AZERBAIJANI REACTIONS TO PUTIN'S SPEECH AT MUNICH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000246 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ RS SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI REACTIONS TO PUTIN'S SPEECH AT MUNICH REF: BAKU 00227 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Most Azerbaijani officials and independent commentators agree that the content of Putin's February 10 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy was not new or surprising. Most agree the speech represents Putin and many Russian government officials' longstanding views. President Aliyev, for example, told visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman and the Ambassador that SIPDIS Putin has spoken in a similar manner during private meetings with Aliyev. Local political analysts also told the Ambassador that the speech was likely driven by a mixture of Russian domestic yearnings for a strong leader, Russia's sense of declining regional and global influence, Russia's heightened confidence about using its energy wealth as a political tool, and Russia's perception that the US is tied down by other international challenges. End Summary. Perspectives from the Azerbaijani Officials -------------- ¶2. (C) Senior GOAJ officials commented on Putin's speech during their meetings with visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman and the Ambassador on February 12. President Aliyev was not surprised by Putin's speech, commenting that Putin has spoken in a similar manner about the US in personal meetings with Aliyev. Aliyev also noted that Putin's increasing self-confidence and the rise of Soviet ideology in Russia meant that Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation was increasingly important (septel). Minister of National Security Elmar Mahmudov said Putin's speech was like "the cry of a drowning man" (reftel). Mahmudov observed that Russia is in "chaos," and is confronting serious economic and security problems. ¶3. (C) MFA Russia Desk officer Elhan Gehramanov downplayed the novelty of the speech. He said the speech primarily focused on Russia's longstanding concerns about the US as a perceived superpower and NATO's enlargement. Regarding NATO, Gehramanov said Russia primarily is concerned with NATO's ties to Ukraine and Georgia, not Azerbaijan. Gehramanov commented that the speech reflects Russia's broader desire to exert greater influence within the post-Soviet space. Independent Analysts' Commentary -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador hosted a February 21 dinner for local foreign policy analysts Ilgar Mammadov, Arif Yunusov, Leyla Aliyeva, and Rasim Musabayov, which included a discussion on their reactions to Putin's speech. Participants highlighted several potential factors that drove Putin's speech: Russian domestic longings for a strong leader, Russia's sense of declining regional and global influence, Russia's heightened confidence about using its energy wealth as a political tool, and Russia's perception that the US is tied down by other international challenges. ¶5. (C) Participants agreed that the speech was not surprising and that there was little interest in the speech among the Azerbaijani public. The speech's themes of anti-Americanism and frustration with Russia's diminished regional influence are part of a much broader trend, according to Leyla Aliyeva. Aliyeva commented that Putin occasionally "takes his mask off" and reveals his true thoughts. Mammadov noted that the speech's attack on NATO expansion reflected a longstanding Russian policy. In particular, Putin was angry with Ukraine and Georgia's movement toward NATO. Mammadov suggested that Putin may even feel that he needs to defend his record in the face of what some Russian officials probably perceive as the "loss" of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO during his presidency. ¶6. (C) Yunusov emphasized the domestic component behind the Putin speech. Yunusov argued that the Russian population desires a "strong leader" who is capable of fashioning "a new Russian policy" that will reverse Russia's loss of regional and global influence. Aliyeva agreed that the speech catered to Russian popular sentiment, but the speech was also driven by Moscow's perception that Russia is increasingly strong because of its energy wealth and that the US is tied down by other international problems. (Note: Aliyeva probably meant the US challenges of dealing with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan.) Musabayov also highlighted that Russia's self-perceived growing strength -- given its energy resources -- and the belief that the US was bogged down in Iraq BAKU 00000246 002 OF 002 contributed to the tone of the speech. ¶7. (C) Most analysts agreed that the speech could backfire. President Aliyev told the Ambassador on February 26 that the speech was "a mistake." Aliyeva observed that while Putin probably feels emboldened by Russia's energy wealth, he probably overestimated Russia's relative power. Musabayov suggested that the speech lacked a sufficient basis to meet the Russian public's desire for a "new Russian policy," because it only articulated a negative vision of Russia's security perceptions. ¶8. (C) One subtheme of the speech, according to the analysts, was Russia's goal of being a key actor in influencing the outcome of the protracted conflicts. Musabayov said that the speech could degrade the unity of the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts. Mammadov observed that Russia is displeased with the EU's stated desire to become more involved in the protracted conflicts. One day before the Putin speech, Putin's presidential aide Sergey Yastrjembsky reportedly warned the EU about involvement in solving the protracted conflicts, according to Mammadov. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The clear consensus of Azerbaijani officials and commentators is that Putin's speech is part of a much broader policy trend and reflected his long-term thinking. What was new was his willingness to put these ideas together, publicly, in a Western forum. We will continue to monitor developments in Azerbaijani perceptions and reactions to Russian policy actions and its impact on Azerbaijan's western orientation and US interests here. DERSE