AZERBAIJAN'S EVOLVING APPROCAH TO RELATIONS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000219 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ RU SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S EVOLVING APPROCAH TO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA REF: BAKU 00154 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Since November 2006, the GOAJ has veered from its traditional practice of not publicly acknowledging tensions in its relations with Russia. President Aliyev and other GOAJ officials have publicly criticized Russia's behavior in gas negotiations and taken swipes at the viability of the CIS. Several other recent incidents -- including Azerbaijan's point-blank refusal to succumb to Russian pressure to buy Russian gas this winter, the arrest and sentencing of a Ministry of Defense employee for spying for Russia, a Russian law clamping down on foreigners involved in Russian retail markets, and an Azerbaijani decision to stop Russian TV broadcast in July -- have seriously increased bilateral tensions from the Azerbaijani point of view. Local analysts agree that Russian influence in Azerbaijan is decreasing, especially as Moscow has few positive policy incentives to offer Baku (but several negative ones). Despite the recent, public wrinkles in the bilateral relationship, Azerbaijani-Russian relations are unlikely to deteriorate significantly because of the good personal relationship between Presidents Aliyev and Putin, Azerbaijani elites' general comfort in dealing with Russia, strong Azerbaijani-Russian economic ties, and the GOAJ's inclination to look to Russia when Azerbaijan comes under Western criticism for its democratic commitments. End Summary. Baku Publicly Signaling Displeasure with Moscow -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOAJ in the past several months has veered away from its traditional practice of publicly avoiding tensions in its relationship with Russia. Several examples demonstrate Baku's recent willingness to acknowledge bilateral frictions. Commenting on Russian-Azerbaijani negotiations on gas prices, President Aliyev said in a December interview on Russian Ekho Moskvy radio that Azerbaijan would not give into "commercial blackmail." Commenting on Russian negotiating behavior, Presidential Administration aide Ali Hasanov on January 15 said Russia "did not act as a gentleman." Finally, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov's January 19 Wall Street Journal editorial -- titled "Protect Us From Bullies" -- was another clear shot at Moscow for its heavy-handed negotiating tactics on regional gas supplies. ¶3. (C) President Aliyev also complained privately to the US delegation to the Economic Partnership Commission on February 6 about Russia's negotiating behavior. Putin, Aliyev said, had been telling Azerbaijan's partners that the Shah Deniz shutdown proved that Azerbaijan had been bluffing and does not have the gas reserves it claims. "We need to figure out what to do with Russia," Aliyev said. Aliyev commented that Azerbaijan's decision to reject Russian gas was a "serious move, the most important sign of our independence" since ¶1991. "We were the only ones not to surrender," Aliyev noted with pride. "We would rather freeze than surrender to blackmail." ¶4. (C) GOAJ officials have also issued tough statements about the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the same Ekho Moskvy interview, President Aliyev said the CIS is "a useless organization, which does not give anything to Azerbaijan from a practical point of view." Similarly, Presidential aide Elnur Aslanov on January 23 was quoted in Interfax as stating that "the CIS mechanism is not working. This makes one wonder what will happen next and whether it should exist at all." ¶5. (C) In addition to these public statements, several other recent incidents have exposed frictions in the bilateral relationship: --In January, an Azerbaijani court sentenced a Defense Ministry employee to twelve years in prison for spying for Russia. Local political commentators Rasim Musabayov and Ilgar Mammadov told us that it was unusual for Baku to BAKU 00000219 002 OF 004 provide public information about this case, although there had been several cases of arrested spies during the 1990s. --In early January, local press carried several stories that the GOAJ may increase prices for the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in northern Azerbaijan, a facility that is strategically important for Russia. A spokesperson from the presidential administration eventually went on record as saying that the GOAJ would not increase the terms of the lease, but this was not before pro-government Parliamentary MP Zahid Oruc warned that the terms of the lease would be reviewed in the spring. Oruc stated that although the reasons for reviewing the lease were purely economic, "Russia's energy policy makes it necessary to reconsider the agreement." Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov subsequently confirmed that the GOAJ would not take action to raise the lease on the Gabala station now but would consider the lease "in a year or so." (reftel) --The Russian government issued a decree on November 15 mandating that foreigners be removed from various retail sectors. The law presents a particular challenge for Azerbaijan, as many Azerbaijanis live and work in Russia, where they sell fruits and vegetables at local markets. Local press and radio reported in late January that approximately 2,500 Azerbaijani citizens have been expelled from Russia, although the GOAJ says this figure is exaggerated. Unlike some of the other bilateral tensions, however, the GOAJ has avoided inflaming public debate regarding this decree. The GOAJ has established a commission that seeks to address the concerns of Azerbaijani citizens in Russia, according to Shakir Yashar Salimov, a senior official at the State Committee on Azerbaijanis Living Abroad. (Note: On 12 February, Azerbaijani television reported that Russia withdrew the decree because prices on retail goods in Russian markets were increasing. While the specific status of the decree and its implementation remain unclear, the GOAJ is likely to interpret this latest Russian decision as another indicator that Russia's influence in Azerbaijan is declining.) --The Azerbaijani National TV and Radio Council in late December anounced that it would stop broadcasting Russian an Turkish television stations because this practice is not compliant with local legislation. The Azerbaijani body stated that it will halt transmission of Russia's ORT and Russia TV stations on July 1, 2007, although this may be a prelude to bilateral negotiations aimed at extracting a monetary and/or political price from Russia. Russian Leverage Receding . . . -------------- ¶6. (C) Local analysts tell us that Russian influence within Azerbaijan is gradually decreasing. Commentators agree that this is a long-term historical process that began with Azerbaijan's independence, and this trend can be seen in the ever-increasing use of the Azerbaijani langauge in all sectors. While the GOAJ has made tactical shifts, most analysts agree that Azerbaijan is gradually and carefully distancing itself from Russia, especially as Russian levers with Azerbaijan are diminishing. ¶7. (C) Musabayov said that "Russia has little to offer Azerbaijan"; he specified that Moscow lacks carrots to offer Baku. Musabayov noted that Moscow consistently has failed to deliver the key positive carrot that Moscow can offer Azerbaijan -- progress towards a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh by pressuring Yerevan to make concessions toward Baku. Western-educated academic Leyla Aliyeva agreed with the view that Moscow increasingly lacks leverage in its relations with Azerbaijan. Analysts also agree that Moscow still maintains negative levers, although even this influence is declining. Commentators typically cite the Azerbaijani minority in Russia, Moscow's warm relations with Yerevan, and Moscow's ability to work with Iran to squeeze Azerbaijan as key sticks that Russia maintains in relations with Azerbaijan. ¶8. (C) In light of diminishing Russian leverage, most Azerbaijani officials and commentators agree that Russia is BAKU 00000219 003 OF 004 seeking to develop a softer, more pragmatic policy to charm -- rather than alienate -- the GOAJ and the broader Azerbaijani public. A variety of respected local commentators -- including academics Leyla Aliyeva and Arif Yunusov and analysts Rasim Musabayov, Dadash Alishov, and Ilgar Mammadov -- have argued that Moscow's evolving approach toward Baku is "pragmatic" and "smart." According to these analysts, Moscow increasingly understands that it would be counterproductive to push Azerbaijan too hard and rely primarily on sticks to shape Baku's policies. Local analysts say that Moscow is especially nervous that a heavy hand could push Baku closer to NATO. We have also heard that Russia in the past years has allocated approximately 17-20 million US dollars for "democracy promotion" efforts in the Caucasus region. One local contact claimed that Russian operatives offered to pay a local political figure to establish a new political party, which would likely be in Russia's pocket. While difficult to confirm, these type of activities likely represent one Russian tactic for currying positive influence within Azerbaijani society. . . . but Bilateral Relationship Unlikely to Become Rocky -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite Baku's recent public statements and the broader trend of declining Russian influence in Azerbaijan, the consensus view is that the bilateral relationship is unlikely to degenerate significantly. Several dynamics suggest that Baku and Moscow will keep the bilateral relationship from sinking too deeply. ¶10. (C) One reason is the warm personal relationship between Aliyev and Putin. Musabayov observed that personal relations between Aliyev and Putin are close, while interstate relations have worsened in the past several years. Musabayov contrasted this with the poor personal relations between former Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Boris Yeltsin. Leyla Aliyeva characterized Aliyev's personal style with Putin as "eastern" and "oriental" because Aliyev goes out of his way to show Putin respect. ¶11. (C) Another reason the bilateral relationship is likely to remain warm is that many Azerbaijani elites feel at ease with Russia. Multiple contacts have told us that from a linguistic, educational, business and economic, bureaucratic and cultural perspective, many Azerbaijani elites often are most comfortable dealing with Russia. Local NGO activist and lawyer Dadash Alishov argued that elite-level economic interests are a key reason the bilateral relationship remains warm. Alishov explained that many wealthy Azerbaijani elites are inclined to favor ties with Russia because their business interests often are closely linked to Russia. Many Azerbaijani elites also received their education and developed a social network while studying in Russia, according to Alishov. While Azerbaijani elites are not a monolithic unit -- their personal economic interests are often competing -- they do appear to favor a pro-Russian perspective. President Aliyev is an example of this trend, according to local journalist Rauf Mirgadirov. Mirgadirov told us Aliyev personally feels most comfortable working with Russia because of his business interests, personal and language links, and because he lived in Russia. (Comment: While Aliyev is at ease dealing with Western interlocutors and speaks English and French, he lived in Moscow for 17 years before returning to Azerbaijan in 1992. He also graduated from Moscow State Institute for International Relations in 1982. One of Aliyev's daughters, Leyla Aliyeva, is married to the son of a prominent ethnic Azeri Russian businessman.) ¶12. (C) A third aspect is that elements within the GOAJ are disposed to look toward Russia for assistance in the face of western criticism with respect to political and economic reform. Local commentators have emphasized that some GOAJ officials seek to maintain warm relations with Moscow as a type of "insurance policy" against potential incidents where Azerbaijani behavior draws western criticism (eg. clamping down on independent media, targeting opposition parties, or violating human rights). Aliyeva noted that Aliyev and Putin share similar domestic policies, which she referred to as the BAKU 00000219 004 OF 004 "institutional building of authoritarian regimes." Yunusov and other commentators have cited Russia's role in the October 2005 Parliamentary elections as an example of this dynamic. While most Western observers cited problems with the elections, Vladmir Rushailo, who led the CIS election observation mission, quickly praised the performance of the election. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Azerbaijan's public challenge of Russia on the above-noted issues represents a sea change in its normally affable and respectful public approach to Moscow. As President Aliyev recounted in 2005 to several senior USG officials, in previous disputes with Russia he had made a point of assuring Russia that he understands its concerns, while privately disregarding Russia's particular request. At the same time, he seemed to take pride in what he clearly believed to be an effective method of dealing with Russia. Now, the GOAJ is making a point of speaking out and publicly chastening Russia, whereas Aliyev just a few months ago had criticized Georgia's approach toward Russia as unnecessarily provocative. The Azerbaijanis, who are well-skilled at managing relations in a difficult neighborhood, are clearly using these public slights at Russia to maximize their tactical advantage. Furthermore, given the close personal ties between the two leaders, and the many cultural and economic affinities between the two countries, we expect that Azerbaijan's new public willingness to criticize Russia will continue to be tempered. Nonetheless, we are witnessing a shift. DERSE