AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER ABIYEV PROVIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001511 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS RU AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER ABIYEV PROVIDES READOUT ON CIS AND RUSSIAN MEETINGS, GABALA DISCUSSIONS REF: A. BAKU 01431 ¶B. BAKU 01467 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Defense Minister Safar Abiyev on November 12 told the Ambassador that he stood up for Georgia during a recent CIS Defense Ministers meeting, which was considering the leadership of the CIS peacekeeping unit in Abkhazia. Abiyev said during Russian Defense Minister Serdykov's visit to Azerbaijan, Serdykov broached the possibility of extending the Russian lease of the Gabala radar station and Serdykov was not optimistic about the prospects for joint U.S.-Russian access to the facility. Abiyev claimed that Russia withheld information about Gabala's technical capabilities during the September U.S.-Russian visit to Gabala. In response to the Ambassador's request for an update on the GOAJ's position on providing additional troops for Iraq and Afghanistan, Abiyev said the Ambassador needed "to catch Foreign Minister Mammadyarov by the throat" to get an answer because "I do not take this decision." End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by the defense attache and naval attache, met with Defense Minister Safar Abiyev on December 13. I Defended Georgia! -------------- ¶3. (C) Abiyev, who typically begins meetings with a harangue about Azerbaijan's readiness to retake Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) and the occupied territories, opened by saying he wanted the Ambassador to know that he sought to defend Georgia at the November 27 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers in Astana. Specifically, Abiyev said he tried to back Georgia's attempt to have Major General Sergei Chaban removed from his position as the head of CIS peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia. When Russia proposed renewing his mandate, Abiyev said he objected, noting that this could not be done in Georgia's absence. Chaban was temporarily reinstated, but Abiyev suggested that a replacement to Chaban will be appointed in January as a result of his intervention. Abiyev also suggested that Azerbaijan would not follow Russia's lead on the CFE treaty by withdrawing from the treaty (a position the President and MFA have confirmed). Recent Russian Visits -------------- ¶4. (C) Abiyev downplayed the importance of Russian Defense Minister Serdykov's November 27-28 visit to Baku (ref A). In addition to meeting with Prime Minister Rasizade, Serdykov traveled to Gabala radar station with Abiyev (insisting on driving when weather prevented helicopter travel) and they had a separate one-on-one meeting at the Defense Ministry. Abiyev suggested Serdykov did not have good information on key issues such as Gabala and Russian military support to Armenia, and he may not be a key player in the Russian government. ¶5. (C) Abiyev proudly observed that he told Serdykov that Gabala was Azerbaijan's property. Serdykov, according to Abiyev, asked about the possibility of extending the Russian lease at Gabala when it expires in 2012; Serdykov also stated that "only one part" of the new Armavir radar will be finished be late 2008/early 2009. Abiyev noted that former Russian Defense Minister Ivanov had previously claimed Armavir was finished. Abiyev said a possible GOAJ decision on extending the Russian lease could not be made until 2012. (This contrasts with Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov's assessment that Russia will probably leave the facility in 2012, ref B.) Abiyev said Russia intentionally did not provide the U.S. with all available technical information on the Gabala radar's capabilities during the September 18 U.S.-Russian visit to Gabala. Abiyev stated that he raised this point with Serdykov, while observing that Serdykov only has limited control over this issue within the Russian government. When Abiyev asked Serdykov about potential joint U.S.-Russian use of Gabala, Serdykov reportedly said the facility probably would not be used jointly. Abiyev offered his personal opinion that he never thought Russia genuinely was interested in joint access to Gabala. ¶6. (C) Abiyev said he raised his concerns with Serdykov about Russian military support to Armenia, some of which is transferred to NK and the occupied territories, but Serdykov "did not understand too much" about Russia's support to Armenia. ¶7. (C) While providing a readout of the December 11 visit of Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Russian MFA's Department of Security and Disarmament, Abiyev suggested to the Ambassador that the GOAJ would not follow the Russian precedent of withdrawing from the CFE treaty. Antonov reportedly said to Abiyev that both Russia and Moscow had congruent CFE positions, but Abiyev claimed that he clarified the issue, saying that the GOAJ has not taken the step of withdrawing from the treaty. Abiyev said he told Antonov that Azerbaijan has declared a force majeure position because of Russian armaments going to NK through Armenia, to which Antonov reportedly was silent. ¶8. (C) Abiyev said Antonov was not empowered to address Gabala-related issues. For example, Abiyev said Antonov appeared to have bad information on the location of U.S. x-ray radars and could not give a frank answer whether Russia would support joint U.S.-Russian access to Gabala. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador outlined for Abiyev U.S. efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense and CFE, sharing several nonpapers, and discussed the recent Iran NIE, noting the need for continued international pressure on Iran and our ongoing concern about Iran's enrichment efforts. Abiyev questioned whether international pressure had genuinely caused Iran to back down, then commented that if the U.S. can exercise such pressure over Iran, it should do the same with Armenia. The Ambassador reinforced the need to solve the NK conflict peacefully, that a return to violence would have enormous costs and would not resolve the conflict, and that bellicose statements are not helpful. NATO -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked Abiyev for his perspectives on the GOAJ's approach toward NATO. She broached the idea of a lunch with other NATO Ambassadors; Abiyev welcomed the suggestion, saying he would like to host the event. Abiyev pledged to share his thoughts on Azerbaijan's NATO policy in this forum. Abiyev expressed interest in more frequent meetings with the Ambassador. ¶11. (C) While discussing EUR A/S Fried's recent speech on a strategic partnership between the U.S., Azerbaijan, and Turkey, Abiyev said he would welcome Turkish participation in U.S.-Azerbaiijani military exercises being considered by the MOD for 2009. Troop Contributions -------------- ¶12. (C) In response to the Ambassador's request for an update on the GOAJ's position on troop contributions for Iraq and Afghanistan, Abiyev said the Ambassador needed "to catch Mammadyarov by the throat," as he, not Abiyev, would make the decision. (NOTE: See septel report on a subsequent meeting with the President.) The Ambassador will follow up with Foreign Minister Mammadyarov. ¶13. (C) Abiyev presented several tidbits of peculiar extraneous information as well. These included report of a "secret" Russian base in Nizhni Asher that can "cause" earthquakes (as it had the 1988 Armenia earthquake),his ministry's interception of radio messages from a Russian ship that sunk near Astrakhan, and that Russia had moved some 30-50 ships based in the Caspian near Iran, without clarifying what their mission was or why Russia took this step. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Since his participation and speech at the Embassy's first celebration of U.S. armed forces day on May 12, at which he outlined publicly to the discomfort of official Russian attendees the range of U.S.-Azerbaijan security cooperation, Abiyev has been more open to engaging with the Embassy with some welcome trickle down effects on our security cooperation programs. DERSE