchmarks of progress. Another aspect of the NATO
agenda would focus on how the USG and GOAJ could engage in
government-to-government contacts on developing its Military
Doctrine and Foreign Policy Strategy, which are key elements
of its NATO IPAP. (Note: Azimov requested on 8 December that
the USG engage in government-to-government consultations on
the drafting of Azerbaijan's Military Doctrine and Foreign
Policy Strategy. We believe it is in our interest to ensure

these two key documents, in such a strategically located
country, fully reflect US interests. Reftel D.)

--Increased focus on the challenges posed to Azerbaijan's
security by regional security actors -- ie. Iran and Russia.
The USG already adequately understands that the GOAJ is
concerned about Russia and Iran. We need to move beyond
simply understanding concerns to finding concrete mechanisms
to address these concerns. We should work with the GOAJ to
identify concrete areas for bilateral cooperation to address
our concerns about Iranian and Russian behavior and
implications for US and Azerbaijani interests in the region.
The USG should consider engaging with the GOAJ as we do the
Gulf countries in the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD). (Note:
During PM DAS Coulter's February visit to Baku, Coulter
broached the GSD with President Aliyev as a topic of
interest. Aliyev noted approvingly that Azerbaijan was
already cooperating with the US on most if not all of the GSD
's six pillars and that "framing" such cooperation in a
GSD-like format would be a useful sign for neighbors of
USG-GOAJ engagement. Septel)

--Review the state of our bilateral cooperation on maritime
and border security activities, with the goal of articulating
how these activities fit within a broader Caspian security
framework or strategy and increasing our strategic access to
the Caspian region. Taking this step would advance the US
interests of countering transnational threats, bolstering
Azerbaijan's sovereignty against Russia and Iran, and
influencing a variety of Azerbaijani security units. This
discussion should not focus on the technical details of where
radars are located or how many boats the coast guard has
manned. The focus should be gaining a broader understanding
of Azerbaijan's strategic threat perceptions and how we can
develop a broader Caspian security framework. Embassy
proposes soliciting the GOAJ's strategic concept and goal for
our existing maritime and border security activities as part
of the security policy dialogue.

--This part of the agenda might also include the GOAJ's
security concerns on the issue of Caspian delimitation as
well as discussion of how the GOAJ can build on and more
fully cooperate with the USG on its non-proliferation
efforts, including clarifying GOAJ concerns on the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). (NOTE: Deputy
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov told the Ambassador that the
GOAJ is hesitant to commit publicly to the PSI Statement of
Interdiction Principles (SOIP) because Russia, who has
committed to the SOIP, is likely to use the forum to pressure
Azerbaijan to join Russian-led fora on counterproliferation,
which the GOAJ does not want to do. He made clear, however,
that Azerbaijan is deeply interested in working more closely
bilaterally with the USG to achieve our joint
non-proliferation goals.)

--Increased focus on critical energy infrastructure security.
The Azerbaijani side should be prepared to identify the
threat and specific infrastructure areas for potential
assistance to address its energy security concerns.

--Focus on Azerbaijan's demonstrated willingness and its
rapidly increasing ability as oil revenues burgeon, to play a
role, especially diplomatically and financially, in enhancing
security outside of the immediate Caspian basin. For
example, the GOAJ has expressed an interest in working with
the USG to promote stability in Lebanon and increasing its
overall contribution in Afghanistan, on the civilian and
military sides. Embassy suggests the consultations devote a
session to exploring strategic security issues of mutual
concern beyond the Caspian region.


12. (C) Embassy provides the following structural
recommendations for the Department's consideration:

--Embassy suggests PM and EUR jointly co-chair the security
policy dialogue. Enhanced EUR participation is essential to
having an increased focus on a key pillar of our security
dialogue: Azerbaijan's relations with NATO. EUR
participation also would support discussion of broader
regional and global strategic developments.

--Based on a review of last year's consultations and
discussions with the MFA, Embassy suggests that the
consultations remain at the A/S and deputy-ministerial level
delegation heads.

--Embassy suggests creating two bilateral working groups that
would meet periodically throughout the year to provide
expert-level follow-up on issues that are raised and/or

decided at the pol-mil consultations. The MFA suggested
creating these groups as a mechanism for making the security
consultations more substantive and practical. Embassy
proposes creating two working groups focusing on the most
important issues: Azerbaijan's relations with NATO and
Caspian region security, which could be the umbrella for a
variety of maritime security, counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, and regional security issues and
activities, rather than a specific working group for every
bilateral security issue.

--Embassy suggests the security consultations increasingly
focus on creating a program of "next steps" or "follow-up
issues" that the working groups could address during the
subsequent year. The working groups could formally report
joint conclusions to the Chairs. The working groups could
meet quarterly, alternating between Washington and Baku or by
DVC. The Chairs could speak via videoconference six months
after the April meeting to measure progress by the working
groups.

--The existing consultations should be renamed the "bilateral
security dialogue," to reflect the broader nature of the
consultations.


13. (C) Action Request: We request that Department approve
April 19 date for Azimov leading a GOAJ delegation to
Washington for pol-mil consultations. We also welcome the
Department's consideration of the preceding recommendations.
DERSE