AZERBAIJANI SPY SHOW ANGERS IRANIANS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001495

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI SPY SHOW ANGERS IRANIANS

REF: A. TD-314/80799-07

B. TD-314/79815-07

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Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Iran reacted angrily to a December 14 Baku
Public Service Television 'special program'
in which several Azerbaijani nationals confessed to spying
for Iran and having connections with the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Characterizing the
allegations as "anti-Iranian propaganda" and attributing them
to "foreign hands," Iran summoned Azerbaijan's ambassador to
refute the allegations and call for a formal apology. While
it is still nclear why the Azerbaijani Ministry of National
Scurity (MNS) made public the details surrounding tis case,
Azerbaijani political analysts and the media, as well as the
Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ),believe that this group
posed a serious threat to Azerbaijan's sovereignty. End
Summary.

Details Surrounding the Mahdi Army Group
--------------


2. (C) On December 14, an Azerbaijani television broadcast
provided details about a group of fifteen Azerbaijani
nationals calling themselves the "Mahdi Army Group," under
the leadership of Said Dadashbeyli, convicted on December 10
by the Azerbaijani Serious Crimes Court of plotting to
overthrow the government and establishing Shari'ah law with
the support of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (ref
a). The broadcast also alleged that the group had sought
information about U.S., Israeli, and other foreign diplomatic
interests in Azerbaijan, as well as details about the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.


3. (C) According to the broadcast, the Azerbaijani nationals
confessed to spying for Iran and having connections with the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). MAG members
reportedly visited Iran in 2005 and 2006, some undergoing
training while there. MAG members allegedly collected over
"150 pieces of information," something they were paid over
USD 10,300 for by the IRGC. To support these claims,
excerpts of the suspects' questioning and other undercover
images were shown on the broadcast.

Iranian and Azerbaijani Reaction
--------------


4. (C) Iran reacted angrily to the broadcast, characterizing
the allegations as "anti-Iranian propaganda" and attributing
them to "foreign hands." Consistent with prior flare-ups in
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, Iranian Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Ali Hosseini said "the political will of the
leadership of Iran and Azerbaijan is aimed at preserving and
boosting bilateral relations, and we should not permit others
to damage these relations." Hosseini called on the Baku
government to either prove the allegations or to apologize
for them. Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tehran was summoned to
the foreign ministry on December 16 so that Iran could refute
the allegations and demand a formal apology. The story has
figured prominently in the Iranian media, including
Azeri-language Seher Television programming.


5. (C) Well-regarded political commentator Rasim Musabayov
told us that he believes the publicly-available information
on the MAG, namely that the GOAJ thwarted a group of
terrorist operatives backed by Iran. Musabayov commented
that in general, the GOAJ seeks to deal with these cases
quietly, so as not to enter into a public war of words with
Tehran. At the same time, the GOAJ takes the threat of
Iranian-backed terrorism seriously and, accordingly, the
defendants were sentenced to send a clear message to Tehran
and the world that the GOAJ will not tolerate these types of
threats to its national sovereignty. While the Azerbaijani
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet to comment on the story,
commentary in many Azerbaijani newspapers - both government
and opposition - has tracked closely with Musabayov's
statement.


6. (C) In a December 17 discussion, MFA spokesman Khazar
Ibrahim led Embassy A/DCM to understand that the MFA was
surprised by the December 14 airing of the broadcast on the
Iranian spy confessions, which he admitted was a MNS
initiative. Asked whether the broadcast would damage
bilateral relations with Iran, Ibrahim said that "the MNS
does what it has to do to preserve the nation's security" and

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"there are always problems" in the relationship with Iran.
He added that the MFA had no public comments on the show, but
would let the Embassy know if that changed.

Comment
--------------


7. (S/NF) Normally the GOAJ seeks to avoid confrontation
with its southern neighbor Iran whenever possible, preferring
to handle matters quietly. The recent closure of all Imam
Khomeini Foundation activities in Azerbaijan indicates this
preference, the GOAJ having shut down this organization in a
quiet, non-public manner so as not to provoke a fight with
the Iranians (ref b). That said, when the GOAJ evaluates a
threat to be serious - as it did when its airspace was
violated by Iranian helicopters in the summer of 2007 - it
responds in a more public, yet still graduated manner.
Having assessed the MAG threat as a real and present danger,
the GOAJ through the MNS chose to take on the Iranians in a
direct, more public manner. However, the television show's
focus on the conspirators' IRGC, vice Islamic Republic of
Iran, connection also can be seen as providing a face-saving
distinction to the Iranian government and thus minimize any
lasting damage to the bilateral relationship.


8. (S/NF) The GOAJ focus on an alleged IRGC connection could
have been motivated by an interest to demonstrate solidarity,
if not curry favor, with the U.S. Revealing this incident
publicly may have also served to highlight for Western
audiences that Azerbaijan is under threat from religious
extremism, including state-sponsored efforts by Iran, a point
the GOAJ consistently emphasizes in our bilateral meetings.
The revelation of a threat to diplomatic missions is new, and
in GRPO's view may be an embellishment. MNS had previously
shared nearly all details of this case from January to March
with GRPO, information GRPO deemed to be credible (ref a and
others).


9. (S/NF) It remains to be seen whether this GOAJ signal of
its displeasure with an attempt to meddle in its internal
affairs will cause lasting damage to its bilateral ties with
Iran. Consistent with previous flare-ups in
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, Iran will most likely continue
to deny any involvement publicly while seeking to create the
impression that an outside actor was ultimately behind these
"anti-Iranian propaganda" efforts.
DERSE