\\CORRECTED COPY - TAG ORDER\\ AZERBAIJAN: DFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000238 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ IR TU TX SUBJECT: \\CORRECTED COPY - TAG ORDER\\ AZERBAIJAN: DFM KHALIFOV SEEKS CLOSER USG CONSULTATION ON IRAN PERIL, TURKMENISTAN PROMISE BAKU 00000238 001.3 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1.. (C) SUMMARY: On February 21 at his request the Ambassador met with DFM Khalaf Khalafov, who handles Iran, Turkmenistan and US as the MFA "bilateral relations" deputy. He informed the Ambassador that the MFA wished to sign the draft Energy MOU originally drawn up for the EPC during FM Mammadyarov 's March 5-7 visit to Washington, preferably with Secretary Rice, and gave the Ambassador a copy of the MFA's draft version (which had minor edits to USG-proposed draft; emailed to EUR/CARC 2/21). Khalafov said that given his portfolio and the broadening and deepening of bilateral USG-GOAJ relations, he seeks increased contact and discussions on Caspian strategic issues with the USG, through an intensive dialogue with the Embassy. The Ambassador agreed that closer consultation and coordination would be of immense help in furthering joint USG-GOAJ strategic goals. Khalafov than gave the Ambassador a read-out on the Prime Minister's recent visit to Turkmenistan, saying that the MFA assessed the GOAJ delegation head, PM Rasizade's, meeting with President Berdymukhamedov as "positive," since the Turkmen President had indicated to Rasulzadeh that past obstacles would no longer stand in the way of better relations. As such, the GOAJ was optimistic that GOAJ bilateral relations with Turkmenistan could be improved. Khalafov asked for closer USG-GOAJ cooperation and coordination in taking advantage of the apparent opening with Turkmenistan to foster joint US-AZ goals. Upon hearing the Ambassador's exposition of USG Iran policy he lauded USG's emphasis on finding a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue, and he offered to work closely with the Ambassador in this regard, sharing MFA insights and information about Iran. They agreed to meet again after his February 25-28 visit to Tehran, where he will be participating in a regional Caspian summit. It seemed clear after the fact that Khalafov summoned the Ambassador not to talk about the Energy MOU, but rather to offer increased regional coordination and consultation on Caspian strategic issues, primarily Turkmenistan and Iran. Given his primacy in the MFA on these issues, and his close ties to the President, we believe intensified dialogue as proposed by Khalafov will be of value in achieving USG regional objectives. END SUMMARY. ENERGY MOU -------------- ¶2. (C) Khalafov officially informed the Ambassador of the MFA's desire for FM Mammadyarov to sign the Energy MOU with Sec. Rice during his upcoming Washington trip. Both Khalafov and the Ambassador agreed that the MOU was a non-binding expression of political intent, and Khalafov gave the Ambassador a revised version of the USG draft MOU with minor GOAJ edits for consideration (subsequently transmitted to Desk via email) ¶3. (C) Khalafov said he had heard that the Ambassador had had a good meeting that day with GOAJ Ambassador to the US Yashar Aliyev, where they discussed several GOAJ proposals for the upcoming FM Washington trip. Khalafov said that he had heard that the EPC had been productive, with many important MOUs signed. The same day Energy Diplomacy Dialogue had also been important, and the draft Energy MOU that had been prepared (but not finalized and signed) for that occasion had great bilateral and regional significance. Giving the Ambassador a draft of the Energy MOU, he asked that both the GOAJ and USG work together towards a final text of the Energy MOU so that FM Mammadyarov could sign it during his visit to Washington, preferably with Secretary Rice. He said that the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington would also be submitting this same draft text to its State Department contacts. The FM had also instructed Khalafov to work with the US Embassy Baku in this effort. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said she would communicate the GOAJ request and the draft document itself to Washington that same day. The Ambassador pointed out that the Energy MOU would be a non-binding statement of political intent, like the MOUs signed at the EPC, which would serve joint GOAJ-USG energy objectives. She said she could not promise that it would be the Secretary who would be signing the document on behalf of the USG, but that she would relay the request. Khalafov acknowledged that the MOU would be non-binding, but said that it would serve the purpose of "continuing the dialogue." He repeated that the GOAJ saw the document as important, as was BAKU 00000238 002.3 OF 004 USG support for the GOAJ's energy policies, given Azerbaijan's status as the regional energy leader. ¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether Khalafov was now also the "Energy DFM," Khalafov said that he was the DFM for bilateral relations. The Ambassador said that given this portfolio, she hoped that they could meet more often in the future to discuss issues of bilateral importance. Khalafov said that he had "not wanted to bother her" up to now because "she was so busy," but given the deepening and broadening of bilateral relations he was eager to meet more frequently. The MFA recognized USG efforts to intensify relations and "wants to be supportive." The Ambassador said that she relied on the MFA for support in the full range of bilateral issues, and was looking forward to working with him on these broader efforts. In response to the Ambassador's question, he said that Shamil Alaskarov had not yet been formally appointed as the Energy POC for the MFA. TURKMENISTAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Khalafov said it would be mutually beneficial to intensify a bilateral discussion on Caspian region developments. For example, a few days prior a GOAJ delegation had traveled to Turkmenistan for the new President's inauguration. PM Rasulzadeh had had good meetings with President Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who had told him that there were "no obstacles or problems" in the way of improved GOAJ-Turkmen relations. The GOAJ saw this signal and the the new situation in Turkmenistan as potentially quite positive, and, given the recent Turkmen leadership change, Khalafov said it would be especially helpful for the US and Azerbaijan to coordinate closely as Azerbaijan seeks to take advantage of this opening to re-engage and improve bilateral relations with Turkmenistan. Khalafov said that given USG-GOAJ mutual interests in the region, increased bilateral dialogue on "regional" security issues could maximize collective effectiveness and also allow the MFA to pass the "latest news" to the Embassy. The Ambassador said that she would benefit greatly from Khalafov's insights, and would also use these talks as a way to keep him abreast of the USG position on various regional issues. ¶7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to the source of GOAJ optimism, Khalafov said that the GOAJ felt that the new Turkmen leadership would not "continue previous misunderstandings" or hold onto "predetermined positions," and as such the GOAJ was determined to increase its efforts to strengthen relations. Azerbaijan had always been seeking to normalize relations, and after the death of Turkmenbashi, its sending a high-level delegation to the funeral and the subsequent inauguration, in addition to a congratulatory letter sent by President Aliyev to President Berdymukhamedov were all signals of this desire. As such, Azerbaijan would strongly encourage Turkmenistan to re-open its Embassy in Baku, and will continue dialogue and promoting bilateral trips. Currently the Azerbaijani Embassy in Ashgabat is seeking an invitation for FM Mammadyarov to travel there. There is also an ongoing bilateral GOAJ-Turkmen Caspian working group that last met in Baku in 2006 that the GOAJ would seek to continue. ¶8. (C) In response to Khalafov's comments that the USG should seek to take advantage of the leadership change to improve its own relations with Turkmenistan, the Ambassador noted that the presence of A/S Boucher at the funeral and subsequent inauguration was a sign of the USG interest in a new page in bilateral relations if indeed Turkmenistan pursues a new path. Khalafov claimed there were many "new ideas" in Berdymukhamedov's inaugural speech. The Ambassador said the USG had noted some signs that the new Turkmen government might be seeking to open up its society more than did the previous government. The Ambassador said she would relay the message back to Washington that the GOAJ had had positive feedback after reaching out to Turkmenistan after Turkmanbashi's death, that the GOAJ thinks there is a real possibility for improved bilateral USG-Turkmen and GOAJ-Turkmen relations, and that the GOAJ would like to intensify its bilateral cooperation with the USG on how best to reach out to Turkmenistan. IRAN BAKU 00000238 003.2 OF 004 -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said that FM Mammadyarov suggested to her that she talk with Khalafov after he returned from his February 25-28 trip to Tehran, where he would be representing the GOAJ in a regional summit on Caspian issues. She said she had earlier that day talked with Ambassador Yashar Aliyev concerning USG Iran policy, highlighting the fact that while no options were off the table, the USG was not seeking confrontation and instead was seeking to use all available diplomatic means to encourage Iran to take "the good path" laid out by the international community. The USG does not object to Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, but an Iran with nuclear weapons is a threat to the region, the US, and the world. The USG was doing all it can diplomatically to support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of its allies like Azerbaijan. The USG put forward a very positive offer to Iran to constructively engage a few months prior, which was still on the table. However, in the face of Iran's unwillingness to listen to reason and to UNSC 1737, the USG was also seeking to "up the pressure" on Iran. The USG was also seeking to prevent Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq. A second carrier group has also been positioned in the Persian Gulf to support our allies and to keep sea lanes open. Outside the 1737 framework, the USG was also seeking to use the international financial system against Iranian proliferation efforts, and welcomed the efforts of other countries in this regard. On a positive note, the US people have positive feelings for the Iranian people, and the USG was continuing in its efforts to reach out to the Iranian people through grants, programs, sports exchanges and other means. Concluding, the Ambassador said she was interested in hearing Khalafov's insights concerning Iran. ¶10. (C) Responding, Khalafov said that Iran was an important country in the region, and bore especial strategic importance for Azerbaijan. As such, the GOAJ strongly supported USG efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, the GOAJ stood ready to help, and was itself trying to use all diplomatic means to solve extant issues. During the time of Heydar Aliyev, shortly after independence, Azerbaijan was having a very hard time due to Armenian aggression and the support of Armenia by neighbors such as Iran. Even then, the GOAJ had sought to normalize relations with its southern neighbor, a goal now continued by Heydar's son. Iran and Azerbaijan have major disagreements, especially on Caspian delimitation, but the GOAJ always try to keep the dialogue open. The presence of Western companies in the region was important for GOAJ development of its energy sector, so the GOAJ chose to use dialogue with Iran vice a confrontation that might have scared these Western companies out of the region. Iranian nuclear weapons would be destabilizing, and not in the region's interest. Iran has the right to the benefits of a peaceful nuclear program, but only within the framework of the international obligations to which it is a party. Because Azerbaijan and Iran are neighbors, Azerbaijan has good insights and information on Iran. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador said that USG-GOAJ cooperation and GOAJ insights on Iran would inform the international community's approach in solving the Iran problem. She urged the GOAJ to use whatever influence it had with the Iranian government to move it towards the "good path." The US, as a "virtual neighbor" to Azerbaijan, would also continue working toward strengthening its relationship with Azerbaijan. ¶12. (C) Khalafov said that there are some 'realistic' politicians in the Iranian government, concerned about Iran's future, who are working to solve Iran's problems on the international scene, but there are also many who don't "recognize the realities," and are seeking to stir up problems. There are disagreements between President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei, as reflected in their respective public statements, and the advisors surrounding Khamenei, like National Security Council Sec. Ali Larijani, are less radical than those close to Ahmadinejad. This difference between the two indicates the possibility of a diplomatic solution. Khalafov added that the US would be well served in paying attention to Iran's domestic situation, in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics between the major power centers, such as Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. BAKU 00000238 004.3 OF 004 ¶13. (C) When the Ambassador asked what the USG could do to encourage any nascent Iranian trends toward moderation, Khalafov said that international solidarity was of paramount importance. It is especially important Russia and China fully join the international consensus on Iran's nuclear program. Given the failure of the EU to positively influence Iran, Iran seeing Russia and/or China more aligned with the international community on Iran could have a substantial effect on Iran evaluating its position. ¶14. (C) COMMENT: It seemed clear after the fact that Khalafov summoned the Ambassador not to talk about the Energy MOU, but rather to offer increased coordination and consultation on Caspian strategic issues, primarily Turkmenistan and Iran. Given his primacy in the MFA on these issues and his status as one of President Aliyev's "Kiev colleagues," we believe intensified dialogue on strategic issues in the Caspian as proposed by Khalafov will be of value in advancing US regional objectives, especially vis a vis Turkmenistan and Iran. END COMMENT DERSE