PRESIDENT ALIYEV ON TRANS-CAPSIAN AND EUROPEAN GAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000256 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND EB; PLEASE PASS TO USTR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PREL PGOV RU TU TX AJ SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV ON TRANS-CAPSIAN AND EUROPEAN GAS INITIATIVES REF: BAKU 98 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a February 6 meeting with the US delegation to the Economic Partnership Commission (septel), President Aliyev outlined the changing regional energy picture. Touting Azerbaijan's refusal to bow to Russian gas policies as "an example for the region" and an act that "destroyed the myth of Gazprom," Aliyev said that Azerbaijan's experience in standing up to Russia on gas could help persuade Kazakhstan to hasten its involvement in the East-West energy corridor. He said Kazakhstan's oil ultimately will find its way into the BTC, as it has "no other choice" but that it will take time, infrastructure and US persuasion to convince Kazakhstan to join a new trans-Caspian gas initiative. Aliyev said Azerbaijan could become a gas supplier to Europe "more quickly than anticipated" due to Shah Deniz phase II, deep gas from ACG, and increased production from SOCAR's own holdings, into which Aliyev would direct SOCAR to focus all of its investment over the next few years. Yet he worried that under Russian pressure Turkey could renege on the Istanbul agreements to redistribute Shah Deniz phase I gas; he also asked for a public show of support from the US to an expected reaction and further counter Russian pressure on energy issues. Aliyev said he made a strategic choice to reach out to Turkmenistan following Niyazov's death, in hopes of repairing historically tense relations and bringing Turkmenistan into the East-West energy corridor. Aliyev underscored that all of these new initiatives would require close coordination with and a strong and public show of support from the United States; the launch of a new high-level energy dialogue requested by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov (ref) could be an effective way to promote an expanded East-West corridor. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a February 6 meeting with the US delegation to the Economic Partnership Commission (septel),President Aliyev outlined the changing regional energy picture. "A lot still needs to be done on energy," Aliyev told the delegation. The situation is "complicated," with lots of players with very different agendas. Azerbaijan's achievements -- the BTC and SCP pipelines -- are due to international cooperation. Azerbaijan, with strong US support, was a pioneer in bringing international capital to the Caspian region. Yet these projects were not the end; they were only the first stage of development, Aliyev said. ¶3. (C) Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan had begun an energy dialogue with the EU, as symbolized by the October 2006 EU-GOAJ Energy MOU, and had successfully concluded an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) with Kazakhstan to bring Kazakh crude into the BTC pipeline. Azerbaijan had worked with Turkey and Georgia to provide gas that will enable Georgia to make it through this winter, and it has the potential to work with Kazakhstan on new arrangements for gas supplies. Yet "other countries" want to control gas supplies, and "only Azerbaijan" can be a new source of gas for Europe, Aliyev said. He noted that Algeria, Russia and Iran are talking of joining forces to create a new gas cartel, adding that "we all know what the outcome will be." Although Azerbaijan is a "small and wounded country," Aliyev said "we are open to wider gas cooperation." "Our goals coincide," he told the delegation; but we need to be "accurate and consistent" as we explore new areas for cooperation. "This stage involves other countries, with other resources and other consumers." Yet this new cooperation could be important for Azerbaijan and the whole region -- including the Caspian and Black Sea regions, as well as Central Asia. ¶4. (C) EB Assistant Secretary Sullivan, SCA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Mann and EUR DAS Bryza briefed Aliyev on the energy component of their regional trip, noting that an inter-agency delegation was traveling to Kazakhstan, Turkey and Georgia, as well as to an IEA conference in Paris, to showcase Caspian resources, motivate our European allies to focus on this region and promote regional cooperation. Mann noted that Kazakhstan increasingly needs to consider trans-Caspian options. Russian unwillingness to expand CPC pipeline capacity is likely to continue, and companies are BAKU 00000256 002 OF 004 looking for new export routes that do not transit Russia. The Tengiz field will double production soon and Kashagan is expected to come on-line in 2011. The Russian attitude toward Kazakh exports is clear, Mann said, and we have warned Kazakhstan about Iran. This leaves the Aktau-Baku corridor as the only viable new export route for Kazakh oil. We have great respect for the IGA, and we have encouraged Kazakhstan to put the conditions in place to start implementing the agreement, Mann said. ¶5. (C) The Kazakhs, Mann noted, are under Russian pressure. "Everyone is under Russian pressure!" Aliyev interjected. Agreeing, Mann said that above a certain volume, Kazakhstan will need to develop a pipeline for crude exports, as shipping will not be economical. Although some in Kazakhstan believe a five-nation agreement is needed for a pipeline, neither the US nor Azerbaijan believes this to be true, Mann said. "That's right," Aliyev affirmed. Kazakhstan's new Foreign Minister is open to these ideas, Mann concluded, and this is a likely area for Azerbaijani cooperation. Aliyev agreed, saying that "we are working on that." But for Kazakhstan, Aliyev continued, the best method of persuasion is to have the infrastructure in place. Nazarbayev agreed to sign the IGA only after BTC was opened; Kazakhstan likely will join (a new gas pipeline) only after the commercial prospects and arrangements for a pipeline are clear. ¶6. (C) Repeating that "we all feel Russian pressure," Aliyev noted that Russia had severely pressured Azerbaijan over its recent efforts to expand gas exports. "That was a clear signal," he underscored. But Kazakhstan can "easily" join the east-west corridor, Aliyev said; there is no need for a five-party agreement on Caspian delimitation. Azerbaijan has a sea border with Kazakhstan; the two countries could sign an agreement for new transit and export arrangements. "US persuasion could be more efficient," Aliyev said, suggesting that we could resume trilateral (US-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan) meetings as had taken place in London. Kazakhstan is now part of BTC; we need to do the same with gas. "There are no serious doubts that this will happen," Aliyev said. "Kazakhstan needs us more than we need them" because its oil production will top 100 million tons. "BTC is the only way," Aliyev said. He noted that Kazakhstan wants to be the OSCE Chair in 2009; "that shows political ambitions." "They'd like to be suppliers to the EU," Aliyev said, and the only way is through SCP, not Russia. Aliyev noted that Russia had suggested that Azerbaijan sell gas to southern Russia in a gambit to prevent Azerbaijani gas supplies from reaching Europe, a proposal the GOAJ was quick to turn down. Unlike Azerbaijan, Aliyev said, Kazakhstan does not have any other options. Now, it can only sell gas to Russia for USD 100 per tcm, when Russia turns around and resells gas to Europe at USD 300 per tcm. Azerbaijan already is a partner to the EU, Aliyev said, "I feel how the situation has changed" in response to Russia's gas policies. ¶7. (C) Referring to his government's decision not to buy gas from Russia this year, Aliyev said with evident pride that, "We are an example. If we survive, they (Kazakhstan) will see that they can too." And if Kazakhstan joins new trans-Caspian energy initiatives, Aliyev said, "probably Turkmenistan will too." Turkmenistan, Aliyev continued, "needs to be more oriented toward the West." "As a country, we already accomplished what we had planned; the East Caspian would be a good addition." But at this moment, Aliyev continued, trans-Caspian initiatives would "create more headaches." "We have become exposed to Russian attacks," Aliyev added, but "we see it in our strategic interests" to become a transit country, as this will provide for Azerbaijan's successful long term development. ¶8. (C) Mann, Sullivan and Bryza underscored that there is a window of opportunity for trans-Caspian initiatives, for Kazakhstan and possibly for Turkmenistan. Bryza added that the new Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov wants to discuss this issue with the GOAJ. There are real opportunities in the West -- both in TGI and Nabucco. Azerbaijan's bold decision not to purchase Russian gas has changed the strategic picture, Bryza said. ("Yes," Aliyev BAKU 00000256 003 OF 004 quietly said, pumping his fist with a satisfied smile.) Bryza noted that a recent "Kommersant" article analyzing the geopolitical after-effects of Azerbaijan's decision not to purchase gas from Russia had proven that Russia's "blackmail policy is a failure." (Aliyev, whose demeanor visibly perked up during this exchange, said with some surprise that he had not seen the article.) Outlining the needs of the TGI and Nabucco projects, Bryza said that up to 16 bcma were required, and Azerbaijani-Turkish discussions are the critical next step to develop a gas transit agreement. ¶9. (C) Aliyev said that Bryza's comments were "absolutely right." The US and Azerbaijan are the "countries that started this process." Azerbaijan cannot seriously influence the policies of Kazakhstan and Turkey without the United States, Aliyev said. "We need joint and coordinated efforts." But on gas, Aliyev said, "there are too many participants." According to Georgian President Saakashvili, there is an "emerging special relationship" between Turkey and Russia. Saakashvili phoned recently, Aliyev continued, to express concern that Turkey was not fulfilling its Istanbul commitments regarding redistribution of Shah Deniz gas. Azerbaijan has a "message" that Turkey and Russia are talking, Aliyev said and that is the reason Turkey is not willing to share gas with Georgia. "We have to deal with Turkey's ambition to redistribute Azerbaijani gas everywhere," Aliyev said. While Saakashvili overcame his early resistance to regional energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, "Turkish difficulties may continue." "We don't want Turkey to be a second Gazprom," Aliyev continued; "we want to sell gas to Europe." When we concluded the deal for Shah Deniz phase I gas, Aliyev said, the gas market was difficult. We can't change those terms. But Azerbaijan can look ahead to Shah Deniz phase II, deep gas from ACG, and increased production from SOCAR's own holdings, due to "several hundred million dollars" of investment the GOAJ is now making to significantly and rapidly increase production. In 2007, Aliyev said, Azerbaijan will produce 1 bcm more than in 2006; by 2008 it will double gas production to 8 bcma. "We can become an EU supplier more quickly than anticipated," Aliyev said. ¶10. (C) The Shah Deniz gas problems were a "big surprise" and "very disappointing," Aliyev said; he acknowledged that there had been problems and "some tensions" in the GOAJ's relationship with BP. Putin, Aliyev noted, had been telling Azerbaijan's partners that the Shah Deniz shutdown proved that Azerbaijan had been bluffing and does not have the gas reserves it claims. "We need to figure out what to do with Russia," Aliyev said. He said that Azerbaijan's decision to reject Russian gas was a "serious move, the most important sign of our independence" since 1991. "We were the only ones not to surrender," Aliyev noted with pride. "We would rather freeze than surrender to blackmail." ¶11. (C) This year, Aliyev continued, Azerbaijan needs to supply gas to Europe and sell some to Georgia. "Russia wanted to blackmail us but it didn't work." Azerbaijan's actions, he said, "encourage other countries" and have broad implications for the regional situation. "We destroyed the myth of Gazprom," Aliyev continued, "and we will probably see consequences." Aliyev said Azerbaijan had "ruined Gazprom's monopoly" and needs to be ready for a reaction from both Gazprom and the Russian Government. Close "contact, cooperation and communication" with the U.S. and "a public show of support, noting Azerbaijan's importance in global energy security" will be key in this regard. The EU, Aliyev said, had asked him how. He said that he had responded, "Through non-energy visits and public encouragement. It should be clearly stated that Azerbaijan is a country that is important." "Our regional development will be influenced by what happened this winter," Aliyev underscored. ¶12. (C) Mann noted that Turkey is likely to push for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. Yet the best way to demonstrate possibilities for new regional cooperation is to first conclude an Azerbaijan-Turkish gas transit agreement. Aliyev responded that Turkey previously had promised to persuade Turkmenistan to join the East-West corridor; maybe the situation had changed. Reflecting on BAKU 00000256 004 OF 004 Azerbaijan's difficult relationship with Turkmenistan, Aliyev said he made a conscious, strategic choice to send Azerbaijani Prime Minister Rasizade to President Niyazov's funeral, in spite of the fact that Niyazov had gravely insulted him by not sending anyone to Heydar Aliyev's funeral. "If they continue to look at Azerbaijan as an enemy, nothing will work. But if Turkmenistan changes, everything can work," Aliyev said. In response to Mann's suggestion that there were some hopeful signs emanating from Turkmenistan, Aliyev said that the new government appears to be continuing some old practices. Azerbaijan recently received two diplomatic notes from Turkmenistan: one inviting Aliyev to Niyazov's funeral and the second asserting Turkmenistan's claims to a "new field." "I don't even know which one," Aliyev said with some bemusement. ¶13. (C) Aliyev believes that Turkmenistan should be more interested in cooperation than Azerbaijan. From a strategic point of view, trans-Caspian cooperation with Turkmenistan would facilitate regional energy negotiations. "We're more open to cooperation" than Turkmenistan, Aliyev said, adding that Azerbaijan would even consider giving Turkmenistan a greater interest in disputed fields if it indicated it were interested in joining the East-West corridor. As for any future sub-sea pipelines, Aliyev said that "the demands on Turkmenistan should not exceed what it can do." Russia, he noted, "can meddle in Turkmenistan" and the US should only do "what is necessary now." Aliyev promised to send Foreign Minister Mammadyarov to Turkmenistan after the Presidential inauguration to "start contact." With close cultural and linguistic ties between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, there may be an opportunity to improve relations now. ¶14. (C) In conclusion, Aliyev emphasized again that strong partnership between the US and Azerbaijan will predetermine the outcome of all of these energy issues. The EU, he said, does not have an energy policy. Large EU member states "build Black Sea pipelines" and "don't care that the Baltic countries and others depend on Russia." The US needs to lead this process. Aliyev added that he would discuss many of these issues with Saakashvili and Erdogan the next day in Turkey. ¶15. (C) Comment: While this meeting made it clear that Aliyev takes great pride in what he views as his government's bold, strategic decision not to purchase Russian gas this winter, it also is very clear that he is aware that there may be leadership and active engagement, political and technical, potential negative consequences of this choice. His request for USG public support, thinly veiled in references to EU discussions, is reasonable and would further our own interests. As Aliyev noted, continued USG involvement is essential to expand the East-West energy corridor. Foreign Minister Mammadayarov's expected visit to Washington in late February/early March offers an opportunity to show the public USG support for Azerbaijan's energy policies requested by Aliyev, with a formal launch of the Energy Dialogue requested by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov (ref),could be an effective way to do so. ¶16. (U) A/S Sullivanand PAS Bryza cleared this message. DERSE